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Russia's Influence in CIS on Second Anniversary Assessed

944Q0115A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Dec 93 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Portnikov: "Commonwealth or Union of Enemies? Russian Influence Therein Has by the Second Anniversary of the CIS Strengthened"]

[Text] There are not that many international formations, perhaps, whose founders have from the outset had entirely different notions as to their purpose and prospects. But this is how the CIS has taken shape: Signing the documents on its formation, the leaders of Russia emphasized primarily the desire to preserve the post-Union space in some unity; the leaders of Ukraine aspired to the creation of an effective instrument for the divorce of the former Soviet republics and the dispatch of the hateful Union to the garbage heap of history. The other participants shared either the Russian or Ukrainian approach, which became a pretext for a constant "tug of war" at each summit meeting.

A "formation of equals" has hardly resulted from the CIS—its participants have been all too dependent, particularly as of late, on Russian supplies of oil, gas, and foreign currency. Nor has a "formation of friends" resulted: Its members are fighting themselves and complaining about one another to international organizations and the leaders of other countries. But despite the examples of manifest estrangement and misunderstanding—supporting Ukraine's policy of the creation of an "instrument of divorce," seemingly—the Russian view of the purpose of the CIS has prevailed, for all that. The post-Union space has been preserved, and the Russian Federation has succeeded in retaining therein the role of leading power capable not only of persuading the others but also of dictating, if necessary, its will. In addition, the past year has made it possible to expand the borders of the CIS to the borders of the Soviet Union (not counting the Baltic countries, which were never part of the USSR *de jure*) and to enlist in the Commonwealth hesitant Azerbaijan and Georgia, which was initially implacably opposed to participation therein. Of course, the level of Russian influence in this former Soviet republic or the other varies—and the denial to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan of the exchange of ruble cash balances while extending the ruble area to Tajikistan is

indicative here. But this was a winning year for the Russian leadership in the strengthening of this influence. Russia won the undeclared economic war (or competition) among the former Soviet republics. It would have won even had it not aspired to success (yet such success was clearly desirable for Moscow). It is simply that, as distinct from all the other former Soviet republics, Russia ventured upon radical economic reforms, whereas the other former Soviet republics (and the Ukrainian example is the most impressive here) remained in the economic past, little by little becoming states without an economy. The past year was for the Commonwealth a time when the inertia of economic development began imperiously to dictate its laws. And particular mention should be made of Ukraine here, because its leaders played an honest game right from the start, not agreeing to remain in the ruble area and thus graphically demonstrating to the rest what might happen to an economy unless cardinal changes in a country's economic structure are counterposed to outside pressure. It merely remained for Russia now to dictate to the other republics the conditions of the game that Ukraine had chosen for itself. This happened at the time of the surprise revision of the agreement on the new-type ruble area. And now not political but economic regularities are capable of influencing the outcome of any negotiations, be they about nuclear weapons, the fleet, or the situation concerning the Russian-speaking population in this region or the other of the former Union.

The members of the Commonwealth today hardly have any choice other than economic integration with Russia, with political concessions that are insulting for them. And lagging behind, what is more, would have the effect of this integration hardly being all that beneficial for Russia's partners and would convert their economies merely into "younger sisters." But recognition of the absence of choice does not make the CIS an organization akin to the Warsaw Pact or CEMA, with their predictable unanimity: On the contrary, resistance to Russian influence will grow in direct proportion to the actual increase in this influence. Unless Russia manages to convince the other former Soviet republics that there is a logical boundary in its intentions and that its pressure will not go beyond mutually acceptable limits, the next year could easily be a time of the conclusive conversion of the Commonwealth into an association of integrated enemies.

Strategy for Foreign Policy Precepts Toward Ukraine Proposed

944Q0103A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian No 83,
25 Nov 93 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Razuvayev: "Russia and Ukraine: Strategy for Today"]

[Text] Something is going wrong in Russian-Ukrainian relations. In just two years of post-Soviet history Moscow and Kiev have by mutual efforts brought matters to a point where the customary words about traditional Russian-Ukrainian friendship are beginning at times to seem simply inappropriate against the background of mutual complaints, accusations, and the growing wave of nationalist propaganda. It is incredible, but in both countries irresponsible people have already articulated words about the possibility of nuclear attacks, seaborne assault landings, ethnic purges, and territorial redivisions. By all accounts, this is not yet the limit of the extreme manifestations of "Slav solidarity."

The main blame for the current situation lies with Moscow. Following the division of the USSR, the present Russian regime inherited not only the main reserves of oil and gas but also the bulk of the intellectual potential of the former land of soviets. Under these conditions what is surprising is not that Kiev's policy in respect to Moscow has been a complete failure. What is surprising is that the present Russian policy in respect to Ukraine has proven, frankly, unsuccessful, if not a failure.

In these two years Moscow has failed to achieve one in any way significant political goal in its relations with Kiev. The chain of most serious mistakes of Russian diplomacy, starting with the Kremlin's condescending reaction to Ukraine's "postscripts" to the Belovezha decisions in December 1991, is explained mainly by such characteristic features of the ruling elite of the Russian Federation as lack of geopolitical thinking and a provincial narrowness in strategic foreign policy decisions and also an incapacity for recognizing itself as a single social group, which is having a most negative impact on the foreign policy course.

Russian policy in respect to Ukraine has in the past two years been characterized by constant fluctuation, the "replaying" of moves already made, and the absence of any in any way serious coordination between different departments and—in parallel—between Moscow and the regions adjacent to Ukraine. From which it is not to hard assume serious defects both in the system of the adoption of decisions and in the process of their implementation.

Under these conditions Russian-Ukrainian relations have necessarily developed in spontaneous fashion, in the main. The absence of a crystallized national identity and the authoritarian nature of the regimes in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation have brought about a situation where relations between the two countries have

been replaced essentially by relations between new ruling elites only partially reflecting in their policy the social mood of the countries they represent. This could make the present balance of forces between the Russian Federation and Ukraine unstable, and the current trends potentially reversible and relative.

Practically any consistent policy of the Russian Federation in respect to Ukraine would be better than the present state of uncertainty and accumulation of unresolved problems. The critical mass of the latter could ultimately go beyond what is permissible and lead to the start no longer of an artificial but a genuine crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations, a crisis in which the parties to the conflict are not political elites, as now, but the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. For Russia this would signify not only an undesirable change in the international surroundings but also an exacerbation of the domestic political situation surrounding the Ukrainian community in Russia. The consequences of this prospect are easy to predict.

A realistic concept of Russian policy in respect to Ukraine should be built primarily on a recognition of existing realities. The latter include, in our view, a strengthening of the power of the groups of persons closely connected with President Yeltsin; the extremely problematical nature, by virtue of this and a number of other circumstances, of the reunification of Ukraine and Russia; the absence of the likelihood of any in any way altruistic approaches of the Russian ruling elite to relations with neighboring countries; and the strengthening of the quasi-imperial trend brought about both by the objective state of the post-Soviet geopolitical space and the subjective intentions of the Russian political elite, which has failed in its impulsive aspiration to integrate as quickly as possible in the Western democracies and has been forced to begin to refocus its attention on the post-Soviet geopolitical space.

Relations between the two states in the coming period will be influenced by the subjective aspiration of the Russian (and Ukrainian) elite to transfer Russian-Ukrainian relations as soon as possible to the interstate category, in this way crystallizing the formal rupture of 1991. In this case it is natural to expect that both will try to belittle the significance of the common historical past and the cultural mutual attraction of the peoples of the two countries.

But an attempt to follow this course would prove a failure for Moscow. Relations between Russia and Ukraine in the transitional period cannot be built on a typically interstate basis. For this reason a rational Russian strategy should proceed from the internal situation in Ukraine, in the main. And—by virtue of the singularities of the structure of power in Russia—be oriented primarily toward the Ukrainian ruling elite, which, endeavoring to preserve the country's independence, is providing the vast majority of its representatives with status and other benefits to which, on account of their provincial position and, frequently, insufficient

qualifications, they could not have laid claim in the Union. This fact is a natural arresting device for the possible aims of Russian policy in Ukraine.

On all other urgent matters the Ukrainian elite is split. And this split is quite typical of the post-Soviet model, what is more. The group of persons in power associates itself not so much with the whole country as with a particular region or regions. In Ukraine these "ruling regions" are Kiev and Galicia, whose representatives displayed the greatest political assertiveness in the period, critical for the republic, prior to the disintegration of the USSR. They came to power beneath the banners of political romanticism and the myth of a future "golden age," which would allegedly inevitably follow Ukraine's secession from the USSR. Following the division of the Union, this line was only slightly transformed in propaganda into dreams of Ukraine's revival in the wake of the conclusive elimination of the "empire," that is, Ukraine's decisive break with the Russian Federation.

Recently the rapidly developing financial and economic crisis has led to an exacerbation of relations within the Kiev-Galician alliance. The nationalist forces of Galicia which in 1991 supported President Kravchuk in his actions pertaining to division of the Union are disenchanted with his moderate policy. In turn, the Kiev bureaucracy is unhappy with the pressure of the politicians representing the western oblasts of Ukraine.

The main task of Russian foreign policy for the immediate future should necessarily, therefore, include the creation of indirect conditions for a qualitative change in the composition of the ruling elite in Ukraine in favor of persons oriented toward cooperation, not conflict, with the Russian Federation. This task would seem all the more urgent in that the immediate future could prove central in the laying of the foundations of a national Ukrainian identity. In this connection the propaganda of Ukrainians' ethnic exclusiveness being conducted in Ukraine could in the future turn this country into a neighbor of whom we will need to beware. The contours of an "extreme" version of Ukrainian policy in relation to Russia were outlined by the local nationalists even prior to independence or in its first months. An assault landing by the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet against Kuban. The transfer to Ukraine of Voronezh, Kursk, Belgorod, and certain other oblasts, including part of the Far East. The justification for the claims is based on assertions that parts of the Ukrainian nation have since time immemorial resided or were the first settlers on the enumerated territories.

The nationalist articulations do not enjoy the support of a majority of the population of Ukraine at the present time. But if Kiev's present propaganda line continues, changes in the public mood under the conditions of an intensifying socioeconomic crisis and the continuing impoverishment of the population are highly likely. Is there if only a hypothetical likelihood that the composition of the ruling elite could change drastically as a result

of the parliamentary elections, which are planned for 1994? From our viewpoint, even a complete change in the composition of the Supreme Council of Ukraine would not bring about a radical change in the apportionment of forces which has taken shape in the highest echelons of power. The competent authority of the Ukrainian parliament has been and will remain extraordinarily limited under the conditions of present-day authoritarian Ukraine. Members of parliament do not make policy in Ukraine. They only talk about it.

The split within Ukraine's ruling elite reflects the general political situation that has taken shape in this country. We would note that there are real political and economic contradictions between the interests of the regions in Ukraine. The Kiev-Galician domination in policy is based on the old system of the political control of the "center" and the redistribution of the products of labor in the economy. Under the conditions of the collapse of the economy the western oblasts, economically less developed and relatively small, but enjoying disproportionately great political influence, may survive only thanks to use of the state mechanism of redistribution of the products of labor. As a result relations between the east and south of the republic on the one hand and the western oblasts on the other have become exceedingly fraught. The east and south of Ukraine, which have decided possibilities in industry and agriculture, link the present calamitous situation primarily with Kiev-Galician diktat.

Economic chaos and the deterioration in the social situation have brought about a sharp increase in sentiments in favor of the land and territorial rearrangement of Ukraine. The obvious lead in this respect has been taken by the Republic of Crimea, which in terms of rights obtained from the center may be considered the leader not only in Ukraine but throughout the post-Soviet space also. There have been attempts in the Transcarpathian region to create a Sub-Carpathian Republic (Sub-Carpathian Rus) and a Hungarian Autonomous National District. The trend toward regionalization in Donetsk and a number of other oblasts of Ukraine is very strong. But the representatives of Kiev and Galicia in Ukraine's power structures are categorically opposed to an increase in the independence of the regions, which is creating additional political tension in the country.

A description of the regions of the country from the viewpoint of the population's religious affiliation says a great deal, for example. The Transcarpathians represent an unstable balance of the supporters of different churches. The Greco-Catholics dictate their will in Galicia. The south and the east are unequivocally oriented toward the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The center of the country, on the other hand, represents a mosaic of supporters of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Autocephalous and Protestant churches.

There is a very appreciable ethno-linguistic difference between Galicia and the main part of Ukraine. Among

the characteristics deserving of attention are not only the different degrees of knowledge of Russian but also the historically evolved linguistic differences between the Ukrainians of Galicia on the one hand and the eastern and southern oblasts on the other. In addition, it is in the east and the south where the bulk of Russians and Russian speakers, that is, persons acknowledging Russian as their native language, live. The largest number of Russian-Ukrainian mixed families live here.

Russia's attitude toward political processes in the neighboring country should take account of the fact that the anti-Russian propaganda of Kiev officialdom is contrary to the current views of a majority of Ukrainian society. Opinion polls steadily show that almost two-thirds of the citizens of Ukraine advocate military-political union with Russia, and approximately as many agree that the Russian Federation was the guarantor of peace and stability on the territory of the former USSR. Almost half those polled support the idea of a nuclear-free Ukraine after it has obtained the corresponding security guarantees.

Use could be made in principle in Russian policy in respect to Ukraine of the regional contrast that exists in Ukraine. Moscow could proceed here from the fact of the cultural proximity to Russia of the east and south of Ukraine, the historical gravitation of the inhabitants of these oblasts toward Russia, and the economic relations of this region's industrial enterprises with Russian enterprises. Account should be taken also of the fact that the bulk of Russians who are citizens of Ukraine live in the east and the south. Proceeding from this, Russia has an interest in a decentralization of political power in Ukraine, which would ease the pressure of Galicia on Kiev and, through it, on the eastern and southern oblasts of the country.

Russia should make efforts to ensure that the current connection between the industrial enterprises of the east and south of Ukraine and Russian industry be preserved and even strengthened. Under the conditions of the decline in production and reduced productivity, the functioning of the Russian economic system depends on cooperation with the Ukrainian enterprises to a certain extent. Obviously, Moscow should endeavor to ensure that the possible reforms and changes implemented in these regions be coordinated with Moscow. The other side of the question is the need to achieve a situation whereby Russian capital may participate when stock companies are being formed from the corresponding enterprises. Moscow should grant Russian capital taking part in the development of the economy of the south and east of Ukraine guarantees here, in accordance with the practice that is habitual for Western countries.

Assistance to the reorganization of the economy of the east and south of Ukraine should be combined with the restoration of the former level of Russian-Ukrainian economic integration, but with regard, of course, for the economic reform in Russia. The possible resistance of Galicia here should be perceived as the legitimate

expression of the population of the said oblasts and should be respected, but only in respect to Galicia itself.

A shift of emphasis in decisionmaking in Russian-Ukrainian economic relations from the central authorities level to oblast and regional level is essential. Moscow should simultaneously seek a strengthening of the traditional ties between the border oblasts of Russia and Ukraine.

The swifter transition to a military union between the two powers is possible in the interests of Russia. The accomplishment of this task would remove certain problems currently weighing down Russian-Ukrainian relations. Thus it would take the edge off the seriousness of the conflict between Moscow and Kiev surrounding nuclear weapons in Ukraine and the problem of the Black Sea Fleet.

This strategic course could ensure the restructuring and consolidation of the political forces friendly toward Russia, whose base is mainly in the east and south of the country. It would be natural to expect after this that the proportion of representatives of these oblasts within Kiev's ruling elite would grow to a certain extent, which would lead to a relative stabilization both of the domestic political situation in Ukraine and Russian-Ukrainian relations.

RF Envoy to Armenia on Effects of Blockade, Status of Ties

944Q0113A Moscow *OBSHCHAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 20, 3 Dec 93 p 7

[Interview with Vladimir Stupishin, Russian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Armenia, by Andrey Lipovskiy and Yelena Movchan; place and date not given: "Does the Armenian Audience Need the Russian Theater of Horrors?"]

[Text] Vladimir Petrovich Stupishin is Russia's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Armenia. He was appointed to this job a little over a year ago. Before that he served as consul general in Milan. Stupishin is a professional diplomat. He has worked at the USSR Embassies in Cambodia and Morocco, was head of the foreign policy group at the USSR Embassy in France, and worked in the USSR MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] apparatus.

[*OBSHCHAYA GAZETA*] By what principle does the MFA select people for embassy work in near abroad countries?

[Stupishin] Naturally, I do not know all the considerations of the MFA leadership on this subject, but one selection principle is obvious: People who are appointed to our embassies in these countries are career diplomats. I see a deep meaning in this, because relations with these countries must be based to a completely proper foundation rather than on the principle of the center and its emissaries.

[OBSHCCHAYA GAZETA] A year ago there were rumors of the creation of a special body that would supervise relations with near abroad countries. A sort of a committee of Commonwealth affairs. How do you feel about that?

[Stupishin] Emphatically negatively. The Russian Federation State Committee on Economic Cooperation With Member States of the Commonwealth is already taking care of economic relations with near abroad countries, and is truly doing a lot of work in this area. Creating a separate MFA for Commonwealth countries is discrimination. Our minister also was against this idea. Among those who actively supported it were some permanent representatives of former republics—by the way, some CIS countries still do not have embassies in Moscow.

[OBSHCCHAYA GAZETA] What is this—an attempt to demonstrate special relations with Russia?

[Stupishin] More likely, the desire to preserve the forms of work that were typical of republic Council of Ministers' representations under the USSR Council of Ministers, with all the attendant and very pleasant consequences for them.

[OBSHCCHAYA GAZETA] Our former republics have already passed through the first phase of attaining sovereignty and independence. The initial intoxication, the joy over flags, anthems, presidential aircraft, etc., has passed. In your opinion: From the psychoanalytical angle, does an Armenian feel more like a citizen of independent Armenia or does he still retain a certain rudimentary feeling that he continues to live in a country that has not yet completely disintegrated?

[Stupishin] Naturally, after such a long period of living together many perceive the separation painfully. Creative unions and intelligentsia are hurting. However, judging by survey results, only 9-10 percent of respondents support restoration of the Union; 30-40 percent, however, want Armenia to remain independent but maintain firm ties with Russia. An absolute majority are for orientation toward Russia. People still do not feel quite at ease in an independent state. There is, however, one BUT here. Armenia in this respect is not an example but rather an exception. The life of an Armenian in Armenia, the life of a Russian in Armenia (there are several tens of thousands of them there), the life of every person in Armenia—life and psychology—are being distorted by the blockade. What does life under a blockade mean? It means that there is no gas, and the small quantity of it that does get through to Armenia goes to facilities that absolutely cannot do without it. Even the presidential village does not have any gas. The overwhelming majority of the population in Yerevan can use electricity one and a half to two hours a day. There is no central heating. Last winter schools, institutes, and even some health-care facilities were closed, let alone theaters. The only bright spot was the Philharmonic Society, and even that only thanks to American Armenians who provided the money. So once a week on Sunday there

was a feast of classical music in the Philharmonic Society, in a heated room, with excellent musicians. And also the opera's mirrored hall, where people came practically free of charge and listened to young voices. This is all there is in cultural life. As for everyday living, people had to chop down trees to heat their homes, and when somebody reproached a person chopping a tree in a park—how could he do this, they would say, what about ecology, etc.—he would reply: I have a sick child at home who is freezing. Whole alleys have been cut down.

[OBSHCCHAYA GAZETA] Do people perhaps have a feeling that the blockade is the result of separation from the Union, of getting involved in the fight for Karabakh? And also—do they not think sometimes that it is somehow Russia's fault for not taking a stand at the time, not putting pressure on Azerbaijan?

[Stupishin] Not in any prominent form. If they do blame someone, it is themselves, and the government, of course. As to Karabakh, for an Armenian, Karabakh is a holy cause.

[OBSHCCHAYA GAZETA] You say that they berate the government. But Ter-Petrosyan still enjoys a lot of support.

[Stupishin] I do not see any other leader of that level, and neither does anybody else, I think. Ter-Petrosyan's rating is not very high right now, but you have to keep in mind that this is the rating of a president currently in office and in very special circumstances. And still, nobody else has a higher rating.

[OBSHCCHAYA GAZETA] What was the reaction to the monetary reform in the summer and the subsequent virtual disintegration of the ruble zone? Did Armenian citizens not feel that Russia's actions were not quite proper?

[Stupishin] There was such a feeling. Armenia has always been and remains oriented toward the CIS and is counting on the ruble zone. Armenians do not openly blame the Russian Government; however, the introduction of our own currency—the dram—was a forced action. The ruble zone is still possible, though.

[OBSHCCHAYA GAZETA] What are Russian interests in Armenia?

[Stupishin] We have been building a common culture with Armenians for decades, if not centuries. And this is our primary interest—cultural. And spiritual: We are returning to Christianity, and Armenia is one of the first Christian countries. The second is economic interest. Even now, under the blockade conditions, Armenia produces output that is very much needed in Russia. They also have raw materials—copper concentrate. Former scientific and economic ties still operate in some spheres—astronomers from Pulkovo still work in the observatory in Byurakan. And above it is a test site for radio telescopes and antennae standards, without which aircraft fly blind. Can it be that we do not need our

aircraft to fly and land without taking unnecessary risks? People who work in this institute—formerly an all-Union research institute—are praying to God that Russia will work with them, so that there would be no need to build everything from scratch and waste billions. There is also such a simple thing as the border, a CIS common border. And finally, political cooperation. We have always counted every vote in the United Nations; I think we still need these votes.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] How are Armenia's relations with other countries developing? Does Russia maintain its authority in Armenian foreign policy?

[Stupishin] There are now embassies of France, the United States, and China in Yerevan; there is a Greek ambassador, and charges d'affaires of Germany, Iran, and Egypt. The diplomatic corps is small, though. Armenia has mutual interests with many countries, especially neighboring ones. A bridge is currently being built over the Araks river, which will link Armenia with Iran. A bridge is needed; a gas pipeline is needed. Still, relations with Russia remain a priority.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] What does the Russian side do in order to maintain the presence of Russian culture in Armenia?

[Stupishin] Very little. Over the entire last winter not a single cultural delegation from Russia visited Armenia. The first to come with guest performances after the blockade nightmare of the winter was... a theater of horrors. This is a kind of paradox. Now things have livened up a little. An agreement between the Ministries of Education has been signed. There are plans to open a classic Russian gymnasium in Yerevan. We are behind the Americans and Germans—there are already American and German universities in Yerevan. Russia must help in setting up a Russian university. We also have to establish cultural exchanges. Right now we want to hold a festival of Russian classical music with the assistance of the Ministry of Culture. There is a wonderful Russian drama theater in Yerevan. Now that the cold weather has set in, the troupe cannot rehearse or perform. This is a good time to invite them here for guest performances, which will be to our mutual benefit: to put on a good performance for Russian theater-goers and give the actors an opportunity to work. In short, we need to help Armenia.

MFA Official on Refugee Issues, Status of Ethnic Russians in FSU

944Q0113B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Dec 93
First Edition p 3

[Interview with Vyacheslav Bakhmin, director of the international humanitarian cooperation department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yevgeniy Bay; place and date not given: "An Attempt To Rid Moscow of Former Compatriots Will Not Save the City From the Mafia"]

[Text]

[Bay] What is the department's position regarding the decision of the mayor of Moscow on the compulsory registration of all citizens of near abroad countries coming to the capital?

[Bakhmin] The mayoralty's decision opens incredible opportunities for corruption and bribe-taking. Many Muscovites apparently are reassured that the task of the new law, as its authors explain, is to reduce the incidence of crime. In my opinion, such measures can only stimulate organized crime. People who fall under the effect of this law are those who cannot pay, cannot find a place to stay overnight. The mafia will pay, will settle in quite legally, and will conduct its affairs.

While this decision was still at the discussion stage, no one from the mayoralty consulted our department, although it involves citizens of foreign states. The statute contains so many violations of current laws and international agreements that just enumerating them would take a whole page.

[Bay] The influx of illegal immigrants—not only from the near abroad but also from foreign countries, such as Kurds, for instance, who besiege the IZVESTIYA perimeter—is a serious problem, and many Muscovites support Luzhkov, who is trying to at least somehow clean up the capital.

[Bakhmin] Russia has signed the Geneva convention on refugees and cannot violate it. If a person has shown proof that he cannot return to his country, that his life is endangered there, he is automatically entitled to asylum as a refugee. Thus, people must be given the opportunity to stay in Russia, while at same time the authorities may talk to them about moving to another country.

If there is no proof of persecution, they may be put on a plane and returned to where they came from. What is needed is to first and foremost tighten visa control, make Aeroflot answer for each passenger it takes on board.

[Bay] Your department monitors the situation with respect to the Russian-speaking population in the near abroad. In your opinion, where is the situation most acute?

[Bakhmin] In a number of Central Asian states. Many of our compatriots have been put under totally unacceptable living conditions. It is a paradox, but there is a much more perceptible exodus of our compatriots from such "oases" of democracy in Asia as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan than, for instance, Tajikistan. The new regional elite squeezes out aliens. There are also more deep-seated reasons—incompatibility of cultures and mentalities.

[Bay] The Russian exodus from Asian republics seems to have become irreversible. Will the new regional leaders not regret it when they find out that there is nobody left, for instance, in Bishkek or Dushanbe, to fix the sewage?

[Bakhmin] There is one group of people in charge of the operation of the sewage system, and quite another who are busy getting rid of aliens. I hope that as the legislative base strengthens, the "childhood disease of nationalism" will subside.

[Bay] In the Baltics, though, it is precisely the legislative base that provides the foundation for discrimination against the nonindigenous population. The presence of

Russian troops is often quoted as the main reason standing in the way of compromise.

[Bakhmin] It is true that the initial basis for conflicts in Latvia and Estonia was the citizenship issue. In the opinion of foreign human rights activists, the presence of our troops does considerably hamper resolution of the problems of the Russian-speaking minority. Once the troops have been withdrawn, the pretext for various accusations addressed at Russia will disappear.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Kravchuk Policies Called 'Fiasco'

944K0409A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian 8 Dec 93
pp 1-2

[Article by Vladimir Kuleba, NEZAVISIMOST editor in chief: "The Total Fiasco of Kravchuk's Policies"]

[Text] The day of 1 December, the second anniversary of Ukrainian independence, passed as routinely as any other weekday, in the state of irritation and sorrow that has become customary in our current situation. Well, we really have no cause for festive celebrations. We voted for a democratic Ukraine at the referendum, but we got instead a communist preserve dyed a different color. The communist bosses of yesterday, who are grabbing at power with their teeth and hiding behind blue and yellow flags as they proclaim their adherence to the new-fashioned ideas, did not simply block the reforms but through their actions also contributed to the complete collapse of our economy, pushing our people to the extremes of poverty and misery, to the point of begging.

Corruption, oligarchy, exports of Ukrainian riches to other countries, bribery, and crime have grown, under their wise guidance, to an extent never before seen. The country has fallen into an abyss in record time, and a realistic threat has emerged to Ukrainian statehood. Those people whom the whim of destiny have put at the helm of power have obscenely used our independence and sovereignty for their own selfish purposes: now they can steal and take whatever they want without looking around or fearing anyone or anything. Erecting a solid wall between themselves and the rest, the bureaucratic caste, sensing their complete impunity, cynically urinated into the bonfire of people's hopes and enthusiasm which started with the acquisition of sovereignty. The concept of Ukrainian statehood has been shamelessly crucified and scorned. Right in front of our eyes they are building either a model of some "Chinese socialism," or a banana republic, or some orthodox and autocratic, half-naked and half-starved monster with the fire of a communist criminal in its eyes and a nuclear cudgel in its hand.

On the eve of 1 December our already deplorable situation was further exacerbated by a number of decisions passed by our authorities; an analysis of these decisions makes one seriously doubt that their authors have even elementary common sense. Our nomenclature reached a climax in its triumph when it passed the antidemocratic law on elections which, similar to its decision on the Treaty on Reduction of Strategic Arms, has alarmed observers the world over, from Brussels to Washington. The subjective and voluntarist attempt to "fix" the dollar rate has not added any optimism; neither has the utterly absurd order to stop broadcasting day- and night-time programs on television, which caused an uproar—the shadow of Ceausescu started to appear on the pages of foreign publications (the majority of our Ukrainian

mass media pretended as usual as though nothing had happened). It is the weak link in the chain that breaks. Our weak links seem to be everywhere. Just before the second anniversary of our independence, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a decision on still another price hike, which caused a wave of indignation in the country. Kiev, however, held a display of festive fireworks on that day.

So, when L. Kravchuk is posing in front of the state TV cameras as he holds an eloquent, full of pathos discourse on the image of Ukraine and puts to shame those who, in his opinion, hurt this image, he probably would be better off pondering his own role and his own policy which, it has become obvious by now, have suffered a total failure inside and outside Ukraine. Really, how could it be possible to bring a country which in reality is not all that poor to its present condition? How could we end up in this half-frozen state when we have our own oil, gas, and nuclear and electric power stations? What concrete measures has the president taken to establish business partnerships with Russia and other neighbors from the near and distant abroad? What is the fate of our hard currency loans? Do we have a basic concept for our domestic and foreign economic activity, and what is it? When will reforms finally begin in Ukraine? Unfortunately, there are no definite answers to these or any other questions.

It so happened that a third of L. Kravchuk's life (he will be 60 in January) was spent within the Communist Party mechanism, where he worked to provide ideological support for the decisions of the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party. This might be the reason (and an objective one) his pronouncements on patriotism, duty, and image are much better and more convincing than his answers to the essential questions posed by our reality. This might also be the cause of the mistakes and failures in his policies and in the economy, which entailed a sharp decrease of our living standard (75 percent in comparison with 1991) and the unprecedented 25-percent drop in production. The people's patience is not boundless. This, incidentally, is not only my opinion. As an example, I would like to quote the letter published on 1 December of this year in GOLOS UKRAINY (I think this newspaper can hardly be accused of biased treatment of our president) under the title "To Resign in Time": "With all due respect for Kravchuk and his good intentions, I must say that this man is incapable of leading a country. Shortsighted in his solutions of government issues and in choosing the right people especially, it was he who suggested Masol, Fokin, and Kuchma for prime minister and Shishkin for procurator general. He participated in the decisions on transparent borders and failed to prevent the Crimean autonomy. All his 'good' intentions and decisions brought immense harm to Ukraine. The people of Ukraine will have to live with the results of his work for decades. It is important for a politician to resign in time. [Signed] A. Mysnik, retiree. Kiev Oblast."

Through a strange coincidence it was at the same time, before 1 December, that a further sad event took place. L. Kravchuk's watch was stolen from the exhibition hall

of the National (former History) Museum of Ukraine. (As you know, the exhibit "Ukraine—The Road to Independence" includes some valuable and rare items: L. Kravchuk's suit, the glasses he wore when he read the president's oath, the folder of this document, the Belarusian-made Luch watch which was given to the museum by Leonid Makarovich personally). Well, this very watch was stolen, according to the UNIAN agency. It seems a trifle, but still an unpleasant one.

Well, a watch is just a knickknack. It is not all that is being stolen in sovereign and independent Ukraine! Here is what I think: If we could bring back not the watch but the time, the two years that were spent on nothing, simply wasted! Had we used this time for the good of the people, rationally, the reforms could be going on and we could live the way human beings should live. Unfortunately, the steps taken by the president and the government before December tell us once again that their declamatory statements on adherence to the market economy and the ideas of bringing our society to democracy hide intentions that are directly opposite in nature. Namely: returning our economy to the vise of the administrative command system, stricter government regulation of prices, subordination of the hard currency market to severe administrative regulation, monopolization of our foreign economic activity, a trend toward militarizing the economy, and phasing out conversion programs.

In his comments on the measures taken by the president and his government in this direction, Volodymyr Lanovyy remarked that the highest government officials who conduct such a policy will sooner or later be faced with the problems of nationalization of private property in Ukraine and of considerable limitation of civil rights, such as freedom of travel, freedom of speech, and the basics of a multiparty system (which is already happening, by the way). However, his final conclusion is difficult to agree with. V. Lanovyy thinks that it is impossible to build such a state at the end of the 20th century and, therefore, the leaders of Ukraine will have to turn back, in half a year at least, and restore the elements of the market economy. We do not share such an optimistic view. The party in power with L. Kravchuk at the helm has shown several times in reality that its main purpose is its personal corporate interests, which it is prepared to do anything in order to achieve. Objectively, its line is limited to restricting the living standard of our people and redistributing the national wealth. Nothing and no one in the world can force those who are currently in power to conduct any reforms because they have no interest in them.

Last week I had a chance to go to Moscow. This trip depressed me. I can still see the people loaded with tote bags and purses, people pushing heaped carts as big as medium-size car trailers, people furiously storming the fast Kiev-Moscow passenger train. An old woman missed her step and nearly got trampled, and her humble belongings remained lying on the platform. Boxes with the famous Kiev torte scattered over on the pavement,

and people's boots conveyed cream and candied fruit around the entire station. Somebody is cursing, somebody is hysterical, somebody else is wiping his bloodied nose. How wild, to what an extent one has to push one's own people to transform them into such a herd which sheds its human image in search of money and food?

It is not everybody that is so desolate, of course. This is understandable: the economic anarchy can only intensify our hoarding instincts. A husband and wife from Khmel-nitskiy who were travelling on the same train with me had, between the two of them, 12 (!) huge, weighing 20 kg each, bags stuffed with food. At the Kiev terminal they will "hand over" their contents to wholesale traders and go back. "Last time," the woman told me, "my husband and I brought home \$100 and 3 million karbovantsi." "What about customs?" "Come on, they only check passports." I thought for a long time on the train: The cost of a ticket to Moscow (before the price hike) is about 30,000 karbovantsi, and a bottle of champagne is twice that. How can this be? I think that the price increase will not solve the problem either. "We do not go to Poland any more, it is more convenient to travel to Moscow. It is just that tickets are hard to get, and we have to pay extra in dollars, but we still recover our expenses later on..." No CIA, together with the FBI, can ever do as much damage to Ukraine and its image as the current leaders have managed to do it through their evil, anti-people policy.

My mood has gone completely sour in the former capital of the former Union. Moscow lives in clover. Store shelves are loaded with food; there are over 10 kinds of sausage and cheese, an ocean of dairy products, lots of fish, meat, and chocolate—eat all you want. Most of this used to be imported, now some of the food is locally produced. I was there some three months ago and was surprised; this time I was even more surprised. Progress is evident. It is true that prices are high. A lot depends on you here, if you do not have enough money for Finnish hard salami, buy some Cherkizovo knockwurst or boiled sausage (eight kinds) which are produced locally on foreign-made machines.

I am not idealizing Moscow. It also has a lot of disorder, dregs, wheeler-dealers, theft, filth, etc. But one thing is definite: their time of hunger is already behind them. But we are still in the same "dead zone" without end or limit. How did we get to live like this? Do we deserve such a life? We must if we have tolerated abuse for so long, if we so easily forgive helplessness, stupidity, and at times open sabotage, if we accept all this as our due. If we obediently heed the lies we are tirelessly fed every day.

I am not sure that Ukraine will survive, that it will last until the elections to the new parliament or, even more, until the new presidential elections. We are already hearing the voices of loyal subjects declaring their purposelessness: it is the president, they say, he is the guarantor of independence, etc. What nonsense. If Ukraine is still alive today, it is not because of the president but in spite of him! But when the elections

finally take place and we vote again, our eyes downcast with shame, for the same smooth and polished, sated and complacent "leaders" who were raised on communist leavening, neither our children nor our grandchildren will understand us and we will never be forgiven.

As I am writing this article, L. Kravchuk is visiting Tunisia. Really, all Ukraine's problems have been resolved, the only thing left must be to visit Africa...

Kuchma, Hrynyov Unite in Reform Bloc

944K0412A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian
10 Dec 93 p 2

[Statement by Volodymyr Hrynyov, former deputy chairman in the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and Leonid Kuchma, former prime minister of Ukraine: "Volodymyr Hrynyov and Leonid Kuchma Unite in the Interregional Reform Bloc"]

[Text] The association was concluded last week as a result of long-term negotiations. It is well-known how democratically oriented intelligent people in our country do not like to unite. But L. Kuchma and V. Hrynyov decided nevertheless to head toward the objective together by creating a promising election bloc.

We are publishing the program statement of the Reform Bloc.

Statement of the Interregional Reform Bloc

We appeal to you, esteemed countrymen, at a time of a sharp worsening of the standard of living and a rapid dissolution of industry and the financial system, on the eve of a complete crash of the economy.

We appeal to all people, because not only our fate but the fate of our children and grandchildren is under threat of penury.

Everything we tried to prevent has happened—empty store shelves, bread lines, cold apartments, and a swift depreciation of money.

We have become convinced from our own experience that the elements of qualified construction of the state and a feeling of state responsibility for the fate of each person are lacking in Ukraine in the higher echelons of power. Narrow departmental and clan interests are suffocating every initiative that is directed toward the common good.

Therefore, the initiatives of individuals alone in the Supreme Council and the government are doomed right from the start.

I, Volodymyr Hrynyov, resigned from the position of deputy chairman of the Supreme Council after becoming finally convinced of the impossibility of the adoption of any kind of progressive decision in the conservative Supreme Council.

I, Leonid Kuchma, resigned from the position of prime minister after long efforts to prevent self-isolation and conduct evolutionary, verified reorganizations in the economy, which was entirely blocked by existing legislation, executive structures, and by political atmosphere itself.

Today, only a bloc of qualified and responsible people, working in a coordinated way in parliament, the government, and local administrations can lead Ukraine in implementing economic and social reforms by means of intensive and painstaking labor.

In this critical situation, we are combining our knowledge and experience and professional and organizational potential for the sake of organizing a political bloc of centrist forces, and we propose to intensify it through your participation, esteemed countrymen.

The formation of such a bloc is extremely necessary and realistically possible.

Society in Ukraine is not yet politically structured, and the parties, unfortunately, are weak. Today, the yearning to establish fair economic rules and relations, the basis of a foreign policy, and a structure of the organs of authority on the principles of a civil society are the reasons uniting a majority of the people.

It is the people who establish a state for themselves and who, at their discretion, assign it the necessary powers to defend the interests of law and freedom.

In Ukraine, the state structures are organized from above, and only partially respond to the interests of the citizens.

Therefore, this arrangement should be implemented consistently: individual—rayon (city)—region—country. It is in this way that new intellectual and qualified forces from the regions can be involved in the adoption of state decisions in the interests of the people.

For citizens of Ukraine, a natural urge to live in peace and accord is inherent in foreign policy. Ukraine is a European country, and we would like to live in an all-European community. But the part of Europe that was the former Soviet Union is today at a different stage of the historical process relative to the Maastricht Agreements.

Ukraine and Russia should become strategic partners, as France and Germany are in West Europe, and they should consolidate and lead the countries of this part of Europe in a common European home.

We intentionally are not dwelling in the Statement on laying out economic and social programs.

First, because our programs are well known and corroborated by previous political activity.

second, they are based on the experience of other countries and features of the Ukrainian economy, and depend not on ideology but only on the logic of necessary reorganization;

third, because program documents should be adopted and publicized only by an assembly of regional representatives of the bloc.

Elementary political culture requires this.

We are not striving to form only an electoral bloc. This must be a permanently acting political force that is capable of influencing the course of events in Ukraine and taking upon itself responsibility to the people for the leadership of the regions and the country.

For this, we propose the following stages:

1. Formation of regional election coalitions that will ensure the selection and nomination of candidates to parliament of regional political leaders.
2. Establishment of political platforms on the basis of the proposals of regional election coalitions, and affirmation of program principles at an interregional conference.
3. Elaboration of a plan of legislative initiatives of the bloc, including the elaboration of very principled draft laws, and their publication.
4. Formation of proposals of the bloc on the personnel composition of the leadership of the government, parliament, and local administrations.
5. Guaranteeing the election of the bloc's candidates to parliament.
6. Conducting an all-Ukrainian bloc conference to elaborate a plan of action on the results of the elections, its organizational structure, and a procedure of activity for the bloc at the time of the presidential election campaign.

We think that it is precisely the establishment of an Interregional Reform Bloc that will offer a chance for the resolution of complicated political questions along Ukraine's path to progress and stability.

[Signed] V. Hrynyov, L. Kuchma

Extreme Nationalists in West Criticized

944K0351A Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian
13 Nov 93 p 2

[Article by Oleh Pavlyshyn, chairman of the leadership of the Lviv Oblast Organization of the Ukrainian Republican Party, under the rubric "Polemics": "Knight-Ernantry of the Absurd" and the Prose of Life"]

[Text] On 16 October 1993, the newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU published a letter in the form of an article from Mrs. I. Kalynets, entitled "It Did Indeed Happen. And Often..." Responding to the newspaper's invitation to

join in the discussion, I would like to state our position on the issues that were raised. However, the remarks published below are not addressed exclusively and personally to Mrs. Iryna Kalynets, but to all the radical politicians in our country who have lately come to regard the Ukrainian Republican Party [URP] as their principal enemy.

I must admit that reading the article, we found it somewhat difficult to make our way through the splendors of its poetic style, and it took us a while to understand the gist of the accusations levelled against us. However, if we have understood them correctly, these boil down to several points. It is Mrs. Kalynets's position that the URP is guilty of preferring "humanitarian methods" of struggle. Next point: the URP is a presidential rather than a Ukrainian party. Moreover, it is a "cosmopolitan" party. In addition, the Republicans are pursuing the wrong policy: instead of combatting communists and chauvinists, they are fighting patriotic youth, whose actions they should be proud of. At the same time, the author presents a "politological analysis" of existing parties in Ukraine. In it, the URP, the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party [UKhDP], and the People's Movement of Ukraine [Rukh] are represented as left centrist parties, while the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN], the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists [KUN], and the Ukrainian National Assembly [UNA] are described as the "center," and only the social-national party is regarded as "right-centrist." On the basis of this division, Mrs. Kalynets reaches the conclusion that there is no extreme right-wing radicalism and fascism in the Ukrainian political spectrum. Finally, condemning the democratism of the URP, Mrs. Kalynets outlines what she as a politician believes to be the most important task. I quote from her article: "We must understand that the goal of our struggle is not the state, but a free nation!" She devotes the rest of her article to defending ultraradical formations, criticism of president Kravchuk, and analyzing Israel's politics and that of some other states. Now that I have systematized the key issues discussed by Mrs. Kalynets in her article, I will try to set forth some of my own thoughts.

Ukraine's history is tragic and I doubt that anyone would deny this axiom. Of all the tragedies we have experienced—repressions, wars, famines—perhaps the greatest was our lack of statehood and our being torn apart. This is our reality. The most terrible legacy of this is that the empire has left us with a people that still does not think of itself as a nation.

The peaceful national-democratic revolution that we have been living through for the past five years has disturbed the "sleeping kingdom" and sown the first seeds of a revived consciousness. These seeds multiplied a hundredfold at the referendum on 1 December, but, in all honesty, as yet not every one of the 40 million Eastern Ukrainians has begun to think of himself or herself as being Ukrainian. The process of the Ukrainization of consciousness, which is extremely complex, full of contradictions, and painful, is continuing. Born of this process is the only thing that such a process could

produce—the UKRAINIAN STATE. Because only if we possess united statehood can we become a full-fledged nation. It is for this reason that the URP, a party of patriotic realists and not of “knights-errant of the absurd,” has set its goal to be STATEHOOD and NATIONHOOD, the formation and growth of which will be assured by having our own STATE. In conditions of FREEDOM. This last condition can be guaranteed only if we have our own national state, law-governed and democratic. We have defined our priorities based on the conviction that what is needed to shape Ukrainian political action are time, stability, and the daily work of teachers, politicians, intellectuals, and church leaders. This requires a strong unitary state with a presidential form of government. We can look to the experience of many countries that have emerged from the post-colonial state (Finland, the Czech Republic, and others). Hence our attitude to the president, which Mrs. Kalynets in her poetic fervor describes as “sloppy whining—that is our president” [as published]. What is important to us is not Kravchuk as such but the responsibility of the politician for his actions. The level of Kravchuk’s decisiveness and Ukrainianism reflects the realities of our life—“we have what we have.” Kravchuk’s left-bank—right-bank policy does not stem from some mythological qualities that he possesses as a person; it simply reflects the objective state of affairs in our country. A politician who does not want to provoke civil war must compromise. We also feel that Mr. Kravchuk is not decisive enough and that he has made wrong decisions at times, for which he has incurred harsh criticism from the Republicans. But what we cannot accuse him of is being unrealistic and irresponsible. I, therefore, urge you to be honest, esteemed radicals. What is of importance to us is not the president as such and not cosmopolitanism, but a realistic assessment of the situation.

We have no wish to divide Ukrainians into “black” and “white,” into “Cossacks” and “buckwheat growers” [i.e., brave warriors and docile yokels]. The national idea as the idea of unity is above all the idea of love for one’s native land, language, history, and culture. We therefore see our main task to be to build up as quickly as possible a politically, economically, and spiritually strong Ukrainian state to serve as a worthy object of love that will win the hearts of millions of its denationalized children. In contrast, certain small-town radical leaders think that love is won with the power of the fist, the bayonet, by force, or by playing at war. Their passion and devotion to Ukraine are not in doubt. They are beyond criticism. But there is another side to the matter—a political rather than an emotional side. Let us remember that just a short time ago the lads from the Ukrainian National Self-Defense Force [UNSO] exhibited the same fervor as now in Georgia fighting in the Trans-Dniester region, where they fought shoulder to shoulder with those very same Russian chauvinists and “Cossacks” against whom Mrs. Kalynets now urges us so passionately to take up battle.

It must be clearly understood that no civilized state can allow armed detachments of citizens holding various

ideological views to freely roam her territory. This has been demonstrated in Georgia and in Azerbaijan. These states are now collapsing; they have lost one-third of their territories and are in retreat before the Armenian army, despite receiving strong Islamic assistance [as published]. Russia has brought both to their knees because of internal conflicts. The result of “revolutionary phraseology” has been the loss of what had been gained. We do not want this to happen in Ukraine. That is why we have demanded and will continue to demand that the government immediately put a stop to the activities of such groups in Eastern Ukraine (FNS [expansion not given] in the Crimea, Rossiyskoye kazachestvo [Russian Cossackdom] in the Donbas region). As to UNSO, Ukrainians and patriots must understand that this group’s actions harm the process of creating a single consolidated Ukrainian nation. The romanticism of these young men has resulted in anti-Ukrainian propaganda from Zhytomyr to Luhansk in KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI and in the hysteria of the Civic Union [Grazhdanskiy soyuz].

I would also like to take this opportunity to say something about the strange political analysis presented by the esteemed Mrs. Kalynets, in which the URP is included among the “left centrists.” To achieve this metamorphosis, the author had to compare today’s Ukraine with prewar Galicia within cleansing Poland. With respect to this, let me remind everyone that today our capital is not Moscow, and not Warsaw, but Kiev. Such artful maneuvers are therefore irrelevant. And now a few remarks concerning the heart of the matter. In universally accepted European political parlance, the term “extreme right” is reserved for parties whose slogan is a monoethnic state of the indigenous nation with some restrictions. Fascism or national socialism builds its state on a single nation, which sharply limits the rights of minorities or expels them (or even exterminates them). This concept was best put into practice by Adolf Hitler in the process of building the Third Reich. This is now a part of history. But how are we to interpret the speech of a member of the Committee for the Salvation of the Nation and the State, who at a meeting in Lviv publicly expressed a desire “to organize a St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of Russians” only, you see, this is not the right time. How are we to judge the conduct of the members of the “Union of Idealists,” who openly proclaim inside a government institution, the Halych district court, that it is necessary “to exterminate Jews”? What term best describes such views? These same radical leaders oppose privatization and want to continue the practice of social leveling and harsh controls over the economy—in other words, they are in virtual agreement with the “comrades” from the socialist party. To prove my point let me cite the words of Mr. Lyubomyr Franchuk, one of the leaders of the OUN (a centrist organization, according to Mrs. Kalynets). Asked if he recognizes the right to private ownership of land, he answered: “The land is owned by the state as a whole. The state is the Ukrainian

nation, thereby assuring each individual's private ownership." Is this not a familiar formula? Surely Lenin himself could not have said it better.

There is another delicate detail in this polemic. In her article, Mrs. Kalynets stressed the youth of our radicals, urged us to take pride in their radicalism, and wrote that it would not be a terrible thing if young students were to clash with the young members of the special militia units [OMON]. We hold a somewhat different view. To begin with, both Mr. Andrushkiv and Mr. Kryvoruchko are well past the age of first-year students. Nor do we feel any reason to be particularly proud of the fact that a portion of our youth is so morally and intellectually immature that they know of no other way of defending their position than by fighting. This bespeaks the low level of culture of these young people and their rejection of Christian values. As a teacher, Mrs. Kalynets should be the first to find this situation alarming.

Let me now deal with another accusation levelled against us—"humanitarian methods of struggle." I regard this characterization more of a compliment than an insult. We will continue to act in a humane manner, relying on parliamentary methods until the situation, God forbid, should become critical. Such conditions will not be tolerated by the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union—Ukrainian Republican Party.

I would like to recommend to our respected opponents from all groups, ranging from the Committee for the Salvation of the Nation and State to the social-national party, and to all the deputies who are now in office and all candidates for the office of deputy to engage in a more constructive debate and bring to it, apart from passionate emotions and poetic embellishments, a modicum of cold reason. Let us discuss more prosaic issues than the need for "knight-errantry of the absurd"—issues such as the fuel, food, currency, and innumerable other crises that beset us. Let us discuss how to stabilize the weak sense of statehood in Eastern Ukraine and how to tackle the question of building up our Armed Forces. There is no shortage of problems and they all need to be solved. Our slogan is "Ukrainians for Ukraine!"

Turn to Authoritarianism Seen Possible

944K0372A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian 3 Dec 93
pp 1-2

[Article by Vyacheslav Pykhovshek, UKRAINIAN PRESS AGENCY: "A 'Police' State?"]

[Text] In the time that is left before the elections, the nomenklatura could ruin Ukraine once and for all. The recent decisions of the government, which are obediently supported by the parliamentary majority, are actually directed not at restraining inflation, but at ratcheting it upward even more.

"Four sources of inflation exist today," says Ivan Zayets, a people's deputy of Ukraine; "these are credit emission, the state budget deficit, the simultaneous circulation of

foreign currency and coupons, and the freezing of incomes. The last factor leads to a drop in the purchasing power of citizens, an increase in prices, and the accumulation of capital abroad. The total plundering of Ukraine is nearing completion. At this moment, the nomenklatura will also want to introduce a police type of statehood, and this will be just before the elections."

None of those who are now preparing for abrupt movements will call the future government a "police" government. It is most likely that it will also not even be an "emergency situation," but what is more likely, "an urgent decision in connection with a crisis situation in the economy." Kravchuk became the head of the government, and now there are no Pynzenyys and Lano-voys, and Kuchmas and Yukhnovskiy, to whom it will be possible to "ascribe" the crash of the economy. The backs behind which it was possible to hide have disappeared. The nomenklatura is showing its real face—the surfeited and helpless face of ideological diktat, which is unexpectedly losing any outward luster before the threat of the loss of a value that is highest to it—power.

The democrats never had power, although they strived for it, as is natural for every politician. "The idea of independence is the most terrifying thing that the authority of the nomenklatura could compromise," says Les Tanyuk, one of the leaders of the democrats in parliament. "The hope remains that it will not succeed in carrying this through."

A state of emergency has never been effective; however, its effectiveness depends directly on how much its feasibility will be proven to the ordinary voter. A state of emergency begins with the aggravation of certain elements of a conventional situation. We will analyze that which has already happened.

1. Administrative influence on the mass media by means of purging personnel, as is occurring on state television and radio, and the "regulation" of the supply of paper of independent newspapers and the schedule for providing them with printing services.

2. Active "proof" of the need to discontinue the transmission of recordings of the plenary meetings of the session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, for which the argument "saving the people's money" can be used as a justification. Some of the deputies think that the plenary meetings could be cut out entirely for a month or two before the elections.

3. The adoption of the Law on State Secrets, with a number of draconian penalties against journalists for their conscientious execution of official duties. A state secret now is that which Kravchuk, Zvyahilskyy, and Plyushch consider it to be.

4. Personnel changes in the Procuracy, Supreme Court, and Ministry of Defense.

5. Prohibition by the government of the functioning of nonstate institutions—suspension of the activity of the Interbank Currency Exchange.

However, this is not yet the "performance," but only "preparation for the performance." The "performance" most likely will consist of a fit of anti-Russian paranoia, a ban on strikes, and, possibly, legal proceedings against newspapers regarding "the defense of honor and dignity."

A key question is how the organs of repression will conduct themselves and whether the nomenklatura can rely on them. Features in the biography of Vitaliy Radetskyy, Minister of Defense of Ukraine, who, supporting the putsch, joined the staff of the so-called "soft" GKChP [State Committee for the State of the Emergency] at the level of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, and of Volodymyr Shevchenko, the new member of the Collegium of the Procuracy General, who was among those who engaged in the "legal" justification for the arrest of Stepan Khmara two years ago, give the nomenklatura definite encouraging information.

The closer the elections, the more chaotic become the movements of the nomenklatura. These will be the first elections that it will lose and the first that the democrats will win.

Opposition Remains Divided Over Elections

944K0374A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Dec 93 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Skachko: "The Opposition Is Unanimous in Criticism of the Election Law: But Differs in Its Views on the Authorities"]

[Text] The recently adopted new Law on Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine has, as was to have been expected, evoked an ambivalent response among the political opposition to Kiev officialdom. On the one hand practically the entire opposition of the center and the right wing have unanimously condemned the new election law as undemocratic and as conserving in Ukraine the old political system. The People's Rukh of Ukraine (NRU) and its leader, parliamentary deputy Vyacheslav Chornovil, who announced his refusal to work during plenary sittings of parliament (without divesting himself of his obligations as a deputy to his electorate here), has gone furthest, perhaps, in condemnation of the law. "Inasmuch as prior to the departure from the Supreme Council the nomenklatura majority is hastily rubber-stamping reactionary laws and the same personnel appointments, thereby making the democratic minority a kind of sharer and co-respondent in its actions, I call on other democrat deputies to refuse to participate in the session sittings or to realize the long-standing idea of parallel sittings of the People's Council" (the opposition in parliament—V.S.), Vyacheslav Chornovil wrote in his statement, but even his closest associates have yet to support him. Rukh, on the other hand, proclaimed in a collective statement in connection with

the new election law: "Ukraine remains the last little island of red autocracy in Europe. The authorities are continuing to lead the state from darkness to nowhere."

Vyacheslav Chornovil himself has not rested content with this. Supported by Vladimir Grinev, chairman of the New Ukraine association and former deputy speaker of parliament, and Vitaliy Zhuravskyy, leader of Ukraine's Christian democrats, Vyacheslav Chornovil officially requested of specialists of the Europarlament and the Council of Europe at a four-party Ukrainian-Russian-French-German conference in Strasbourg an expert evaluation of Ukraine's election law and that it be "checked for democratic content." And such an expert evaluation was promised. In the opinion of the leader of the Rukh, Ukraine should not, following elections in accordance with such a law, be admitted to the Council of Europe and other democratic European institutions. And these structures should bring political pressure to bear on the present authorities in Ukraine to force them to implement political and economic reforms.

But, on the other hand, even such an election law has not united the opposition, on the contrary even, it has intensified the disintegration processes. The divide between democrats is the same as before—the attitude toward the current authorities. Some national democrats united in the Congress of National Democratic Forces (KNDS) have in this situation also, as distinct from Rukh, for example, supported the authorities, acting according to the principle "first the state, and then everything else—democracy included."

The KNDS issued its statement, which says: "We believe that all initiatives aimed at discrediting Ukraine in the international arena are irresponsible because they are detrimental to the authority of the Ukrainian state. A political game, in which the survival of the state and the nation is at stake, is currently being played." This protest merely confirmed the previous conclusion that, despite all the unificatory efforts of certain opposition leaders of the Levko Lukyanenko, former ambassador of Ukraine in Canada, type, a single democratic election bloc will not be formed in Ukraine. And this will intensify Ukraine's election battles considerably since each bloc and each party has declared that it will nominate its own candidates for people's deputy. Objectively, this could play into the hands of the so-called power party, which could put up few candidates, but those such as will muster the requisite 25 percent of the total vote of any constituency, whereas the democratic candidates will pull votes of the supporters of democracy each for himself and will be unable to clear the hurdle necessary even for a runoff. The nomination of candidates in Ukraine begins officially on 27 December of this year.

Transcarpathia Economic Zone Denounced

944K0369A Kiev UKRAYINSKA HAZETA
in Ukrainian No 20, 2-15 Dec 93 p 4

[Article by Andriy Rak, UKRAYINSKA HAZETA economic commentator: "Separatists Are Stirring Things Up in Transcarpathia. It Is a Pity That There Is No Yeltsin to Handle Them"]

[Text] From among all the laws the Supreme Council discusses and adopts or rejects in order for Ukraine to be able to overcome a crisis, the parliament suddenly considered at its 10 November meeting the draft Law on the Special Free Economic Zone in Transcarpathian Oblast. This was an uncommon, regional law. The discussion was stormy and prolonged. The assessments of the proposed draft ranged from unqualified approval to "Down with it!" They agreed on the latter. The document was referred for revisions. However, it is premature to turn the page.

In conjunction with this event, People's Deputy of Ukraine Mr. Mykhaylo Shvayka sent a letter to UKRAYINSKA HAZETA. He believes that the "amusements" of Transcarpathian bosses will cost Ukraine 24.9 billion karbovantsy in 1990 prices. In addition, the autonomists are demanding 10.4 billion from the monies of the loan fund, and no-interest loans under Article 11.

Of course, Ukraine does not have such money at present. Both Mr. Shvayka and the editorial office find it surprising that responsible government personalities, such as Mr. M. Zvyahilskyy, Mr. R. Shpek, and Mr. G. Pyatachenko endorsed the draft. On what basis? After all, neither they nor other members of the government had any answers for the Supreme Council Committee on Economic Reform Issues as to where these large funds are to be had or whether they can be procured at all.

The irresponsibility of our officials is particularly striking because even now Transcarpathian Oblast makes no contributions at all to the budget of Ukraine and even receives subsidies at the rate of 50 percent. As of 28 July, the local budgets of the oblast received a loan of 7.8989 billion karbovantsy, and a grant in the amount of 50.2732 billion karbovantsy was also envisioned in order to close the gap between revenues and expenditures.

Given this state of affairs, only enemies of both the oblast and Ukraine can talk about the self-financing of the territory. What kind of state will it be if oblasts begin to withdraw from the general economic system of the state and if this or that oblast introduces special customs, currency, financial, and other conditions?

Who is stirring things up in Transcarpathia?

The Association of Carpathian Rusyns (they are Carpathian indeed, looking from Budapest, Prague, or Bratislava, but viewed from Kiev, they are Transcarpathian), the Settlement of Don Cossacks, the Russian House Association, and a segment of the leadership of Hungarian cultural and ethnic associations have been particularly reactionary and active. Even a so-called "Provisional Government of the Republic of Carpathian Rus" headed by Mr. Turyanytsa has already been formed. In letter No. 244, dated 15 August 1993, to the Supreme Council, he wrote that, according to them, it depended on us whether Rusyns and thus Hungarians remain within Ukraine or whether we cast them away, and they would be forced to seek sovereignty as their Croatian and

Slovenian brethren have done.... Mr. Dorchynets, leader of the Transcarpathian Oblast Council, supports him.

The separatists are foisting on the population of Transcarpathian Oblast a venturesome and pernicious path of development, isolation, collapse, and decay. Their vigorous activities facilitate the still greater deterioration in the economy, the aggravation of sociopolitical situation in the oblast, and the paralysis of state power in Ukraine.

All this did not begin in Transcarpathia with the substantiating of the free economic zone. The helmsmen of the oblast took Ukrainophobic positions (those of the adversaries of everything Ukrainian) and, having joined up with international forces, mounted vigorous activities aimed at undermining the statehood of Ukraine in Transcarpathian Oblast. The following avenues were followed:

- 1) dismemberment of the oblast, creation of a Hungarian autonomous okrug which would include the lowland section of Uzhgorodskiy, Mukachevskiy, and Vinogradovskiy Rayons and the entire Beregovskiy Rayon;
- 2) in the rest of the territory of the oblast, the so-called political Rusyn movement, headed by its international agent-subversives, was fueled.

As Mr. Shvayka attests, it is impossible to ignore the fact that these forces are financed not only from the sources abroad (Canada, Hungary, and Russia), but actually from the budget of Ukraine as well. Funds which the Government of Ukraine has appropriated to establish new institutes and scientific-research centers in which anti-Ukrainian activities are being registered. Other such establishments—the Carpatia Institute (headed by scientist I. Pop, who has arrived from Moscow), the Uzhgorod Hungary Center (headed by Associate Professor Shandor Fodo of the Uzhgorod University), as well as the Sociological Research Institute (headed by the former secretary of the oblast committee of the party, Myhovych, who is on a mission from Moscow)—are persistently working on tearing the area away from Ukraine.

Undoubtedly the hopes of the local leadership to secure royal seats of power are associated with this process. It is noteworthy that Mr. D.F. Dorchynets, chairman of the Transcarpathian Oblast Council, is already angry that "his authority" is not recognized at the state border between Ukraine and Romania.

Specialists in substantiating the idea of the Free Economic Zone are imported from all quarters.

Thus, Mr. V. Symchera, one of the authors of the free economic zone, stated at a meeting of the Supreme Council Commission on Economic Reform Issues: "I want my fellow countrymen to live as well as my family does [rendered in Russian in the original]." When deputies inquired where this scientist is from and why he had forgotten his native tongue, it came out that he is a

"Muscovite" and had come over with an entire group of consultants and advisers in order to make Transcarpathia "happy" and "free."

Mr. Shvayka writes: "The conscientious Transcarpathians, the true patriots of Ukraine, resolutely come out against separatism, autonomy, the Free Economic Zone, and estrangement from Ukraine; they desire the integration and unity that Avhustyn Voloshyn and his friends fought for in 1938 and 1939, worthily raising the flag of fighting for the independence of Ukraine."

The Transcarpathian Zone, the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic, and Novorosiya are all elements of the same passive process of "leadership" (and we must say, a natural process under our conditions). Given that the presidential and governmental staff work ineffectively and do not meet the expectations of the citizens of the state, local cells of power develop the desire to assume some of the "government's" powers. How is this regional anarchy to be stopped? We should begin at the "head." Resolute actions by the president in the local echelon are needed, first of all suspension of the operation of local councils, as Yeltsin and Nazarbayev are doing. Purposeful and effective political and economic reforms in Kiev itself should begin. Is it normal for the representative of the president in the capital city to fight the windmill-stands of Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for Press Distribution of the Ministry of Communications] as if he were Don Quixote, instead of putting the shops themselves in order and seeing to it that they have the necessary goods and foodstuffs.

Mr. Shvayka sums it up, and we cannot but agree with him: "With the blessing of local authorities, small enterprises and joint ventures with foreign capital have already seized about 3,000 enterprises. Most of them are engaging in dubious activities in the foreign economic sphere. They are selling out the raw materials and material resources of not just Transcarpathian Oblast but all Ukraine on a particularly large scale. Foreign exchange funds are appropriated and deposited in accounts at foreign banks. Crime in the economy has become commonplace, and it is being sheltered by the power structure and law enforcement organs."

I would like to complete the review with kind words addressed to the Supreme Council, whose current membership is being perceptibly filled with healthy, patriotic forces. The decision of the parliament to not allow the Transcarpathian separatists to split and rob Ukraine is excellent proof of this (notwithstanding the great pressure put on it by the opinions of so-called "world" academicians). Now it is the turn to stop the Donbass, Odessa.... God willing, everything will stabilize. However, Ukraine needs a Ukrainian patriot, a "Yeltsin!"

Law on Elections, Implementation Decree

944K0348A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
27 Nov 93 pp 3-6

[Law of Ukraine: On the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine]

[Text]

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. Main principles and bases for the election of people's deputies of Ukraine

The election of people's deputies of Ukraine (henceforth—deputies) is unrestricted, and is conducted on the principles of universal, equal, and direct right to vote under secret ballot procedure.

2. The voting process is carried out on the following bases: unrestricted nomination, based on equal rights, of candidates for deputy (henceforth—candidates); public declaration and openness; equality of opportunities for all candidates in conducting their election campaign; impartiality toward candidates on the part of state organs, institutions, and organizations, and organs of local self-government; freedom to spread propaganda.

3. The election will take place in 450 single-seat electoral districts on an absolute-majority basis.

Article 2. Universal right to vote

1. The election of deputies is universal: Citizens of Ukraine who are 18 years of age on election day possess the right to vote.

2. A citizen of Ukraine may be elected deputy if he possesses the right to vote, is at least 25 years old on election day, and has been a permanent resident of Ukraine for at least the last two years.

3. It is prohibited to provide any privileges or effect any restrictions, directly or indirectly, with respect to the right to vote of citizens of Ukraine, proceeding from their origin, social or property status, racial or ethnic affiliation, sex, education, language, religious beliefs, political convictions, or nature or field of endeavor, unless stipulated by this law.

4. Citizens declared incapacitated by a court do not possess the right to vote. Exercise of the right to vote is suspended for an appropriate period of time for persons in confinement facilities by sentence of a court and persons in compulsory treatment centers by decision of a court.

5. Citizens may not be elected deputy if on election day they are performing active military or alternative (non-military) service, if they are officers or warrant officers in the Armed Forces, National Guard, Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, or other militarized formations of Ukraine and have not been discharged to the

reserves (retired), or if they are representatives of the President of Ukraine in the localities, judges, or procurators.

The above-mentioned individuals may be registered as contenders for candidate if, during registration, they submit to the district electoral commission a statement of consent respecting their release from the position in question in the event they are elected people's deputies of Ukraine, and a statement on temporary cessation of their official authority for the period of the election campaign.

6. A people's deputy of Ukraine may not simultaneously be a deputy of another representational organ of state power or organ of local or regional self-government.

Article 3. Equal right to vote

The election of deputies is conducted on an equal basis: Citizens participate in the election based on principles of equality; each voter has one vote.

Article 4. Direct right to vote

The election of deputies is direct: Deputies are elected directly by the voters.

Article 5. Secret ballot

Voting procedure for the election of deputies is secret: Any monitoring of the expressed will of the electorate is prohibited.

Article 6. Openness in preparation for and conduct of the election

1. Preparation for and conduct of the election of deputies are carried out openly and with public declaration.

2. Electoral commissions provide citizens with information as to their composition, location, and operating procedures, and regarding the formation of electoral districts and precincts. They acquaint citizens with voter lists, the enumeration of candidates for deputy, the election programs (platforms) of candidates, the parties and electoral blocs that are participating in the election campaign, the form and procedures for filling out signature lists and election ballots, the slates of candidates for deputy, information concerning candidates for deputy, and the results of the voting.

3. The basic format of operation of the commission is open session. At sessions of electoral commissions, during the registration of candidates, during the voting, tallying of the vote at the election precinct, determining the results of the election in the district, and tabulating the overall results of the election, the right to be present is extended to agents of candidates for deputy or persons so authorized by them, to one representative of each party and party electoral bloc taking part in the election campaign, each labor collective nominating candidates

for deputy, and each nonparty committee of voters established to monitor the course of the election campaign, and to official observers from other states and international organizations. The authority of the above-mentioned representatives is certified by appropriate documentation. Interference on the part of the above-mentioned representatives in the work of electoral commissions is prohibited.

4. In the event that violations of the election law are uncovered, the persons enumerated in Part 3 of this article have the right to present to the appropriate or higher standing electoral commission a statement on elimination of the violations, or to draw up an official document in this regard, signed by the person who uncovered the violations and voters who witnessed them. The statement or official document is subject to registration with the commission.

5. The mass media publish information on the process of preparation for and conduct of the election. Their representatives are guaranteed unimpeded access to all meetings and sessions related to the election. Electoral commissions, state organs, and organs of local and regional self-government provide the mass media information on the preparation for and conduct of the election.

Article 7. Right to nominate candidates for deputy

The right to nominate candidates for deputy belongs to citizens of Ukraine who possess the right to vote. This right is exercised both directly and through political parties and their electoral blocs which have been registered in accordance with legislation, as well as through labor collectives, according to procedure as determined by this law.

Article 8. Conduct of the election

Conduct of the election of deputies is organized by electoral commissions formed according to the procedure determined by this law.

II. PROCEDURE AND TIME FRAME FOR SCHEDULING ELECTIONS

Article 9. Types of elections and their scheduling procedure

1. Elections of deputies may be regular, special (early), repeat, and to fill vacant seats.

2. The decision to conduct a regular or special (early) election of deputies is made by the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

3. The decision to conduct a repeat election or election to fill vacant deputy seats is made by the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine, in instances and according to procedure as envisaged by this law.

Article 10. Time frame for scheduling elections

1. Regular elections of deputies are scheduled by the Supreme Council of Ukraine during the 44th month following the date of the first session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.
2. Regular and special elections of deputies are scheduled by the Supreme Council not later than four months prior to their conduct.
3. Repeat elections and elections to fill vacant deputy seats are scheduled by the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine within the time frames established by this law.
4. Elections are scheduled for a Sunday or some other nonworking day established by law.

The organ that scheduled the election provides this information through the mass media not later than the third day following the scheduling.

III. ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND ELECTION PRECINCTS**Article 11.** Formation of electoral districts

1. In conducting the election of deputies, the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine forms 450 single-seat electoral districts, upon recommendation of the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Crimean Republic, the chairmen of oblast councils of people's deputies, and the chairmen of the Kiev and Sevastopol city councils of people's deputies.
 2. Electoral districts are formed throughout the territory of Ukraine, encompassing approximately equal numbers of voters, taking into account the administrative-territorial division of Ukraine and habitation density of ethnic minorities. The norm established for number of voters per electoral district is determined by the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine.
- Electoral districts must meet the following conditions:
- 1) the deviation of number of voters from the average number of voters in electoral districts throughout Ukraine cannot exceed 12 percent, as a rule;
 - 2) territorial unity: The formation of electoral districts comprising territories that do not border upon one another is prohibited;
 - 3) periodic review of the boundaries of district territories—once every eight years, as a rule.
3. A list of electoral districts indicating their designations, numbers, district centers, territorial boundaries, and numbers of voters is published in the press by the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine and is announced through other mass media not later than 100 days prior to election day.

Article 12. Formation of election precincts

1. In order to conduct the voting and tally voting results, electoral districts are divided into election precincts.
2. Election precincts are formed by district electoral commissions upon the recommendation of local (rayon, city) organs of state executive power or the executive organs of local self-government situated within the bounds of the territory of the electoral districts. For ships that are at sea on election day, election precincts are formed by the above-mentioned organs by locality of the given ship's port of registration.

For representations of Ukraine abroad, election precincts are formed upon recommendation of the Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs in accordance with their registration as determined by the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine.

3. Election precincts are formed encompassing from 20 to 3,000 voters; in certain exceptional cases, they may comprise a lesser or greater number of voters.
4. Election precincts are formed not later than 60 days—or in exceptional cases, not later than five days—prior to conduct of the election.

5. The district electoral commission informs voters as to the boundaries of each election precinct, the composition and location of precinct electoral commissions, and the premises where voting is to take place not later than the fifth day following the formation of precinct electoral commissions.

IV. ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS**Article 13.** System of electoral commissions

The following bodies are formed to conduct the election of deputies:

the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine (henceforth—the Central Electoral Commission);

district electoral commissions;

precinct electoral commissions.

Article 14. The Central Electoral Commission

1. The Central Electoral Commission is the highest organ with respect to organization and conduct of the election and is formed, as a rule, simultaneously with scheduling of the election but not later than 120 days prior to election day.
2. The Central Electoral Commission is confirmed by the Supreme Council of Ukraine upon recommendation of the chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine. It is composed of a chairman, two deputy chairmen, a secretary, and 11 commission members.

The chairman, deputy chairmen, secretary, and at least one-third of the members of the Central Electoral Commission must have higher education in the field of law.

3. The chairman, deputy chairmen, and secretary of the Central Electoral Commission work on a permanent basis.

4. Political parties and their electoral blocs which participate in the election campaign in accordance with this law may each appoint one representative at the Central Electoral Commission with the right to address it.

5. The term of office of the Central Electoral Commission is four years.

The Central Electoral Commission exercises its authority until such time as a new Central Electoral Commission is appointed.

6. Within five days of its formation, the Central Electoral Commission publishes information with respect to its personnel composition, location, and postal address. It also furnishes data pertaining to the account in which contributions may be deposited to the Central Electoral Fund and provides an explanation of the right of citizens and juridical persons to make contributions to this fund.

7. The Central Electoral Commission:

1) organizes the preparation for and conduct of the election of people's deputies of Ukraine;

2) exercises supervision throughout the territory of Ukraine of compliance with election legislation and ensures that such legislation is applied uniformly;

3) provides clarification of procedures for the application of election legislation and presents to the Supreme Council of Ukraine, when necessary, proposals concerning the interpretation of this legislation or the introduction to it of amendments and additions;

4) forms electoral districts;

5) directs the activity of district and precinct electoral commissions;

6) establishes the procedure for use of funds for conduct of the election and distributes these funds to electoral commissions and appropriate local councils; assists in providing electoral commissions with premises, transportation, and communications, and examines other questions involving provision of material-technical support for the election;

7) establishes the form of the election ballot to be used in the election of deputies, the form of voter lists, minutes of electoral commission sessions, and other election documentation, the types of ballot boxes to be used in the voting and the seals of electoral commissions; determines the procedure for storing and transferring election documentation;

8) hears the reports of electoral commissions, ministries and departments of Ukraine, other state organs, and organs of local and regional self-government on questions related to preparation for and conduct of the election;

9) publishes a list of districts, information on the time frames for conduct of the election campaign, and other materials on commission activity;

10) registers parties and electoral blocs that have expressed the intention to nominate candidates to run in the election;

11) registers elected deputies, tabulates the results of the election in Ukraine as a whole, and publishes in the press and announces over other mass media the election results, providing a list of elected deputies;

12) informs the Supreme Council of Ukraine concerning the results of the election and declaration of deputy empowerment;

13) decides matters pertaining to the scheduling and conduct of repeat elections and elections to fill vacant deputy seats, as well as matters concerning the recall of deputies;

14) examines statements, appeals, and complaints of citizens with respect to the decisions and actions of district and precinct electoral commissions (except complaints concerning irregularities in voter lists), repeals or suspends decisions of electoral commissions, and makes other decisions on these issues;

15) upon recommendation of the Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, decides matters pertaining to the registration of election precincts formed at the representations of Ukraine abroad with electoral districts in Ukrainian territory;

16) exercises other authority in accordance with this law and other legislative enactments of Ukraine.

Article 15. The district electoral commission

The district electoral commission is formed not later than 95 days prior to election day.

2. The chairman, deputy chairmen, and secretary of the district electoral commission, and eight commission members, are appointed, as appropriate, by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Crimean Republic, in sessions of oblast councils of people's deputies, and in sessions of the Kiev and Sevastopol City Councils of People's Deputies, upon recommendation of the chairmen of these councils.

Parties and their electoral blocs whose candidates are registered in a given electoral district may appoint one representative each to the district electoral commission, with the right to address that body.

3. The authority of the district electoral commission expires 10 days following declaration by the Central Electoral Commission of the empowerment of the new deputy.

4. Within five days of its formation, the district electoral commission publishes information concerning its personnel composition, location, and postal address. It also furnishes data pertaining to the account in which contributions may be deposited to the election fund of the district electoral commission and provides an explanation of the right of citizens and juridical persons to make contributions to this fund.

5. The district electoral commission:

1) exercises supervision of compliance with election legislation in the territory of the electoral district;

2) forms election precincts, establishes a unified numbering system for them throughout the electoral district, and publishes a list of these precincts along with their locations;

3) directs the activity of precinct electoral commissions;

4) monitors the compilation of voter lists and their presentation for public familiarization;

5) effects the registration of candidates for deputy and their agents, and issues them appropriate credentials; ensures that posters are published that provide biographical data on the candidates and position points with respect to their election programs (platforms);

6) participates jointly with the appropriate council in organizing meetings of candidates for deputy with the voters;

7) approves the text of the election ballot and of the invitation for the electoral district, provides for their generation and provision to precinct electoral commissions;

8) ascertains the results of elections for the electoral district, provides this information to the mass media, and issues temporary credentials to the elected deputy;

9) organizes the conduct of runoff elections and repeat elections, as well as elections to fill the deputy seat when vacant;

10) examines appeals, statements, and complaints regarding decisions and actions of precinct electoral commissions and makes decisions in their regard;

11) exercises other authority in accordance with this law and other legislative enactments of Ukraine.

Article 16. Precinct electoral commissions

1. Precinct electoral commissions are formed by rural, settlement, and city (rayon-in-city) councils of people's deputies or executive organs, and consist of a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and five to 11 commission

members, not later than 45 days prior to election day, upon recommendation of the chairman of the appropriate council, taking into account the proposals of political parties, other associations of citizens, labor collectives, and groups of voters.

Parties and their electoral blocs whose candidates are registered in a given electoral district may each appoint one representative to the precinct electoral commission with the right to address the commission.

2. The term of office of precinct electoral commissions expires 10 days following acknowledgment by the Central Electoral Commission of the empowerment of an elected deputy.

3. The precinct electoral commission:

1) draws up the voter list for the precinct;

2) familiarizes voters with the voter list, accepts and examines statements regarding irregularities in the list, and decides matters pertaining to the introduction of appropriate changes to it;

3) informs the populace of the date the election will take place and the voting location, delivers invitations to the voters, acquaints interested persons with data on candidates registered in the district, and with reports published by the Central Electoral Commission and the appropriate district electoral commission;

4) ensures that premises are prepared and ballot boxes produced for the voting;

5) organizes conduct of the voting at the polling station;

6) tallies the votes cast at the election precinct;

7) examines statements and complaints concerning matters of preparation for the election and organization of the voting, and makes decisions in their regard;

8) exercises other authority in accordance with this law and other legislative enactments of Ukraine.

Article 17. Organization of the operation of electoral commissions

1. Sessions constitute the main form of operation of an electoral commission. An electoral commission session is convened by the commission chairman or, in the event of his absence, by the deputy chairman, as well as upon the demand of at least half the members of the commission. In such instances, it is mandatory that all commission members be informed as to the time and place of the session.

2. A session of an electoral commission is considered competent if at least two-thirds of its members are participating. A resolution is adopted by open voting, a majority of the votes of those present being cast for it. If equal numbers of votes are cast for and against the resolution, the vote of the chairman is considered deciding. A resolution of an electoral commission must

be justified and contain references to specific articles or points of legislative acts and to the circumstances of the case. Members of an electoral commission who are not in accord with an adopted resolution may object in writing by submitting a special opinion, which is attached to the minutes of the session.

3. The chairman or deputy chairman of an electoral commission presides over commission sessions. In the event that they do not fulfill this function for any reason whatsoever, the commission determines a presiding officer from among its members for the specific session.

4. An electoral commission may adopt a resolution on denying the right of participation in a session to persons indicated in Part 3, Article 6 of this law, if such persons are impeding conduct of the session.

5. Resolutions of an electoral commission that are adopted within the framework of its authority are to be implemented on a mandatory basis by the participants in an election and by the organs that provide for conduct of the election.

Organs of state power and local and regional self-government, as well as state enterprises, institutions, and organizations, are obliged to assist electoral commissions in the exercise of their authority.

Article 18. Appeal of the decisions and actions of electoral commissions

1. The decisions and actions of a precinct or district electoral commission may be appealed by candidates for deputy, their agents or persons so empowered by them, and by the voters or other participants in an election, to a higher standing electoral commission within 10 days following adoption of a resolution or commission of an action, unless otherwise stipulated by this law.

2. Grievances with respect to denials by precinct electoral commissions of statements alleging irregularities in voter lists are submitted to a court by location of the appropriate election precinct, and are examined by the court within three days.

3. The decisions and actions of the Central Electoral Commission may be appealed in instances envisaged by this law to the Supreme Court of Ukraine, which examines these within seven days.

4. The decisions of judicial organs are considered final.

Article 19. Legal status of persons who are members of electoral commissions

1. Any citizen of Ukraine who possesses an active right to vote may be appointed a member of an electoral commission. He may not be a candidate for deputy or the agent of such a candidate, nor can he be included within the category of other persons identified in Part 3 of Article 6, Part 4 of Article 14, Part 2 of Article 15, or Part 1 of Article 16 of this law. In order to be secretary of

an electoral commission, it is also necessary that an individual have command of the state language.

2. Upon decision of an electoral commission that is confirmed, as appropriate, by the district electoral commission or Central Electoral Commission, the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and individual members of the electoral commission may be released from execution of their official or production duties by main place of work for the period of the election campaign. Individuals are paid for working in the electoral commission in the amount of the average wage for one of the past three months, taking into account indexation or the salary by main place of work proportional to their time working in the commission. The wage is paid by main place of work with subsequent compensation provided to the enterprise, institution, or organization out of the state budget.

3. The chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, or member of a commission may be removed from his position on the commission by the organ that appointed him, at his own request or for gross violation of the stipulations of election legislation.

V. VOTER LISTS

Article 20. Voter lists and procedure for their compilation

1. Voter lists are drawn up for each election precinct by the precinct electoral commission and are signed by the chairman and secretary of the precinct electoral commission not later than 30 days prior to election day.

Executive organs of city (rayon-in-city), settlement, and rural councils of people's deputies (or the organs that carry out these functions) maintain a register of voters and convey to precinct electoral commissions necessary information concerning the voters who reside in the appropriate territory.

2. A voter list contains the last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, and home address of each voter. The last names of voters are indicated on the voter list in a sequence that is convenient for organizing the voting. Voter names are entered on the voter list for that election precinct in which territory the voters reside.

3. Voter lists for voters who are military servicemen stationed at military units, the family members of such servicemen, and other voters who reside in regions where military units are located, are drawn up on the basis of data presented by the commanders of the military units to the appropriate local council and precinct electoral commission not later than 30 days prior to election day. Military servicemen residing outside military units are included with the voter lists compiled by their place of residence in the normal manner.

4. Voter lists for election precincts formed in hospitals or other fixed medical treatment facilities, on ships which are at sea on election day, or with representations of Ukraine abroad, are drawn up on the basis of data presented by the directors of these institutions or by the ship captains.

Article 21. General procedure for the inclusion of citizens on voter lists

1. A voter list includes all citizens of Ukraine who have reached the age of 18 or will have done so by election day, who reside in the territory of the given election precinct as of the time the list is drawn up, and who possess the right to participate in the election.

2. A voter may be included on the voter list of only one election precinct.

Article 22. Publication of voter lists and procedure for introducing changes to them

1. The precinct electoral commission publishes the voter list for general familiarization not later than 15 days prior to the election. In election precincts formed in hospitals or other fixed medical treatment facilities or on ships that are at sea on election day, the voter lists are presented for general familiarization not later than two days prior to the election.

2. Each citizen is guaranteed the opportunity to familiarize himself with the voter list and check the accuracy of information concerning him in the premises of the electoral commission.

3. Each citizen is afforded the right to present a grievance with respect to noninclusion or erroneous inclusion on a voter list or removal from such a list, as well as with respect to inaccuracies in the presentation of voter data that appear on the list. A statement on errors in the list is examined by the precinct electoral commission, which is obliged, within two days, or on the day before election day or on election day itself, immediately to examine the statement and enter the necessary corrections to the list, or to issue the applicant a copy of the decision disallowing his request along with applicable justification. This decision may be appealed to a rayon (city) people's court not later than five days prior to the election.

4. Not later than 10 days prior to election day, the precinct electoral commission delivers or sends by mail to each voter an invitation to participate in the voting. The invitation contains the following information:

- 1) first name, last name, and patronymic of the voter;
- 2) address of the voter;
- 3) designation and number of the district in which the voter is casting his ballot;
- 4) address of the precinct electoral commission.

VI. NOMINATION AND REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES FOR DEPUTY

Article 23. Nomination of candidates for deputy

1. The nomination of candidates for deputy begins 90 days prior to election day and ends 60 days prior to it. Following registration by the Central Electoral Commission, parties or their electoral blocs which are participating in the election campaign have the right to nominate one candidate each to the electoral district through their regional divisions (local cells).

An electoral bloc is formed by a group of parties or their regional divisions. An agreement on formation of the electoral bloc signed by all entities joining the bloc (party leaders) is registered by the district electoral commission.

2. A contender for candidate for deputy must be a person meeting the requirements of Article 2 of this law.

3. In the nomination by voters of a contender for candidate for deputy, at least 10 voters who reside within the electoral district in which the candidate is up for nomination sign a statement in this regard indicating the last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, series and number of passport, and home address of each voter.

4. In the nomination by voters of a contender for candidate for deputy, the regional division of the party (electoral bloc) present an application to the appropriate district electoral commission. The application indicates the last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, profession, job position (occupation), place of work and residence, and party affiliation of the contender for candidate, as well as the last name, first name, patronymic, address, and telephone number of the authorized representative of the party (electoral bloc) nominating the contender.

5. In the nomination of a contender for candidate for deputy, the party (electoral bloc) attaches the following to the application:

1) an excerpt from the minutes of the meeting (conference) of the regional (Crimean Republic, oblast, Kiev or Sevastopol City) division of the party (electoral bloc). The excerpt indicates the designation of the party (electoral bloc), address of its regional division, telephone number, total number of members of the party (or parties united in an electoral bloc) who belong to the regional division in question, the number of attendees participating in the meeting (conference), the results of the voting, and the date the decision was made. The minutes are authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officer and secretary of the meeting (conference);

2) a list of members of the party (parties united in an electoral bloc) belonging to the regional division in question (first 100 members), indicating their last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, series and number of passport, home address.

6. In order for the meeting (conference) of a regional division of a party (parties united in an electoral bloc) to be acknowledged as valid, participation is required of at least two-thirds of the members of the regional division of the party (parties united in an electoral bloc) or delegates elected at the conference who belong to the appropriate regional division, under the condition that at least 100 party members are present. At least 50 delegates must be elected at the conference.

7. In the nomination of a contender for candidate for deputy by a labor collective, an application on behalf of the collective is signed by the individual so empowered by the meeting or conference nominating the contender.

8. The district electoral commission issues a certificate on acceptance of the application to the authorized representative of the voters, party (electoral bloc), or labor collective nominating a contender for candidate for deputy.

Not later than three days following the acceptance of an application on nomination of a contender for candidate for deputy, the district electoral commission issues the above-mentioned authorized representatives a certificate on registration of the contender for candidate for deputy, along with the necessary number of signature lists for collecting signatures in his support.

9. A contender for candidate for deputy who has been nominated by voters, a party (electoral bloc), or a labor collective may be registered as a candidate for deputy if at least 300 voters in the given electoral district support him through their signatures. A monetary deposit is submitted during registration in the amount of five times the minimum wage.

10. Collection of signatures in support of a contender for candidate for deputy begins when the certificate on registration of the contender is issued.

11. The monetary deposit is returned to the person who submitted it in the event that the candidate receives at least 5 percent of the voter ballots cast in the election. Deposits that are not returned are transferred to the state budget.

Article 24. Lists of voters in support of a contender for candidate for deputy

1. A list of voters who support a contender for candidate for deputy is submitted to the district electoral commission not later than 45 days prior to the election.

2. The beginning of each signature list in support of a contender for candidate for deputy indicates the last name, first name, and patronymic of the contender, his year of birth, profession, job position (occupation), place of work and residence, and party affiliation.

3. Alongside each signature, the individual collecting the signatures indicates the last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, address (as annotated in the individual's passport), series and number of passport of the

person affixing his signature, and the date of the signature. The signatures are numbered. The list is signed by the individual responsible for collecting the signatures and also indicates his address and telephone number.

4. Each voter has the right to sign his name in support of only one contender for candidate for deputy in his electoral district.

5. Electoral commissions have the right to verify the authenticity of signatures. If a single voter has expressed support for more than one contender, all of his signatures are considered invalid. Also considered invalid are forged signatures and signatures gathered by coercion, if the voter who was coerced to sign or whose name was forged on the list so indicates in a written statement. If for the above-mentioned reasons the number of signatures turns out to be fewer than necessary, authorized representatives are given five days to secure additional voter signatures in support of the candidate. In the event that this stipulation is not met, the contender is not registered as a candidate for deputy. Statements with respect to signatures are accepted by the district electoral commission not later than five days following submission to it of the voter list in support of the candidate.

6. Only members of electoral commissions have the right to familiarize themselves with the lists of voters supporting contenders. In the event that legal proceedings are instituted in a court, participants in the judicial process also have this right.

Article 25. Registration of candidates for deputy

1. A candidate for deputy is registered by the appropriate district electoral commission not later than five days following the submission of all documents required for registration and upon payment of the monetary deposit.

2. A decision on registration of a candidate for deputy is made when the following documents are present:

a statement signed by the leader of a regional division of a party (or by the leaders of regional divisions of parties united in an electoral bloc) for candidates nominated by the party or electoral bloc, or a statement signed by the authorized representative of voters for candidates nominated by voters, or a statement signed by the individual authorized by a labor collective for candidates nominated by labor collectives;

the list of voters who support the contender for candidate for deputy;

the statement of a candidate for deputy on his commitment to secure release from his previous work in the event that he is elected deputy;

a document confirming payment of the monetary deposit;

the candidate's program;

a statement on temporary discontinuation of official activity, for persons envisaged in Part 5 of Article 2 of this law;

a declaration of income received over the previous year, drawn up in the format as prescribed by the Ukraine Ministry of Finance.

3. The district electoral commission issues a certificate to the person submitting the above-mentioned documents, which notes the date and time of their receipt.

4. If the documents submitted do not meet the requirements of this law, the district electoral commission so informs the persons who submitted them within three days of their receipt, with the aim of correcting the deficiencies. Corrected documents are submitted to the commission not later than 40 days prior to the election.

5. Not later than three days following the submission of documents, the district electoral commission makes a decision on registration of the contender as a candidate for deputy and issues him the appropriate credentials.

An official statement on registration of a candidate for deputy is sent to the Central Electoral Commission.

6. Not later than five days following registration of a candidate for deputy (or upon the candidate's request—after his election fund account is opened), the district electoral commission makes a radio announcement and publishes a report in the press on registration of the candidate for deputy in the electoral district in question. The announcement and report also include information concerning the opening of the candidate's election fund account (along with pertinent data) and provide an explanation regarding the right of citizens and juridical persons to make contributions to this fund.

The names of registered candidates for deputy are numbered by the district electoral commission in accordance with the sequence in which documents in fulfillment of the requirements of this law were received, and are published in the press not later than five days following the completion of registration of all candidates.

7. One and the same individual may not be registered in more than one electoral district.

Article 26. Withdrawal of candidacy by a candidate for deputy

1. A candidate may withdraw his own candidacy in an electoral district at any time prior to election day, having submitted written application in this regard to the district electoral commission. In such instances, the candidate's name is deleted from the list of candidates drawn up by the district electoral commission, and the candidate drops out of the voting process.

2. In the event of the death of a candidate, the district electoral commission declares him removed from the voting process.

3. The district electoral commission immediately informs the Central Electoral Commission of any withdrawal of candidacy. The district electoral commission publishes information in the press regarding the withdrawal by a candidate for deputy of his candidacy, not later than three days following acceptance of the application in question. When such application is received earlier than three days prior to election day, the district electoral commission must inform the precinct electoral commission the day it receives the application.

4. If 15 days prior to expiration of the time frame for registration of candidates for deputy in an electoral district, only one registered candidate for deputy is running for election, the district electoral commission releases this information over the radio and in the press, and requests voters, parties (electoral blocs), and labor collectives to present additional nominations of candidates for deputy.

5. In the event that a candidate for deputy violates the requirements stipulated in election legislation of Ukraine, the Central Electoral Commission may present to the Supreme Court of Ukraine, upon recommendation of the district electoral commission or at its own initiative, a statement on revocation of the decision on registration of the candidate for deputy.

The Supreme Court of Ukraine examines a statement of the Central Electoral Commission within seven days of its receipt, but not later than one day prior to election day.

VII. GUARANTEES OF THE ACTIVITY OF CANDIDATES FOR DEPUTY AND OTHER ELECTION PARTICIPANTS

Article 27. Rights of candidates for deputy during conduct of the election campaign

1. As of the time they are registered by electoral commissions and receive their credentials, candidates for deputy have equal rights in the conduct of the election campaign: to appear at election and other meetings, rallies, conferences, and sessions directly related to the election, and to make presentations in the mass media (press, radio, and television).

2. District electoral commissions, state organs, organs of local and regional self-government, their responsible officials, and the administrations of state enterprises, institutions, and organizations are obliged to assist candidates for deputy in organizing meetings with the electorate and in receiving necessary informational materials.

3. Candidates for deputy are not permitted to use their official position for conducting election campaign activity.

Article 28. Right of a candidate for deputy to free transportation

A candidate for deputy has the right to free transportation within the boundaries of the appropriate electoral district with respect to all types of transportation facilities (except taxi), upon presentation of his credentials.

Article 29. Release of a candidate for deputy from his official or production responsibilities during the election campaign

Following registration in a district electoral commission, a candidate for deputy may be released at his request from official or production responsibilities while retaining his average wage over the previous three months, taking into account indexation or salary by main place of work, over the period of the election campaign or the period of time he conducts meetings with the electorate and delivers presentations at election meetings and over radio and television. The wage is paid by main place of work, with subsequent compensation provided to the applicable enterprise, institute, or organization out of the state budget.

Article 30. Immunity of a candidate for deputy

During conduct of the election campaign, a candidate for deputy is immune from criminal prosecution, arrest, and administrative penalty measures imposed in accordance with judicial procedure, without the consent of the Central Electoral Commission.

Article 31. Agents of a candidate for deputy

1. A candidate for deputy may have no more than five agents, who assist him in the conduct of his election campaign, conduct election campaign activity in his support, and represent the interests of the candidate in relations with state organs and associations of citizens, organs of local and regional self-government, and electoral commissions, as well as with the electorate.

2. Following registration, a candidate for deputy determines his agents according to his own discretion and applies to the district electoral commission to effect their registration. The application for registration of a candidate's agents indicates the last name, first name, patronymic, home and work address, and telephone number of each prospective agent, and also includes the written consent of the individual in question.

3. Not later than three days following receipt of the application, the district electoral commission registers the agents and issues them the prescribed variety of credentials. An agent may not be a member of an electoral commission.

4. A candidate for deputy has the right at any time prior to election day to submit a statement to the district electoral commission regarding termination of the authority of an agent and registration of another individual in his place. A candidate's agents may terminate service at any time at their own initiative, returning the

credentials they were presented to the district electoral commission and informing the candidate for deputy in this regard.

5. Upon the proposal of a candidate for deputy, his agents may be released from fulfillment of their official or production responsibilities in order to conduct meetings and other preelection events.

Agents (no more than two) may be released from fulfillment of their official or production responsibilities, upon proposal of the candidate, for the entire period of election campaign activity.

Agents receive pay on the same basis that applies to the candidate for deputy himself.

The authority of agents goes into effect as of the date of their registration with the district electoral commission and is terminated following election of the deputy.

6. It is prohibited to appoint agents and campaign workers from among persons engaged in the performance of active-duty military or alternative (nonmilitary) service, officers, or warrant officers in the Armed Forces, National Guard, Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, or other military formations of Ukraine.

VIII. PREELECTION CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY

Article 32. Forms and means of preelection campaign activity

1. Citizens of Ukraine, associations of citizens, labor collectives of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and agents of candidates have the right to discuss, freely and comprehensively, the preelection programs of candidates for deputy, their political, performance, and personal attributes, and the platforms of the parties and electoral blocs that nominated the candidates for deputy, and to engage in campaign activity for or against a candidate for deputy at meetings, rallies, and discussions, in the press and on radio and television.

2. Candidates for deputy and their agents conduct meetings with the electorate both at assemblies and in other formats convenient for the voters. The district electoral commission, jointly with state organs, organs of local self-government, and organs of associations of citizens, facilitates the conduct of such meetings, affording premises, providing timely information of the time and place of the meetings, and carrying out other necessary measures.

3. Preelection campaign activity may be carried out in any forms and through any means not in contravention of the Constitution or laws of Ukraine.

Article 33. Materials used in preelection campaign activity

1. The district electoral commission provides for the printing of election campaign posters for candidates for

deputy out of the centralized election fund not later than 20 days prior to election day in the amount of 2,000 posters per candidate.

2. In order to effect the printing of election campaign posters, the candidate must submit to the district electoral commission not later than 35 days prior to election day the following: his photograph (in the size prescribed by the commission), election program (platform) consisting of up to two pages of typewritten, one-and-a-half-spaced text, and autobiography (of the same scope) relating the most significant results of his labor activity not comprising classified information protected by law. Preelection campaign posters may not contain false information or commercial advertisement. The district electoral commission coordinates the text to appear on election posters it will have printed with the candidate in question.

3. The printing of election campaign materials on a commercial basis is limited to the scope of a candidate's own election fund.

4. Local organs of state executive power and organs of local self-government allocate space and equip displays and billboards in public places to permit citizens to post election campaign materials, and they ensure that campaign materials published by the district electoral commission are displayed here, as well as reports issued by the commission concerning the election campaign and candidates, as stipulated by this law. These organs may make decisions prohibiting the placement of such materials on individual buildings that constitute architectural monuments, or with the aim of ensuring vehicular traffic safety.

5. A candidate submits to the district electoral commission signed samples of preelection campaign materials produced with his consent.

Article 34. Use of the mass media

1. Candidates for deputy are afforded the right of free use of the state mass media through the extension to them of air time of equal value and equal time.

The specific amount and time of radio and television broadcasting stipulated for election campaigning is established by the district electoral commission upon coordination with the management of the applicable mass media.

2. Candidates for deputy also have the right to free publication of the text of their election platform in an amount not to exceed two typewritten pages in the same printed format in the print mass media (newspapers) whose founders are the organs of state executive power and organs of local and regional self-government, these mass media being located in the district in which the candidate for deputy is campaigning, with the exception of state-wide mass media.

3. Campaign activity in the nonstate mass media is limited to the scope that can be provided through the

individual candidate's election fund under equal payment conditions for all candidates.

Article 35. Restrictions in the conduct of campaign activity

1. During the election campaign, candidates for deputy who work for radio or television are prohibited, within 30 days of election day, from making presentations over radio and television in excess of the time allotted to candidates for deputy.

2. With respect to candidates for deputy who work for the newspapers and other state mass media, the volume of published materials dealing with them, within 30 days of election day, may not exceed the volume established for other candidates for deputy.

3. In organizations and units of the Ministry of Defense, National Guard, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Committee for Defense of the State Border, the Security Service, and Civil Defense, election campaign activity is restricted. Meetings of candidates for deputy with voters who are military servicemen in the above-mentioned departments are organized by the district electoral commission and entail the mandatory invitation, not later than three days prior to the meeting, of all registered candidates. Upon the start of the election campaign, visits to organizations and military units on the part of individual candidates for deputy, their agents, campaign officials, and the representatives of parties, movements, and blocs are prohibited.

Only those printed campaign materials that have been produced by the district electoral commission in accordance with Part 1 of Article 33 of this law are permitted to be distributed.

4. One week prior to election day, the mass media are obliged to refrain from promulgating unverified materials of a compromising nature regarding a candidate for deputy, political party, or electoral bloc.

When materials of a compromising nature regarding a candidate or political party (electoral bloc) are promulgated by the mass media, the media are obliged to offer the candidate in question or representative of the applicable party (electoral bloc) the opportunity to refute such materials within one week, but not later than the day prior to election day.

5. All disputes with respect to election campaign activity are resolved by the district electoral commission, and when necessary—by the Central Electoral Commission.

6. Campaign activity on election day, i.e., the distribution of leaflets, posters, and appeals to voters to vote for or against candidates or to boycott the election in some way, is prohibited.

Article 36. Financing of campaign activity

1. Campaign activity is financed out of funds received from the state, political parties, electoral blocs, and

candidates for deputy, and through the contributions of physical and juridical persons.

2. District electoral commissions pay for the measures established in accordance with this law out of funds allocated for the election: broadcast time over state radio and television, printing of election posters, and the publication of election campaign programs (platforms) in the newspapers of state organs and the organs of local and regional self-government.

3. Along with the state financing of election campaign activity, a candidate for deputy may use funds from his own election fund.

4. A candidate's election fund is established out of the candidate's own funds, the funds of political parties, and contributions from citizens of Ukraine and juridical persons registered in Ukraine, with the exception of enterprises with foreign investments. The amount of a candidate's election fund must not exceed 100 times the amount of the minimum wage.

5. Upon written application by a candidate for deputy, Sberbank [Savings Bank] of Ukraine, by location of the electoral district, is obliged to open up an account under the classification "Election Fund" in the name of the fund manager.

6. The fund manager is issued a separate checkbook for the entire amount of the election fund.

7. Supervision of the use of funds of the election fund of a candidate for deputy is exercised by the district electoral commission.

8. Financial reports on the sources of funds in a candidate's election fund and on their use are published in the press within the course of 20 days following the election.

IX. Voting

Article 37. Time and place of the voting

1. The voting takes place on election day from 0700 to 2000 hours. The precinct electoral commission provides information to the voters regarding the time and place of the voting not later than 15 days prior to election day.

2. With respect to election precincts formed at hospitals and other fixed medical treatment facilities, at rest homes, in military units, in regions of difficult access, on ships that are at sea on election day, and at the representations of Ukraine abroad, the precinct electoral commission may terminate the voting earlier than 2000 hours if all the voters whose names appear on the list have cast their votes.

Article 38. Organization of the voting

1. Each voter is issued an election ballot of the prescribed form for the election.

2. The voting is conducted in specially allocated premises, which must be equipped with the required

number of booths or rooms for voting in secret, where places are designated for the issue of election ballots, and ballot boxes are installed. The ballot boxes are installed in such a manner that those voting must pass into the booths or rooms for voting in secret in order to reach them. Entrances to the booths or rooms for voting in secret, the exits from these, and the paths from them to the ballot boxes must be within the field of view of members of the precinct electoral commission or observers.

3. The precinct electoral commission bears responsibility for organizing the voting, ensuring secrecy in the demonstration of the will of the electorate, and for equipping and supporting the premises as required. A voter may remain in the voting premises only for that period of time which is necessary to cast his ballot.

4. Information on the candidates for deputy and the text of this law must be posted in the voting premises in a location that is accessible to the voters.

5. On election day prior to the start of the voting, the chairman of the precinct electoral commission checks the ballot boxes and affixes on them a stamp or seal in the presence of commission members and persons determined by Part 3 of Article 6 of this law. Following this, a verification letter signed by the commission members and the voter who is first to cast his ballot is dropped into the ballot box. The letter indicates the time it was put into the ballot box.

6. Election ballots are issued by the precinct electoral commission on the basis of the list of voters for the election precinct, upon presentation by the voter of his passport or other document attesting to his identity. Upon issue of the election ballot, it is stamped or signed by that member of the precinct electoral commission who issued it. The voter enters his signature on the voter list as having received an election ballot.

Article 39. The election ballot

1. The election ballot must contain the designation of the organ to which the election is being held.

2. The ballot includes all registered candidates for deputy in alphabetical order, indicating the last name, first name, and patronymic of the candidate, his year of birth, party affiliation, and job position (occupation).

3. Election ballots are printed in the state language or in languages used by the population of the electoral district.

4. The election ballot must not contain the names of candidates who have been removed from consideration. In the event that a candidate withdraws from the voting after the ballots are printed, the district electoral commission decides whether to reprint the election ballots or to delete this candidate's name from the ballot.

5. The election ballots in the territory of an election district must be identical in size, material, color, and

content, and must conform to the form prescribed by the Central Electoral Commission.

Article 40. Voting procedure

1. Each voter casts his vote personally. Voting on behalf of another person is not permitted.

2. The election ballot is completed by the voter in the booth or room for voting in secret. When the ballot is being completed, no one except the person voting is permitted to be present. A voter who is unable independently to fill out his election ballot may invite another person into the secret voting booth. This person is chosen at the individual's discretion but may not be a member of the electoral commission, a candidate running in the electoral district in question, or an agent of a candidate.

3. A voter may leave the name of just one candidate on the ballot or leave none, having crossed out the names of those candidates on the ballot against whom he is voting.

4. In instances where individual voters are unable to travel to the voting premises by virtue of their state of health or other valid reasons, the precinct electoral commission directs, at their request, no fewer than three commission members to set up the voting process at places where these individuals are located. In such instances, an excerpt is made from the voter list in the form of an extract delivered by the chairman of the precinct electoral commission to the appropriate commission members, together with the required number of election ballots. During the voting process at the individual voter's location, the voter in question signs the excerpt from the voter list as having received an election ballot, and votes in compliance with the requirements of this law. Following the voting at the separate location, an appropriate annotation is entered on the voter list. The extract from the voter list is attached to the voter list.

Article 41. If a voter changes his location during the period following the time the voter list is made available for general familiarization and election day, that voter may cast his ballot early.

X. TALLYING THE VOTE AND DETERMINING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION (VOTING)

Article 42. Tallying the vote at the polling station

1. Upon completion of the voting, the precinct electoral commission determines, based on the voter list, the total number of voters taking part in the balloting and receiving election ballots.

2. The tallying of the vote at the polling station is conducted separately for each candidate for deputy by the precinct electoral commission.

3. The precinct electoral commission must observe the following sequence of actions during tallying of the vote:

1) upon completion of the voting, the electoral commission cancels, tallies, and wraps up the unused election

ballots. Inscribed on the packet are the designation and number of the election precinct, and type and number of unused election ballots. The packet is signed by the chairman of the commission, the deputy chairman, and the commission secretary, and a seal is affixed;

2) the electoral commission establishes, based on the main and supplemental voter lists, the total number of voters in the election precinct and the number of voters who have taken part in the election (received election ballots);

3) the chairman of the electoral commission verifies in the presence of commission members that the seals on the ballot boxes are still intact, and breaks them open;

4) the commission tallies the total number of ballots and the number of ballots declared invalid.

Election ballots are declared invalid if they are not of the prescribed form, if the names of more than one candidate remain on the ballot upon voting, and if the stamp or signature of the issuing member of the electoral commission is missing.

If doubt arises regarding the validity of an election ballot, the matter is decided by the commission through a vote. Ballots that have been declared invalid are placed in separate envelopes and sealed in such a manner that it would be impossible to extract one from its envelope or insert a ballot without damaging the seal. The designation and number of the election precinct and the number of ballots placed in the envelope are inscribed on its face;

5) the commission tallies the number of votes cast for each candidate. Following this, the ballots are placed in separate envelopes for each candidate and are wrapped up in the manner described in point 4 of Part 3 of this article;

6) the commission examines the results of the vote tally at its session and enters these in its report.

The report includes:

the designation and number of the election precinct;

the total number of voters entered on voter lists for the election precinct;

the number of voters who received election ballots;

the number of voters taking part in the voting;

the number of votes cast "for" and number of votes cast "against" each candidate;

the number of ballots declared invalid.

The report is drawn up in triplicate.

7) each copy of the report is signed by the chairman of the commission, the deputy chairman, secretary, and members of the commission. The first copy of the report is immediately sent, together with the election ballots, to

the appropriate district electoral commission in accordance with the procedure it has established. The second and third copies are retained by the precinct electoral commission. One of these copies must be immediately posted at the commission premises for public familiarization.

Article 43. Determination of election results in an election district

1. Based on the reports of precinct electoral commissions, the district electoral commission determines the following: total number of voters in the district; number of voters who received election ballots; number of voters taking part in the voting; number of votes cast "for" and number of votes cast "against" each candidate for deputy; number of votes declared invalid. It then draws up its report based on this information.

2. The number of copies of the report must exceed the total number of candidates for deputy by two copies. Each copy of the report is signed by the chairman of the commission, the deputy chairman, secretary, and members of the commission. The first copy of the report is immediately sent to the Central Electoral Commission. The second copy is retained with the district electoral commission. The remaining copies are provided, one each, to the candidates for deputy who ran in this electoral district.

3. An election is declared null if fewer than 50 percent of the number of voters entered on the voter lists of a given district took part in it, or if the names of all registered candidates in the district have been removed.

4. A candidate for deputy is considered as having been elected if he receives more than half the votes cast by voters participating in the election in addition to at least 25 percent of the number of voters entered on the voter lists of the given district.

A runoff election is conducted when candidates receive the same number of votes.

5. The district electoral commission may declare an election invalid if, during conduct of the election or in tallying the vote, violations of this law have taken place which significantly affect the results of the voting.

Appeals with respect to declaring an election invalid may be presented to the district electoral commission by entities of the election process, as well as by organs of the Procuracy of Ukraine, prior to determination of the election results for the electoral district in question.

6. Information on the results of the election in an electoral district is published in the press by the district electoral commission within time frames as established by the Central Electoral Commission. This information indicates the following: total number of voters in the district; number of voters who received election ballots (took part in the election) and the percentage they comprise of the total number of voters in the district; number of voters participating in the voting; number of

votes cast "for" and number of votes cast "against" each candidate; number of invalid ballots; last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth, profession, job position (occupation), place of work and residence, and party affiliation of the elected deputy, as well as who was nominated as a candidate for deputy. If the election is declared null or invalid, this too is noted in the information provided, along with the reasons for this.

Article 44. Registration of deputies and publication of the election results

1. The Central Electoral Commission registers elected deputies, publishes this information in the newspaper GOLOS UKRAINY, and broadcasts the election results over television and radio. These actions are accomplished within 10 days of the tallying of election results.

2. The Central Electoral Commission publishes a report of the election results in general across Ukraine and the list of elected people's deputies of Ukraine in the press, in alphabetical order, indicating the last name, first name, patronymic, profession, job position (occupation), party affiliation, and place of work and residence of the elected deputies and the electoral districts in which they were elected.

Article 45. Temporary certification of a deputy

Following publication in the press of the list of deputies registered by the Central Electoral Commission, the district electoral commission issues to each elected deputy temporary certification of his election.

XI. RUNOFF ELECTIONS, REPEAT ELECTIONS, AND ELECTIONS TO FILL VACANT DEPUTY SEATS

Article 46. Runoff elections

1. If more than two candidates for deputy were running in an electoral district and none of them was elected, the district electoral commission makes the decision to conduct a runoff election in the district with respect to the two candidates for deputy who received the greatest number of votes, not considering candidates who were removed from the running prior to the runoff election. The district electoral commission notifies the Central Electoral Commission of this decision and informs the voters of the district. The runoff election in the electoral district takes place not later than two weeks from the date of the general election and is conducted in conformance with the requirements of this law.

2. Determination of the election results for a runoff election is made according to the procedure prescribed in Article 43 of this law.

Article 47. Declaration of an election as invalid

1. The Central Electoral Commission may declare an election or runoff election invalid if during the election

or during the tallying of the vote, violations of this law took place which significantly influenced the voting results.

2. Appeals with respect to declaring an election invalid may be presented to the Central Electoral Commission by entities of the election process, as well as by organs of the Procuracy of Ukraine, within 10 days of the date of publication of the election results by the district electoral commission.

3. Article 48. Repeat elections

1. A repeat election takes place in electoral districts in instances where no more than two candidates for deputy were running and neither candidate was elected, or the election was declared null or invalid for the electoral district.

2. The decision to conduct a repeat election is made by the Central Electoral Commission.

3. A repeat election is scheduled not later than one month following the date of the general election. Voting takes place in the same polling stations and using the same voter lists as pertained to the general election. The nomination and registration of candidates for deputy and other election procedures are carried out in accordance with the procedure prescribed by this law.

4. Candidates who withdraw their candidacy, or who did not receive the necessary number of votes and were not elected in an election that was declared neither null nor invalid, may not run in a repeat election. Also unable to run in a repeat election are citizens with respect to whom registration as a candidate was revoked, citizens by virtue of whose actions an election was declared invalid, and citizens found guilty by a court of committing violations of the law as indicated in Part 1 of Article 51 of this law and in whose regard a sentence of the court has entered into legal force.

Article 49. Conduct of an election to fill vacant deputy seats

1. In the event that a deputy is recalled or his deputy's authority is terminated for other reasons, an election to fill the vacant deputy seat in the appropriate electoral district is conducted within four months of the date of termination of his authority.

In such cases, the district electoral commission is formed at least 50 days prior to the election, precinct electoral commissions at least one month prior to the election, and registration of candidates for deputy is completed at least one month prior to the election. Voter lists are presented for public familiarization at least 10 days prior to the election.

2. The election is scheduled by the Central Electoral Commission not later than three months prior to its conduct, and is organized in compliance with the requirements of this law.

3. In the event of removal of a deputy with less than one year remaining in the term of office of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, an election to fill the vacant deputy seat is not conducted.

4. By decision of the Central Electoral Commission, elections to fill vacant deputy seats may be held in abeyance over the course of a year if they have twice been declared null.

XII. CONCLUDING PROVISIONS

Article 50. Expenditures related to the election of deputies

1. Expenditures related to the preparation for and conduct of elections of deputies are effected by electoral commissions out of the centralized election fund created by the Central Electoral Commission. The Central Electoral Commission holds the status of juridical person and is the manager of the centralized election fund. The amount of this fund is confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

2. Citizens of Ukraine, associations of citizens of Ukraine, and juridical persons registered in Ukraine, with the exception of enterprises with foreign investments and state organs, institutions, and organizations maintained out of the state budget, may make contributions to the centralized election fund and to the election funds of district electoral commissions.

Article 51. Responsibility for violating the election legislation of Ukraine

1. Persons who use force, deceit, threats, or other means to impede the free exercise by a citizen of Ukraine of his right to vote, to be elected people's deputy of Ukraine, or to conduct campaign activity, persons who publicly agitate or appeal for a boycott of elections, and members of electoral commissions or responsible officials of state and public organs who commit forgery with respect to election documents, who wittingly tally votes incorrectly, violate voting secrecy, or permit other violations of this law bear responsibility as prescribed by law.

2. Also held liable are persons who publish or through other means wittingly disseminate false information concerning a candidate for deputy.

Article 52. Restrictions on the introduction of amendments and additions to this law

Amendments and additions to this law may be introduced not later than one year prior to expiration of the term of office of a given convocation of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and enter into force following the scheduling of the election to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, new convocation.

[Signed] President of Ukraine L. KRAVCHUK
City of Kiev, 18 November 1993

Decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine

944K0348B Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
27 Nov 93 p 3

["Decree On the Procedure for Implementation of the Law of Ukraine 'On the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine'"]

The Supreme Council of Ukraine decrees:

1. To implement the Law of Ukraine "On the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine" as of 27 November 1993.
2. Until such time as the legislation of Ukraine is brought into conformance with the Law of Ukraine "On the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine," acts currently in effect are applied insofar as they do not contradict this law.
3. To direct the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine to effect the broad-circulation publication of the Law of Ukraine "On the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine."
4. To direct the Supreme Council of Ukraine Commission on Matters of Legislation and Legality and the Supreme Council of Ukraine Commission on the Activity of Councils of People's Deputies and the Development of Local Self-Government to draw up and present for examination by the Supreme Council of Ukraine the necessary amendments and additions to Ukrainian legislation that proceed from this law.

[Signed] Chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine I. PLYUSHCH
City of Kiev, 18 November 1993

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Government Policies Said To Increase Chaos

944K0375A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian 1 Dec 93
p 3

[Article by Sergey Vasin, candidate of economic sciences, NEZAVISIMOST economic commentator: 'If Ye. Zvyahilskyy Were Acting God Almighty...']

[Text] *We have had the opportunity lately to discover the economic credo of our quasi-prime minister. Its quintessence is the idea of confiscating 9 trillion karbovantsy allegedly circulating in the shadow economy and commercial structures (combined into one category by Ye. Zvyahilskyy himself). It turns out that when commercial banks issue credit they should be guided by considerations of conscience, especially when this involves state enterprises. Naturally, it is the Cabinet of Ministers that decides what falls under the category of "conscience" and what does not, and then applies restrictions on the credit operations of private sector banks. Rumor has it that it was Ye. Zvyahilskyy personally who pushed through the closing of the hard currency exchange. And now we are witnessing a new attack on market mechanisms.*

At issue is foreign currency regulation. As is known, last week the Supreme Council prescribed that the National Bank is to get the Cabinet of Ministers' concurrence when setting up official exchange rates of foreign currencies; thus, as of 24 November the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar was set at 7,090 karbovantsy, that of the Russian ruble at 5.87 karbovantsy. At the same time, enterprises are prescribed to sell one-half of their foreign currency earnings at this exchange rate, and the other half at a rate no more than double the official one, that is, about 14,200 karbovantsy per dollar. The National Bank was also told—"despite the position of its leadership on this issue"—to limit the number of commercial banks that are granted the right to engage in foreign currency operations.

Then it turned out that Ye. Zvyahilskyy and V. Yushchenko had already signed a decree, this time prohibiting commercial banks from deviating from the double value of the official exchange rate by more than 2.5 percent. This caused panic in financial circles. And no wonder: For more than a month banks have been buying dollars at 25,000-26,000 karbovantsy to the dollar, which in the new situation equals considerable losses.

Exporters of goods, who earn foreign currency income for Ukraine, also feel shortchanged. While the compulsory sale of one-half of foreign currency earnings at an extremely low rate may be considered a tax of sorts, until recently they have been selling the other half at the exchange at 30,000-32,000 karbovantsy per dollar. Now "the good times are over." All this is simply laughable when taken against the background of unending laments on the subject of falling Ukrainian exports. Apparently, those who do not wish to export their products at a loss also lack that proverbial "conscience."

The government, of course, cares least of all about ordinary citizens who have saved a few dollars for a "rainy day." Needless to say, in conditions of hyperinflation there is no alternative to a personal hard currency reserve, which, naturally, cannot be built on a salary paid by the state. So why should we be surprised that the government wants to bring this "rainy day" closer and thus force consumers to part with their dollar savings, just as in the past they parted with their Savings Bank deposits!

The "black market" bosses, on the other hand, may rejoice. The war against civilized market mechanisms recognized all over the world resurrects their power. We should remember that selling foreign currency in unauthorized places remains an administrative misdemeanor and may result in confiscation of foreign currency and a fine. Naturally, a "black market" dealer may feel secure and will even assist in militia racketeering aimed against deals not controlled by the mafia. As a result, we should expect a further criminalization of market relations and increasing chaos, which is the price the economy always pays for hypocritical arbitrariness on the part of the state.

To be fair, we have to point out that the war against the foreign currency market temporarily artificially raises the value of the karbovanets. But who will benefit from this, considering that another sharp jump in prices is slated for December? Apparently, those who will receive cash karbovanetsy for goods sold at new prices. It is quite easy to see here the connection between the trade sector mafia and that of the foreign currency "black market," which ensures mutually profitable cooperation for them. Well, while trade mafia profits have lately faded in comparison with the superprofits of financial aces, the good old times are coming back now (was this not predicted when the composition of the new government was announced?).

All of this shows not only where Ukraine is being led, but also how it is being led. The government today is obviously prone to unexpected turns, and this promises even greater chaos in the future. When this material was being written, an announcement was made that television will no longer broadcast programs during the day. A new victory for a frugal economy! Only God—or those who consider themselves His deputy in Ukraine—know whether the next victory will consist of closing down the newspapers.

Massive Price Rises Detailed

944K0413A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian 8 Dec 93
pp 1-2

[Article by NEZAVISIMOST commentator Yanina Sokolovskaya under the rubric "Price List Details": "Impoverished Millionaires: This Is What the Inhabitants of Ukraine Will Become in December"]

[Text] According to the rules of military science, coups are best accomplished on a Friday night, when the activity of the masses worn out during the work week ebbs. Apparently, it was in compliance with this postulate that an announcement concerning a universal and full price increase was made in Ukraine precisely on a Friday night.

Unlike the previous, gradual raises, in the course of which goods sitting in warehouses and at stores were sold at old prices, this time around price increases for all goods and services were turned on instantaneously throughout the entire country, as if a switch had been thrown. Let us not gossip about the amount of profits this action could net for hustlers in the trade sector and the proportion of the profits that the state got. Something else was much more conspicuous for those on this side of the counter: as had been expected, the percentage scope of increases in the prices of goods given by the government turned out to be substantially understated. The price of milk went up by a factor of approximately six rather than 2.6, the price of butter—by a factor of 2.5 rather than 1.6, and the prices of other small (household) items—by factors of three to four rather than 2.1.

It turned out that the government retained jurisdiction only over the fixing of sugar prices. Determination of the cost of other components of the "consumer basket" was made the domain of local administrations.

The Cabinet of Ministers will follow this from a distance, and influence it from the sidelines by offering reference prices and setting the level of trade and industrial markups (no more than 55 percent) and the 5-percent profit margin in order to contain the growth of prices.

Nonetheless, prices are growing and will continue to grow by leaps and bounds. By failing to compensate for the decline in the standard of living, the quite scanty local budgets are once again bringing us closer to an issue and ration-card system. For example, it has already been announced in Kiev that each resident of the city is allowed only 400 grams of butter per month at a fixed price, which is by no means low. This is almost like the song says: "Nine grams in your heart...."

The top echelon of Ukraine has repeatedly called what is happening "price liberalization which, to a reasonable extent, should stimulate production."

This would have been likely under a market scenario of development. However, given our eccentricities tending in the direction of command administration, such stimulation of production appears quite dubious, along with the talk in the ministries about promptly reining in inflation, restoring the purchasing power of the Ukrainian karbovanets, and preventing further emission (which is likely to exceed 25 trillion on account of an increase in minimum retirement benefits and wages alone).

No matter how much wages are raised, one will hardly succeed in putting together a rich diet with honestly earned "dough." According to conservative calculations, sustenance for an adult will claim more than 560,000 karbovanetsy a month. The inhabitants of Ukraine are beginning to stock up on belts in order to have something to tighten on a "rainy day."

Under the circumstances, information disseminated through UNIAN channels concerning the possibility of the introduction in Ukraine of "a state of emergency with centralized distribution of output, introduction of rationing, mobilization of the foreign exchange funds of commercial structures in order to purchase energy resources, and political measures—postponing the period of holding the election campaign, bans on parties..." appears quite likely.

In the opinion of experts, the ambiguously alarming situation will drag on until February. Restoration of relative economic equilibrium is projected for the end of February. As Minister of the Economy Roman Shpek commented, "a state of emergency does not have to be proclaimed. It will suffice to take emergency measures."

As far as these measures are concerned, they have already been discussed briefly at the meeting of the Presidium of the Cabinet of Ministers which was held on 6 December. They include joint actions by the government and the National Bank of Ukraine to avert the emission of credit and bring down inflation. However, as those in attendance said themselves, there is no way for us to avoid a new price increase, although it will not be as runaway as this one. This means that the growth of wages is likewise unavoidable. Many of our fellow citizens will then accomplish something that was inconceivable before—they will become millionaires. It is a pity, though, that they will be impoverished millionaires.

Average Prices for More Expensive Foodstuffs in Kiev

Foodstuffs	New prices, karbovantsy
Split-top bread loaf	2,300...2,800
"Ukrainian" bread	2,100...2,300
Bulk milk (one liter)	5,000
Milk (one bottle)	2,900
Sour cream (on average)	30,000
Farmer's cheese (on average)	17,000
Meat (on average)	35,000
Boiled sausage (depending on grade)	36,100...57,500

Cost of Electricity Sold To Meet Communal and Household Needs (per kw-hour)

	Rate, karbovantsy/kw-hour		
	Maximum consumption level per consumer, kw-hours	Within the quota of the maximum consumption per month	Above the maximum level
In rural localities	75	50	180
In urban localities (with the exception of houses with stationary electric ranges)	75	90	180
In urban localities (in houses with stationary electric ranges)	190	60	180
Garden plots, gardening and construction cooperatives, gardening associations	10	90	180
Garage-building cooperatives, garages for personal cars	2	90	180

Price Rises Said To Bring Strike Threat

944K0413B Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian 8 Dec 93
pp 1-2

[Article by Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, UPPRESSA, under the rubric "Price List Details": "The 'Preelection' Price Rises: A Strike Explosion May Make Ukraine Tremble"]

[Text] Each price increase resembles a shock, the consequences of which come to be perceived only later. The stupor that overcame a majority of the common citizens after just a glance at price tags will only wear off in a day or two.

The situation in which Ukrainian citizens greeted yet another administrative price increase is characterized by some of the details given below.

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine received about 40 percent of the funds requested to pay wages to officers and warrant officers.

They barely succeeded in establishing a dialogue at the locomotive house in Nikolayev with railway workers who had gone on strike two months earlier and were demanding that wages be indexed 80 percent in the course of the forthcoming price increase; three extra [monthly] wages were urgently paid to the workers.

The situation in the Donbass is even worse. Aleksandr Mrii, chairman of the Independent Trade Union of Miners, said: "We cannot guarantee tranquility for the people. If the state does not urgently come up with 1 trillion karbovantsy in order to pay the debts of enterprises, an explosion is unavoidable." His assistant Vladimir Derkach added: "In Donetsk they have just begun to issue November wages to miners; the growth of wages has long fallen behind the growth of prices. If people do not receive their wages, which at least provide an opportunity to live, something terrible will happen." The demand to increase wages which is almost always the leading motive in any miners' strike in reality amounts merely to an attempt to return to the previously achieved status quo: at present the miners are demanding wages of 2.2 million [karbovantsy], that is, about \$80 at the real exchange rate. This is actually the July wage in real terms.

The government could not fail to understand what an abrupt increase in the cost of living means as it violated quite a number of provisions in the General Tariff Agreement with trade unions, including among others the agreement on the mandatory coordination of price increases with workers' organizations. As these lines are being written, conferences are being held in the chapters of the free trade unions at which decisions on how to act under the current conditions are being made. The issue of whether strikes are to be held or not has not even

arisen. They are only discussing the degree to which the free trade unions will be able to control the strike, which poses the threat of an uncontrollable social explosion otherwise.

The situation in the capital city is amply illustrated by the words of Gita Moiseyevna Kolker, senior physician of emergency medical services of Kiev: "The number of fatalities that occurred on 6 December is without precedent in my medical practice. On 5 December five fatalities were registered during the entire day, whereas before 12:30 on 6 December—12 deaths."

Having yet again plucked the money from the wallets of its fellow citizens, the government apparently was not entirely sure about the consequences of the shock. For this reason, it launched in the evening of 4 December a report on preparations for the state of emergency which had been planned at a joint conference of the ministers of the economy, finance, and defense. People's Deputy of Ukraine Stepan Khmara said: "This report is something of a trial balloon of the power structure, a deliberate instigation for a social explosion, the consequences of which will be passed off as the reason for canceling the elections. The people will simply not bear this price sprint."

1994 Commodity Export Regulations

944K0403A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
4 Dec 93 p 2

[Commodity export regulations: "In the Interests of the State"]

[Text] For the purpose of an improvement in the regulation of foreign economic relations, a tightening of government supervision of foreign trade transactions, and the guaranteed payment into the foreign exchange fund of Ukraine of a corresponding part of the currency earnings of exporting organizations, the cabinet proposes that particular groups of commodities (coal, ammonia, ethylene, benzene, methanol, mineral fertilizers, ferrous metals, grain, sugar) be exported in 1994 on special conditions. They will be regulated by the corresponding statute, which is published below.

Statute on the Procedure of Commodity Exports Realized by Subjects of Foreign Economic Activity in 1994 Specially Authorized by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

1. This statute determines the procedure of shipments of particular types of highly profitable commodities, for which special export conditions shall be introduced for the purpose of the protection of state economic interests, prevention of the unlawful investment of currency earnings overseas, and the unwarranted competition of Ukrainian enterprises on the foreign market. The list of such products shall be published in the mass media.

2. The decision to grant enterprises (organizations) the right to export strategically important raw material commodities shall be adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the basis of the findings of an expert state interdepartmental commission under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine as proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

The expert state interdepartmental commission approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall include specialists of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the State Committee for Material Resources, the Security Service, and the ministries and departments that have jurisdiction over the enterprises producing the strategically important commodities.

3. Enterprises and organizations wishing to avail themselves of the right to export the said commodities shall submit to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations a written application and the package of documents in accordance with the attached list.

4. In accordance with a decision of the expert state interdepartmental commission, other information concerning their foreign economic activity may be required of the enterprises and organizations producing strategically important commodities.

5. The applications shall be examined and the documents studied within 15 working days following their registration in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, after which the material and the findings thereon shall be presented for approval to the expert state interdepartmental commission under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (authority shall be given to the enterprises that have come out the winners as a result of competitive bid (tender)).

6. The decision on enterprises and organizations being accorded the right to export strategically important commodities shall be formalized by the corresponding directive of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, on the basis of which the subjects of foreign economic activity shall be issued a certificate of the established specimen by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

A substantiated refusal to grant the right to export such commodities shall be presented to the applicant in writing above the signature of the chairman of the expert state interdepartmental commission.

7. The enterprises and organizations that are granted the right to export commodities in accordance with the special conditions shall be required to fulfill export supplies of the said products in accordance with orders of enterprises that have not been granted this right.

8. The list of enterprises and organizations that have been granted the right to export strategically important commodities shall be published in the mass media and

also forwarded by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to the appropriate ministries and departments.

9. Enterprises and organizations may be deprived of the right to export strategically important commodities by a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in case of:

—violation of current legislation of Ukraine; failure to comply with the demands of legislation of a foreign state if this has caused economic damage; failure to discharge export commodity supply obligations; exports of commodities (products) at dumping prices; unfair competition.

List of Documents Presented by the Enterprise (Organization) to the Expert State Interdepartmental Commission To Obtain the Right To Export Commodities in Accordance With the Special Conditions

1. A written application indicating the Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Nomenclature export commodity list, date of creation, the founders, the numbers of employees, the relations between the Ukrainian and foreign partners, the areas of economic activity, including information on import-export transactions, the extent of the commodity turnover, financial results of activity in the past two years, and the annual balance for the previous year and also a concise technical-economic justification of the expediency of realization of the said exports based on an analysis of market conditions and state benefits.
2. A registration card in four copies containing the OKPO [All-Union Enterprises and Organization Classifier] (eight-digit), SOATO [System of Support for Facilities of the Administrative-Territorial Division of the USSR and the Union Republics and Also Localities] (seven-digit), and the OKONKH [All-Union National Economy Sector Classifier] codes.
3. Notarized copies of the constituting documents (charter, agreement) with addenda and revisions and the certificate of registration of the subject of entrepreneurial activity.
4. The certificate of the state statistical authorities concerning conferment of the codes.
5. A certificate of the banking institution concerning the existence of karbovanets and foreign currency accounts showing the amounts in them and confirming the solvency of the enterprise (organization) and the possibility of it being granted credit in the corresponding amount.
6. A financial report for the previous two years with an analysis of movement of monetary resources.
7. A list of the export contracts concluded and fulfilled in the previous two years and the contracts in respect to the stated group of commodities above the signature of the leader and person responsible for the finance office. The list should be attested by a seal with the attachment of a

copy of the licenses on the strength of which these contracts were concluded (for joint ventures, a copy of the customs declarations).

Statistics Show Decline in Sevastopol Economic Situation

944K0364A Sevastopol SLAVA SEVASTOPOLYA
in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 1

[Article by V. Ivanov: "Carthage Is Falling"]

[Text] During the first 10 days of November, afflicted by the cold, waiting lines and lack of light and money, tormented by criminals of all stripes, Sevastopol did not seem to pay any attention to the extraordinary event that had occurred in Ukraine. Austria, Italy, France, Germany, and the United States threatened to cut off all the republic's lines of credit. After this the European Parliament suspended the program for technical aid to Ukraine. From now on we can expect no charity from anywhere. What happened was bound to happen. The West will not help us, and this has been said repeatedly by people with common sense, but, unfortunately, we did not want to listen to them. Nobody needs us. Nobody needs our poor-quality products, not one of the moneybags wants to give us access to their market, nobody wants to invest dollars and marks in us so that their money will produce another competitor. The illusions have been dispelled, the hopes of the fools were in vain. In the world to which we were so zealously led by big-time and small-time politicians, we have ended up alone, one on one with economic destruction, political ills, and a sense of inexorably impending doom.

According to the prediction of Deputy Prime Minister of the Economy V. Pynzenyk, who has suddenly decided to speak, come 1 December in Ukraine transportation, many productions that consume oil and its derivatives, and also gas, will grind to a halt. Nobody will be able to buy them through state channels because of the restrictions put in place by L. Kravchuk's Edict "On Measures for Restraining Price Growth Rates." And the state cannot do anything. According to the opinions of Western experts that have appeared in the press, Ukraine has only about two months left to live.

If the former deputy prime minister is frightened, it is understandable—he has begun his election campaign—but if people who just yesterday were promising mountains of gold are intimidated, this really is alarming.

The first early freezes have shown that neither Kiev nor Moscow nor even Simferopol need Sevastopol either. Our organs of power have once again convinced everyone that they cannot work in an anticipatory mode, but under extreme conditions they are capable, at least partially, of acting like they are rushing to a fire. Just because one of the low-level bosses has received a dressing-down or a reprimand, this does not make it any warmer in the homes, there are no more goods on the shelves of the stores that were so zealously commercialized and leased out, there is no smell of gasoline at the

majority of service stations that have been turned over to private hands, and the majority of delegations that were sent out after the freezes have returned without any special results. Only crime and the social ills are growing. And the local mafia are going wild before our eyes and after them the thirst for blood is overcoming people who used to be decent citizens.

Everything that has been done and is being done in this state and in this city has proceeded and is proceeding to the tune of catchwords about improving the life of the people. I personally have never heard a single statement from the president, his assistants, the local representatives, or deputies to the effect that one innovation or another was directed against the people. So why after so many years are we still seeing no signs of this "improvement" or "advancement"? It means that we are being deceived, or else the helmsmen themselves did not know and do not know what they are doing. Allusions to intrigues of enemies in the state and city are groundless. We do not believe that we are being led by residents of foreign intelligence organizations or enemies of the people.

The abridged summary from the administration of statistics about Sevastopol's social and economic development during January-October shows a free-fall of the city's economy into an abyss. Here are the basic characteristics of the collapse.

Rates of Increase and Reduction (-) of the Most Important Indicators of Social and Economic Development During January-October 1993.

	actually (%)	
	1993	1992
Volume of industrial output	-1.3	-19.7
Production of consumer goods (total)	-12.7	-7.8
including: foodstuffs	-14.3	9.2
nonfoodstuffs (not including light industry goods)	-8.7	4.4
light industry goods	-8.6	1.1
wine and vodka items and beer	-7.7	5.7

Concealed beneath these figures are the growth of prices, wages that do not meet the elementary physiological needs of a human being, and the inexorable winding down of once powerful productions. Statistics show that during nine months of this year the number of workers in industry decreased by 10.4 percent as compared to the same period of last year. The proportion of women working in industry was 46.7 percent. Women have already become equal to men in our city.

City enterprises stood idle for 97,848 man-days because of a lack of processed materials, raw materials, and work orders. During the nine months the losses per one worker amounted to 8.8 days. This was in industry, and in

construction it was 5.5 days, trade—2.3 days, at public catering enterprises—2.1 days, and at consumer service enterprises—2.5 days.

The bare figures are wearisome. They give no hope and they do not cover the nakedness of the leaders, who are no longer rulers but are not comrades either. They show that no anticrisis mechanisms are working yet; all the programs are still projections and nothing more.

If there are no positive changes in the economy, it is naive to hope that they will come in other spheres of the city's life. Against the background of this continuing decay, cheerful appeals to stay calm and wait sound simply unconscionable.

To wait means to accept everything as it is today. To accept poverty, cold, bloodsuckers who are getting fat on human poverty, who have bought the leaders wholesale and are selling them retail, and to accept murder as an inevitable byproduct of the reforms, and the impossibility of giving the elderly everything they need and helping children who have long become pale from malnutrition. Those who call for patience today are pursuing just one goal: to sit at the feed troughs as long as possible.

So far, in my view, there are no forces in the city that are capable of overcoming this ill-fated course of events. At least, they have not yet made themselves known. Nor is there any unifying idea that is comprehensible and attractive to the majority. Although in the near future there will begin to be an intensive glimmering in the political sky. The elections lie ahead and the time left is being counted in days. I hope that the right to take over the helm will be won not by the person who has run the country and the city into the ground but the one who will set the goal of nurturing and protecting the producer of goods and services, who will create conditions for the prosperity not of the wheeler-dealer but the worker, the physician, the kolkhoz worker, the farmer, the teacher, the baker, the fisherman, the ones who provide water, feed, cure, and teach both this country and this city. And it is not important whether it is a private party or a statesman. As long as they produce. Otherwise it is all over.

Our clever leaders do not want to accept the simple truth. And God help us to make it through peacefully until the first warm days when the grass turns green. That is the main thing. Not to throw stones, not to speak at rallies, but, using available methods determined by law, to force the powers that be to solve the problems upon which not only our well-being but our lives depend.

There is an old formula tried and true: The only firm that will fight for a politician is the one that has invested money in him. Under our conditions this law clearly shows who has bought whom in this city. Corruption will appear in all its glory. And it is appearing.

Even if Ukraine wanted to give significant aid to Sevastopol today, it could not do so. According to data of the Republic Ministry of Statistics, the crisis of the economy

is growing everywhere. During nine months of this year as compared to the same period of last year the gross domestic product decreased by 11 percent and the national income decreased by 12 percent. The average monthly per capita incomes of the population increased 15.9-fold, and prices—24-fold. In order to patch up the holes, the printing press is grinding tirelessly and the issuance of money has reached 4,755.2 billion karbovantsy (9.7-fold). The production of food, coal, and gas is decreasing inexorably and the volume of commodity output in industry is declining. The indicators for transportation and communications are all worse.

During the time of its perestroika and "rozbudova" [buildup], Ukraine has been transformed into a raw material appendage of developed countries. They continue to buy from us at inexpensive prices ferrous metals, ore, mineral fertilizers, and floating vessels to be scrapped. The oversaturated foreign market will not accept anything else. Sevastopol too is helping more and more in this unprecedented sellout.

I do not know how you react to statistical figures, but I am embarrassed by the fact that a band of politicians were able so unceremoniously and flagrantly to deceive an entire people and bring them to their knees. Listen to the speeches of the present day guides of all ranks; none of them will take the blame for the fact that the country has been ravaged, degraded, and deceived in the best of hopes, that the people have been thoughtlessly divided into a small bunch of nouveau riche and a large mass of beggars, or that thieves and murderers crept out of every crack. They still have the audacity to speak of certain appreciable achievements of ours. They say things could be worse.

The disaster that has overtaken the country is carefully disguised. In Sevastopol this is noticeable even from the statistical summary, which contains no figures on capital construction, transportation, communications, health protection, education, the environment, legal violations, etc. It is possible to hide everything, even one's own destruction. But nobody will be buried alive voluntarily. One should not forget about this unwillingness, even if someone might feel for a moment that he is the center of the earth. It is dangerous.

Donbass Miners Seek Work in Neighboring Rostov

944K0416A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
7 Dec 93 p 1

[Article by A. Voliy Yeremenko: "Donbass: Miners Succumbed to Earnings, and... Not Only Broke the Laws of a Neighboring State But Also the Solidarity of the Workers"]

[Text] Like residents of Lugansk, some Donetsk miners also succumbed to earnings in nearby foreign areas. Formalities in the system of work according to the watch method at coal enterprises, which, by the way, is forbidden by Russian legislation, have been simplified to

the extreme. It is enough for a miner who has decided to "make a pile of money" in a neighboring oblast to apply to the numerous recruiters or simply to sit in a bus obligingly sent by the folks from Rostov.

There is no denying that the phenomena is absolutely new. For the time being its dimensions have not been determined exactly; however, it can be asserted that the number of interested persons continues to increase. The miners, of course, are attracted to the earnings. Tunneling and coal-mining foremen are not intimidated by the fact that, as a rule, they are paid half as much as their Russian colleagues. And, indeed, it becomes necessary for some to work for 12 hours at a stretch, and to work without any particular claims and conveniences, and at times almost in real hovels.

As reported in the local press, even an experienced person, Fedor Khlebnikov, chairman of the Rostov regional organization of the miners independent trade union, was horrified when he saw the conditions in which 37 Donetsk miners live at the Mayskaya mine. In addition to everything else, the farsighted Rostov contract employers do not guarantee the implementation of all points of social protection of the traditional collective contract. As a result, it is still not known who will bear responsibility and have to pay a claim in the event that, God forbid, our miner sustains an injury.

Even knowing all this very well, people nevertheless endure the discomfort, tear themselves away from their families, and take risks. Lately, people in a number of Donetsk mines have been not only been leaving individually. Entire groups and sectors are breaking away. Nobody is making a secret of their decision. Calculate, they say, the 200,000 ruble [R] pay of a shift worker converted at the market rate of exchange into karbovantsy...

The discouraged directors of Donetsk mines, even if they know that the value of a ruble versus a karbovanets is artificially raised, cannot do anything for the time being. Therefore, they reluctantly sign applications for the best ones. Even there no one needs those who are the worst.

The influx of "Varangians" has been ambiguously perceived in Rostov Oblast. Agreeing to work under humiliating contracts, the Donetsk miners are unceremoniously invading the holy of holies of their Russian colleagues, and are placing miners' solidarity in doubt.

A traitorous breach was noted between the Russian and Ukrainian miners, who earlier amicably and repeatedly came out with a single demand. Some people feel sorry for the workers, but in the main they are contemptuously called strike-breakers. It is for this reason that, defending the interests of their own members, the Rostov regional organization of the Miners Independent Trade Union, in the words of its leader, will be compelled to raise the question at the next congress of independent trade unions of the CIS.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Chornovil on Strasbourg Talks

944K0368A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
3 Dec 93 p 2

[Interview with Vyacheslav Chornovil, head of the People's Rukh of Ukraine, by Andriy Derepa; place and date not given: "What Was Discussed in Strasbourg"]

[Text]

[Derepa] Mr. Vyacheslav, what was the highlight of your trip?

[Chornovil] It was the second conference of political figures, journalists, and scholars from Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Robert Schuman Institute [for Europe]. The former took place in Paris last year. The other—in Strasbourg, at the Council of Europe.

The West has a great interest in the relationship between Ukraine and Russia; the discussion was lively and very intense. Unfortunately, we have not seen any shift in attitude toward this problem on the Russian side. The Russian delegation was headed by Andreanik Migranyan, member of the Presidential Council; one of the leaders was Dzhakhan Polliyeva, adviser to the deputy head of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation. I was the head of our delegation; other members were Volodymyr Lanovyy, Les Tanyuk, Vitaliy Zhuravskyy, and journalist Volodymyr Skachko.

The discussion revealed interesting points: Russian representatives in full voice, without reservation, spoke of lebensraum, the vital interests of Russia on the territory of former republics of the Soviet Union. Ukraine also is included in the so-called sphere of Russia's vital interests. And they maintain that the status of these countries should be completely different from, for instance, Austria and Germany. By the way, their appetite extends also to Poland and Hungary. They are categorically against these countries joining the European Community, or NATO, or other European associations without Russia, since this is a sphere of Russia's interests.

We had to put them in their proper place; tell our German and French colleagues about the abnormal situation that has emerged in connection with such statements; refute various tendentious allegations that all our democratic forces are built on an anti-Russian foundation, that we are conducting a process of nearly forcible de-Russification, and other such things. On the second day of the discussion we began to iron out contradictions somewhat. In any case, we saw that European politicians now understand us a little better

than the Russians—perhaps because Russian representatives spoke in a tone of ultimatum with respect to the European Community, in particular the Council of Europe. For instance, Migranyan will have to think twice about joining the Council of Europe (although nobody has invited them there) now that it has been joined by Estonia and Latvia, which violate human rights. We asked about the status of Ukrainian in Russia, about the numerous violations with respect to us. About the decision of the Russian parliament, which still has not been repealed, regarding territorial claims against Ukraine on the subject of Sevastopol; and about keeping Russian military units on the territory of other states against their will.

It turns out that members of the Council of Europe are well versed in certain aspects of the situation in Ukraine. For instance, Senator Louis Jung, president of the Robert Schuman Institute and member of the European Parliament from France, said that he already knows that an antidemocratic election law has been adopted in our country and asked that we send them the text as soon as it is published so that the Council of Europe's expert commission can see whether this election law corresponds to accepted norms of democratic development of countries. This is more or less a summary of our two-day discussion.

[Derepa] And what is the European Community's position on Ukraine's ratification of the START I treaty?

[Chornovil] Generally positive. You know, this was not a subject of heated discussions. They took note of our information. We, by the way, at the same time emphasized that the Russian side blames us for all sorts of farfetched things, but let them explain why their Ostankino on the whole did not report on the START I ratification and did not comment on it properly. I think that despite all the Ukrainian reservations, Western politicians believe that Ukraine has made a positive step. I felt that the reaction to the ratification was positive.

One more circumstance we all took note of: A considerable number of the Russian delegation, especially the leadership, propounded openly chauvinistic views (for example, that the notion of nation should be discarded). European politicians delicately explained to them that there exist such notions as the French, German, and so on, nation. A national minority, on the other hand, is an invention; there are no national minorities. They talked themselves to the point (especially the aforementioned Polliyeva) that in the past we had been essentially one nation—the Soviet people, and that the disintegration of the Union is a great loss. That is, they advanced old theories that science already discarded in the period of so-called perestroika. It has been a long time since we have heard such openly chauvinistic attitudes, and we were quite surprised by the openness of them.

BELARUS

Prospects for Market Reforms Examined

944K0376A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 49,
1-7 Dec 93 p 6

[Article by Aleksandr Cherepanov: "And Kebich Disagrees With Balcerowicz"]

[Text] A powerful explosive device went off recently at Independence Square in Minsk. The Party of Justice, which claimed responsibility for this terrorist act, in addition to "the main goal—restoration of the USSR"—set for itself a no less important, in its opinion, task—a "return to socialist justice and the restoration of the socialist basis of economic activities...." It is doubtful, however, that the new bombers, who have set a historic goal for themselves, know what the Belarusian economy actually is. No one has a sensible answer to this question.

In the former Soviet Union, the Belarusian economy was closely linked to that of the other republics, especially Russia and Ukraine. According to IMF estimates, in 1988 goods turnover between them comprised 44 percent of total gross product. If we look at these links in terms of the current, "post-Union" categories as foreign trade of sorts, their volume was comparable to indicators characterizing the turnover of countries comparable with Belarus in population—such as the Netherlands or Belgium.

The dominant place in Belarusian imports was occupied by fuel and raw materials, and investment means; in exports—output of the chemical and oil refining industry, machine building, means of transportation, and consumer goods (refrigerators, clocks, etc.). The collapse of an integrated economic mechanism had a considerable negative effect on Minsk. Since the second half of 1991 trade turnover with other states that had emerged on the territory of the former USSR has been declining. In 1992 it had already fallen by one-third. The causes of this phenomenon are quite prosaic: the production decline in the economies of Belarus' main partners—Russia and Ukraine—and the ruble losing its function as a means of payment as a result of its replacement by Belarusian "zoological" coupons.

The collapse of centralized planning during the "post-USSR" period gave life to two more negative trends, which to a large extent limited trade turnover inside the CIS. The first was the introduction of local compulsory licensing for importing and exporting goods from oblasts and autonomies. The second was the change in the structure of prices. In 1992 in Belarus' trade with other countries, prices approached the world level. This included first and foremost fuel. According to IMF estimates, for Minsk this means in particular a worsening of the terms of trade by 30 percent. But even already concluded agreements are not being fully carried out by partners.

Thus it is easy to explain the catastrophic Belarusian economic indicators. While in 1992 national income fell by 11 percent, and industrial production by 10 percent, in the first quarter of 1993 alone they fell by 14 percent and 16.5 percent respectively, and the volume of investment in production declined by 15 percent. The current situation is also exacerbated by the absence of any serious steps in the direction of economic reform.

Of special interest is the relatively low unemployment rate. Last year it amounted to only 1.2 percent of the labor force. This indicator is still quite low now. Minsk cannot bring itself to implement mass layoffs at unprofitable enterprises.

At the same time, prices continue to soar... Minsk's attempts to "put a brake" on inflation only caused a new wave of budget expenditures. And although retail prices, especially for the main categories of foodstuffs, remained under state control, and for some ration coupons were introduced, nevertheless the supply of food to the population has not improved. A further decline in food reserves may worsen the general situation (the explosion in Minsk mentioned above is only one of the examples) by the end of the current year.

So what can one say today about Belarus' "entry into the market economy"? One of the most important indicators—the private sector share—shows that, for instance, at the end of 1992 the state sector accounted for 48 percent of trade turnover, cooperatives for 32 percent, and only 20 percent was handled by enterprises functioning on the basis of lease or other forms of ownership. The report of the German Institute of Economic Research mentions that centralized administration still dominates the Belarusian economy. There is no chance of "shock therapy à la Balcerowicz"—the Belarusian leadership would only consider a gradual transition to a controlled market.

Privatization, both in its abridged and expanded version, remains only on paper. Despite the fact that the law on economic downsizing was passed by the republic parliament in January 1993. It was envisaged that 60 percent of state property would be transferred free of charge into the hands of the population, and 20 percent sold at the lowest prices to labor collectives. But in February the process was already halted by the decision of the same Supreme Soviet. Despite this, as well as the fact that privatization terms have not yet been fully defined, the Kebich government still plans to implement it before the end of this year with respect to 17 percent of state enterprises.

Without doubt, the state should spearhead structural changes in the Belarusian economy. There are two restraining factors standing in the way of this: the formal one—the parliament has not yet passed the respective law; and the real one—the lack of budget means. It is still not known what the budget deficit was at the closing of the last fiscal year (it was guesstimated at 2 percent of gross national income). It is anticipated that in the

current fiscal year it will reach 6 percent. Keeping in mind that government obligations remain in effect in the social sphere, in the area of subsidies for basic goods, and with respect to many enterprises, one may come to a conclusion that there will not be any money left for reforming the economy as such. Besides, the direction of the reform is absolutely unclear. On the one hand there is a clear desire to make a transition to market relations; on the other, a strong mechanism of state supervision remains in place. Thus, the existing dualism in the economic sphere portends only a further increase of instability.

What will happen to the Belarusian economy? Nobody can give a definite answer to this question. At the same time, the explosion mentioned above may reverberate strongly among the public against the background of rising prices, emergence of state borders, and gasoline shortages. We can hardly count on finding solutions to overcoming all problems in the area of political decisions, especially those as absurd as restoration of the USSR.

Opposition Hits Kebich for Energy Deal

944K0429A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Dec 93 p 2

[Article by Mikhail Shimanskiy: "Opposition Is Accusing the Government of Selling Belarus Out"]

[Text] Minsk—Major industrial enterprises and associations in Belarus are announcing that they are closing for holidays or going on furlough. The main reason is the lack of electric power; the Gomselmash has stopped, the Minsk tractor factory has switched to a shorter working week...

It seems there was hope the other day for a "warm-up" after the negotiations between the republic's prime minister, V. Kebich, and the head of the Russian Government, V. Chernomyrdin. The first issues discussed with Chernomyrdin was energy. With respect to crude oil, a "zero variant" had been achieved by the time of negotiations: Belarus no longer owes a single Russian ruble or a single dollar for oil, which means that this "zero" is to Belarus' advantage. But the Belarusian debt for natural gas amounts to over R150 billion. Kebich says that, according to the decision of the Russian minister of finance, B. Fedorov, R32 billion in technical credits due Belarus were given directly to the gas suppliers. In fact, the issue of the republic's debt for gas in this year has been removed by the Russian Government. Now Belarus is receiving more natural gas than before, V. Kebich assured deputies.

An important agreement was reached on the creation of a joint-stock company with the participation of Belarusian oil refineries, the Novopolotskiy and the Mozyrskiy ones; some of its stock will be owned also by two large Russian associations from Tyumenneft. Finally, Kebich said, we have agreed that there should be a political declaration on including our republic and Russia in a

single monetary system. Chernomyrdin thinks that Belarus is the only CIS country so far that can join such a system.

The Belarusian parliament was not quite unequivocal in its acceptance of the negotiation results. This is understandable as they were talking about matters that are of vital importance for Belarus. The parliamentary opposition asked a question point-blank: You can find free cheese only in a mousetrap; it is very important for Belarusians to know what the terms are for paying off the oil debt and the gas loan? Is there a high "price" for Belarus to pay for its entry into the ruble zone?

The opposition leader Z. Poznyak thinks that the government is not doing anything serious either in the area of fuel or the monetary system, therefore, they should hear Kebich's explanations immediately. However, the government says that it is doing things. But all this is only on paper, what about reality? As we have already mentioned, enterprises have to suspend operations due to the lack of fuel. Villages do not have any means of carrying fertilizer into the fields. It is cold in residential housing. Children are freezing in schools and kindergartens.

The republic cannot come out of its most severe energy crisis in one day, of course. But it has been with us since this summer. How many meetings and negotiations on oil and gas have taken place during this time, how many promises were there! Russia will not heat Belarus for free, of course—everything has to be paid for. But a legitimate question is what price we pay. However, it seems that the republic leaders cannot answer this question now. Or they do not want to.

NARODNAYA GAZETA, the organ of the Belarus Supreme Soviet, just published a most critical article headlined "The Sale of Belarus Has Begun. What Comes Next?" It was written by a group of republic people's deputies that includes some opposition members. The deputies have come to the conclusion that the political declaration about the entry of Belarus and Russia into a single monetary system will in reality mean a rejection of independence by Belarus.

As you can see, it is a categorical opinion. Kebich and his cabinet are being directly accused of selling out Belarus but so far they are keeping silence.

MOLDOVA

Commission Seeks Russian Action on Dniester Issues

944K0420A Chisinau NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 2

["Statement of Members of the Joint Control Commission from the Republic of Moldova"]

[Text] The following statement has been handed to the Moldova-pres national agency for distribution:

Evaluating the current situation in the security zone controlled by the peacekeeping force, members of the Joint Control Commission from the Republic of Moldova are forced once again to declare that the Dniester side is failing to discharge the obligations pertaining to realization of the Moldavian-Russian Agreement of 21 July 1992 "Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova" which it had assumed.

During the armed rebellion in Moscow the Dniester authorities not only dispatched their combatants from the Dniester Battalion and weapons to assist the putschists but also openly incited the development of similar events in the security zone of the Republic of Moldova. The military commissariats of the Left Bank and the city of Bendery announced a callup of reservists. In the night of 3 October the city of Bendery and other localities were taken over by armed special militia subunits and border troops while the military contingent of peacekeepers of the Russian Federation, despite the tense atmosphere, were in barracks. A large quantity of weapons and munitions were conveyed without hindrance to many facilities of Bendery which had earlier been declared mustering points for the reservists.

Following the failure of the putsch in Moscow, members of the Joint Control Commission from the Republic of Moldova officially demanded on 13 October of the Peacekeeping Force Joint Military Command an immediate inspection of the locations where weapons were stored. But in breach of the Agreement and the decisions of the Joint Control Commission the parties' military observers were not admitted for an inspection of the facilities.

The local authorities of the city of Bendery (a city in which a stepped-up security posture has been announced and which is controlled by the peacekeeping force of Russia) is systematically preventing fulfillment of the Agreement and the decisions of the Joint Control Commission. Automatic weapons and ammunition were stored and continue to be stored at this time with their tacit consent at enterprises of the city. On 10 January of this year the Joint Control Commission was presented with Waybill No. 26 concerning the alleged transfer by the Bendery Machinery Plant to Tiraspol of a consignment of automatic weapons, grenade launchers, and ammunition. But this shipment was not monitored by the military observers or recorded by guard posts of the peacekeeping force.

Numerous militia subdivisions (PPS [precise expansion unknown], the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate, and such), which have undertaken to "secure" the curfew conditions in place of the peacekeeping force of Russia, have been formed willfully, without the authorization of the Joint Control Commission, in the city of Bendery in parallel with the operational-investigation group. Employees of state institutions (the law enforcement authorities, educational institutions, and schools) of the Republic of Moldova are being subjected to violence.

Various destructive forces have repeatedly picketed the Joint Control Commission, the military commandant's office, the operational-investigation group, and the passport office, thereby disrupting their normal working hours. The hounding of citizens who do not recognize the anticonstitutional authorities of the so-called Dniester Moldavian Republic is incessant. For this reason thousands of refugees cannot return to their permanent place of residence. The "Ilascu group" trial is being used by Tiraspol as a means of deterring dissidents. The combat engineer battalion stationed in the village of Parkan in Sloboziyskiy Rayon, which previously belonged to Russia's 14th Army and which subsequently was illegally transferred to the jurisdiction of the Dniester Moldavian Republic, has not been pulled out of the security zone, in violation of the Agreement and the decisions of the Joint Control Commission.

The demands of the Agreement and the decisions of the Joint Control Commission for the removal of the fortification structures and firing ports from the dam of the Dubesar State Hydroelectric Power Station and the bridges in Rybnica, Dubesar, and Bychok have still not been met. A solution of the question of restoration of the destroyed bridges and the installation of a vitally necessary pontoon-bridge passage across the River Dniester at the Vadulluy-Vode settlement is being blocked. The command of the Russian 14th Army is violating the principles of neutrality specified by the Agreement. Exercises with the participation of militarized formations of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic are being conducted at military proving grounds of the 14th Army. Practically the entire armament of the separatist groupings from the eastern areas of Moldova was illegally transferred to them by the command of military units of the 14th Army. There have been frequent instances of this armament having been shipped beyond Moldova. On 4 October of this year (at the time of the armed rebellion in Moscow) Ukrainian law enforcement authorities exposed a criminal group which included former servicemen of the 14th Army also. Some 39 grenade launchers, 990 grenades, two carbines, and approximately 10,000 cartridges were confiscated from the offenders upon their arrest. The CSCE mission in Moldova has for more than six months been unable to carry out the mandate granted it in the security zone on account of the fact that delegations from the Dniester region and the Russian Federation have been unjustifiably dragging out the adoption of a decision on the principles of cooperation between the CSCE mission and the Joint Control Commission. At the same time, on the other hand, the Tiraspol media have mounted yet another campaign of slander against the leadership of the Republic of Moldova, creating a new image of the enemy of the Dniester region and trying to persuade public opinion of the impossibility of the achievement of peace and harmony.

These and other violations have been discussed repeatedly at meetings of the Joint Control Commission and have been the occasion for statements of protest from

members of the Joint Control Commission from Moldova. But owing to the fact that members of the Joint Control Commission from the Dniester region are represented exclusively by extremist persons, including Matveyev-Goncharenko, who has been declared a traitor in Latvia, adopting constructive decisions to secure a peaceful settlement of the conflict is extremely difficult. A clearly passive position in realization of the Agreement and the decisions of the Joint Control Commission has been adopted here by members of the Joint Control Commission from Russia, who are thereby failing to support the role of guarantor in a settlement of the conflict assumed by the Russian Federation. An analysis of the situation taking shape in the security zone shows that the Dniester leaders have been using the Agreement of 21 July 1992 solely for their own political purposes—for the creation of anticonstitutional authorities, and for placing under their dictatorial control as large an amount of territory as possible, flagrantly flouting the basic principles of the Moldovan-Russian accords regarding respect for the sovereignty and independence and preservation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and the exclusion of all actions impeding a settlement of the conflict by peaceful political means.

To ensure lasting peace and security in the eastern areas of the Republic of Moldova and to enhance the efficiency of the activity of the mechanisms of a political settlement of the conflict it would seem expedient:

1. For the leadership of the Russian Federation to send to the Republic of Moldova an inspection team for joint verification of the parties' compliance with the Agreement of 21 July 1992;
2. To ensure the Russian Federation's fulfillment of the mission of guarantor in a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Dniester region of the Republic of Moldova;
3. To conduct an investigation of the instances of involvement in the armed rebellion in Moscow of citizens from the Dniester region of the Republic of Moldova and of the connection of the leaders of the putsch with the leaders of separatism from Tiraspol and their plans to destabilize the situation in Moldova;
4. To accelerate the Moldovan-Russian negotiations on the status of the 14th Army of the Russian Federation and the timeframe of its withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of Moldova;
5. To ensure unimpeded admittance to the security zone and the whole territory of the Republic of Moldova of the CSCE mission and other international organizations for their discharge of peacekeeping functions;
6. To draw up and conclude the new Moldovan-Russian agreement "Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova" (having secured the transition from a military-tactical resolution of the armed conflict to its political settlement).

[Signed] V. Katan, M. Druce, G. Larin, G. Sadovic, I. Solonenko, V. Sova, members of the Joint Control Commission from the Republic of Moldova.

Edict Sets New Minimum Wage Standards

944K0421A Chisinau NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 1

["Edict of the President of the Republic of Moldova: On the Minimum Wage in the Republic of Moldova"]

[Text] For purposes of reinforcing social protection of the population in connection with the growth of prices for consumer goods and services, I decree:

1. Effective 1 November 1993 the minimum wage shall be set at 10,000 rubles [R] per month.

Institutions and organizations financed from the budget shall introduce the minimum wage by the deadline set in the first paragraph of the present point. Additionally, up until 1 January 1994, in order to calculate supplemental pay, increases, and payments established by existing wage conditions as multiples of the minimum wage, the amount of R 7,500 shall be used.

Other enterprises, organizations, and institutions shall introduce the minimum wage established in the first paragraph of the present point as they find their own funds for these purposes but no later than 1 January 1994.

The minimum wage does not include supplemental pay, increases, bonuses, compensations, or other incentive payments.

2. The introduction of a minimum wage and the establishment on its basis of concrete amounts of wage rates and salaries shall be carried out according to the procedure and under the conditions envisioned in the Law "On Labor Compensation" and the Decree of the Government of 26 May 1993 No. 300 "On Improving Wages of Workers of Economically Accountable Units."

3. It shall be established that the recalculation of all kinds of pensions established in keeping with the Law of the Republic of Moldova "On State Pension Support in the Republic of Moldova" shall be done by 1 November 1993 on the basis of the new amount of the minimum wage determined in Point 1 of the present edict.

4. Stipends for doctoral candidates, graduate students, students in higher educational institutions, and individuals attending colleges and vocational and technical schools, and grants and payments established depending on the amount of the minimum wage shall be increased effective 1 November 1993 based on the newly established amount.

5. In order to provide additional support for underprivileged and low-paid citizens:

a coefficient shall be introduced effective 1 November 1993 for increasing the wage rates and salaries in the amount of 1.1 for workers whose pay is in the range of categories 1-8 of the Unified Wage Scale;

the amounts of pensions recalculated in keeping with Point 3 of the present edict shall be increased by 30 percent;

monthly monetary compensations shall be preserved for individual categories of the population established by Decree of the Government of the Republic of Moldova of 30 August 1993 No. 548 "On Social Protection of Underprivileged Categories of the Population in Connection With the Liberalization of Prices of Bread and Bakery Items, Milk, and Dairy Products."

6. During the time remaining before 1 December 1993 the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection shall recalculate all kinds of pensions in keeping with the present edict.

7. Sources of providing for additional costs shall be earmarked:

for increasing wages of workers of budget institutions and stipends—the income of the National Bank of Moldova from the results of activity during nine months of this year;

for increasing pensions and grants—money from the Social Fund of the Republic of Moldova.

8. Within five days the National Bank shall provide for depositing into the republic budget payments from revenues in the amount of R10 billion in keeping with Point 7 of the present edict.

9. It shall be recommended to the National Bank of Moldova that it operationally regulate monetary income in order to provide for additional cash expenditures and other forms of settlement with the population.

10. The Government shall locate financial resources to provide for the introduction of a minimum wage in the amount of R12,500 effective 1 January 1994.

11. The Edict of the President of the Republic of Moldova of 21 June 1993 No. 91 "On the Minimum Wage in the Republic of Moldova" shall be declared invalid.

12. The present edict shall take effect on the day it is signed.

[Signed] Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova

Chisinau, 1 November 1993

Government Action To Address Trade Imbalance Outlined

944K0421B Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 47, 21 Nov 93 p B4

[Article by Oleg Grabovskiy: "Moldova Switches to Partial Protectionism"]

[Text] The republic has introduced a 20 percent value added tax for goods and services imported from countries that are not members of the CIS.

A decree to this effect was adopted on 20 October by the Government of Moldova, taking into account the unfavorable tendencies that had developed in trade with distant foreign countries. In particular during June-September the deficit of the country's trade balance increased almost 20-fold and reached \$37.338 million.

From the results of the nine months of 1993 foreign trade turnover (not including nearby foreign countries) in Moldova amounted to \$253.386 million: Exports—\$108.024 million and imports—\$145,362 million. The exports amounted to 90 percent of the average monthly indicators for a similar period of 1992. Imports, conversely, increased—115 percent.

The autumn indicators look especially depressing against the background of the spring ones. Thus during January-May 1993, although the republic's foreign trade volume with distant foreign countries was 1.5 times less—\$155.7 million, the trade deficit was only \$1.9 million. By the beginning of summer exports amounted to 100.1 percent of the amount for an analogous period of 1992, or \$76.9 million. There were increases in the sale of rugs, footwear, and television sets, although machine-building slipped somewhat.

But there was also an extraordinary appetite for imports—they increased by 20 percent, because of purchases mainly of cotton fabrics, ingredients for the leading food industry, etc. The arrival of fall, with its crops setting a record for the past 10 years, inspired optimism. But it was misplaced. Even the remarkable Moldovan wine is finding it difficult to make its way onto the foreign market. For example, a batch of selected collectors' wines was returned after remaining in Germany for two months. It turns out that the republic does not have quotas for their sale to the FRG.

From the results of the nine months the group portrait of participants in foreign trade did not change. But the traditional partners are gathering points in their favor. Thus Romania, which by the beginning of July had 34.4 percent of Moldova's trade turnover with traditional foreign countries, has now increased its share to 35.3 percent. For Germany these figures are 16.4 and 15.8 percent, respectively, and for Bulgaria—6.8 and 7.3 percent. Trade with Italy became more active—6.8 percent, the United States—4.8 percent, and Holland—3.4 percent.

Western countries account for a total of 35 percent of Moldova's foreign trade turnover. The rest is linked to the East, and about 82 percent of the exports and 75 percent of the imports are with the CIS, with the Russian Federation accounting for more than half of it.

Telephone of the Ministry of Finance of Moldova: (0422) 22-92-51

Telephone of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations: (0422) 23-30-59

Spokesman Notes Effort To Increase Trade with Turkey

944K0423A Chisinau NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 2

[Interview with Vedat Yener, leader of a delegation of the Turkish International Cooperation Agency, by Vladimir Dubovoy; place and date not given: "TICA: Moldova's New Partner"]

[Text] We have already reported on the arrival in Moldova of a TICA [Turkish International Cooperation Agency] delegation (NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA of 27 October 1993). Agency specialists conducted a number of meetings with businessmen of the republic, directors of enterprises, and heads of Moldova's ministries.

Vedat Yener, leader of the TICA delegation, talks about the results of the visit.

[Yener] TICA is an official state organization that functions under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. The agency was established in 1992, and its main task is rendering technical assistance to other countries. First and foremost, this assistance is intended for states bordering on Turkey and the Turkish-speaking republics of Central Asia.

There is no denying that our visit to Moldova was in many ways determined by the fact that the south of your republic is a place that is densely populated with Gagauz.

[Dubovoy] Does this mean that the visit of the TICA delegation will promote the development only of the south of the republic?

[Yener] Unequivocally: No. And the program of our stay in Moldova proves this. In the week we spent in your country we have been not only in the south of Moldova but also visited the Trade-Industrial Palace and met with managers of Moldova's ministries and departments.

I would put it this way: Turning its sights toward Moldova, TICA is looking intently at the southern part.

During our stay in the republic we visited many places, and became convinced that Moldova's economic and technical potential is on a higher level than we supposed before the visit.

In this connection, it seems very important to me that TICA is basically helping the private sector, indicating

possible directions in the development of small and average business. After all, it is in these spheres of private business undertakings that you are encountering the greatest difficulties. It seems that the advice of our specialists will help the formation of business in Moldova.

[Dubovoy] Does this mean that the recommendations given by the experts in your agency can be considered the results of the visit?

[Yener] Not only. The importance of the TICA delegation visit to Moldova is that practical specialists—owners and managers of enterprises—were members of the delegation. They came to the conclusion that it is possible and necessary to cooperate with Moldova. On returning to Turkey these businessmen will meet with their colleagues and, to all appearances, new visits will be made to Moldova.

This trip proved fruitful for both sides: A decision was reached on the construction of a tile factory in the city of Chadyr-Lunga, and production operations are already being conducted. Also, there is a desire among businessmen of Turkey and Moldova to participate in the joint construction of similar enterprises in other regions of the republic.

An agreement was concluded on cooperation between the television service of Turkey and Moldovan television. The Turkish side granted, free of charge, technical equipment that will make it possible to receive and transmit Turkish TV programs on Moldovan territory. And despite certain technical difficulties it can be said with confidence that the residents of Moldova will be able to watch Turkish television programs in the very near future.

[Dubovoy] Since we have started to talk about charitable actions, let us continue this subject.

[Yener] In connection with the Gagauz change to the Latin script, and after becoming familiar with the condition of printing shops in the southern rayons of Moldova and Chisinau, we came to the conclusion that certain material expenditures are necessary to render assistance in the publication of literature and textbooks for the Gagauz population of your republic.

At the request of the Ministry of Education, we have prepared a program of assistance for the Gagauz of Moldova in the study and mastery of their native language. Without delving deeply into the details, I will say that the program has already started.

[Dubovoy] The representatives of the agency have completed their work in Moldova. Does this mean that final conclusions have been made concerning the condition of the economy of the country?

[Yener] The visit to Moldova made it possible for us to come to certain conclusions about the condition of the economy of the republic, and in Turkey we will prepare

projects and proposals on other possible forms of cooperation between business representatives of Moldova and Turkey, and other countries.

By the way, an expert of our agency has already been working more than five months in the Trade-Industrial Palace of Moldova. In the near future, experts on forests and forestry and other experts will arrive in Chisinau. And this means that we will have the opportunity to continuously monitor the pulse of the economic life of your country.

[Dubovoy] Mr. Yener, an economic council was recently formed at our newspaper. Entrepreneurs and economists of Moldova have joined it. Would the Turkish International Cooperation Agency agree to participate in the work of the council?

[Yener] It is an interesting proposal. Until now we have not had experience in such activity, but I think that it is worth trying...

[Dubovoy] Thank you for the interview.

P.S. The interview was organized with the kind assistance of Mr. Yender Arat, consul general of the Republic of Turkey in Moldova.

National Bank Official on Hard Currency Actions

944K0423B Chisinau NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 11 Nov 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with L.L. Burunchuk, chief of the administration of foreign currency and foreign economic activity of the National Bank of Moldova, by N. Pavlov, NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA correspondent; place and date not given: "Is the One Who Pays Also the One who Orders?... The West—to Moldova"]

[Text] In the opinion of many specialists, without foreign assistance and efficient currency regulation it will be difficult for Moldova to build a market economy. That is why particular attention is being paid in the republic now to the work with currency (in accordance with the recommendations of Western experts), to international financial cooperation, and to the consolidation of business relations with foreign banks and firms. What turned out well, and what did not turn out well? Our correspondent's interview with L.L. Burunchuk, chief of the administration of foreign currency and foreign economic activity of the National Bank of Moldova, concerned this.

[Pavlov] Liliya Leonidovna, tell us, please, about the specific results of the cooperation with international financial organizations, first of all with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

[Burunchuk] After becoming a full member of these financial organizations, Moldova naturally began to receive significant assistance from them. For example, the IMF, in support of a special government program of economic and financial stabilization for the period up to 1 July 1994, allocated credit to our republic to the extent

of \$32 million. The IMF may grant an equal amount if the Government of Moldova continues to follow its recommendations. Moreover, in the event of the republic's achievement of significant successes on the road to the market, the IMF is prepared to grant installment credit of the "standby" type for stabilization of Moldova's payment balance. The total sum of this credit is \$126 million. As for the World Bank, the republic will receive \$60 million in credit from it. Of this, \$55 million will be spent on the purchase of commodities we need from abroad, including raw materials and fuel, and it is planned to sell the remainder on the republic currency market, which will undoubtedly strengthen the national currency.

All told, just to the end of this year, international financial organizations will allocate our republic another \$40 million in credit.

[Pavlov] Under what conditions is the IMF granting Moldova credit?

[Burunchuk] First of all, the fund requires strict observance of the already mentioned government program coordinated with it of systemic reorganization of the economy of the republic for the period up to 1 July 1994, which was part of a special memorandum signed by our government and the IMF. Also, one of the conditions for granting credit is strict adherence to the program of "standby" credit. The main objective of these programs is to sharply reduce the level of inflation in Moldova, by limiting the overall monetary mass in circulation and reducing the budget deficit. The budget deficit is not supposed to exceed 6 percent of the gross domestic product at the end of 1993, and 3 percent the following year, 1994, which in the opinion of IMF experts is quite acceptable.

Specialists of the fund are also recommending modernization of Moldova's foreign trade system and the development of a mechanism of export-import operations that would make it possible to increase our export potential and eliminate the balance of payments deficit. This can be achieved by removing taxes on exports and reducing the number of commodities subject to quotas and licensing. It is simultaneously planned to put new tariffs on imports into effect.

On the recommendation of the IMF, it is contemplated eliminating the practice of favorable extensions of credit, accelerating the process of privatization, energetically supporting entrepreneurship, rebuilding the structure of industry and the APK [agro-industrial complex]... In general, the program of economic and financial stabilization that has been coordinated with the IMF is of a complex nature, and it is entirely subordinate to the interests of the civilized market. This program will be expanded and refined to the extent necessary, once again in consonance with the recommendations of the IMF.

[Pavlov] Specialists of the IMF and the World Bank think that if the government program that is coordinated with the fund is implemented successfully in stages, the

republic's level of inflation will reach 12 percent in December of 1993 and only 1 percent in December of 1994.

[Burunchuk] I also want to believe in this. Especially because it has already been proven by the example of the Baltic countries: If there is a serious attitude toward carrying out new economic reforms and toward the IMF recommendations, then the level of inflation can be reduced to 2-3 percent a month. As for the general economic upswing, apparently it will start in the years 1995-1996.

[Pavlov] It is said that the National Bank, given the technical assistance of the IMF, will soon complete work on the new law of Moldova on currency regulation...

[Burunchuk] Its final version will be ready, apparently, in November, when experts from the IMF will arrive in Moldova. The new document will determine the procedure for the circulation of foreign currency on the territory of the republic and the basic rules for conducting currency operations. Variants of the law on currency regulation have already been discussed several times, for example, in the parliamentary commission for financial and bank policy; however, parliament has not examined it yet. In this connection, the National Bank of Moldova thinks that it would be better if the president approved the aforementioned law.

[Pavlov] As far as I know, the recommendations of the IMF were also used in the establishment of the interbank currency exchange and the system of exchange currency centers...

[Burunchuk] This is so. And today the exchange trades and auctions, established with the participation of the IMF, make it possible to determine the real rate of

exchange of currency and promote stabilization of the currency market. Of course, at present there is still a large deficit of freely convertible currency on the exchange. However, it is believed that it will be possible to resolve this problem with the assistance of foreign credit.

Currency exchange centers have also turned out well, especially Gineya, which was the first to open in the republic. The most advantageous exchange rates for the purchase and sale of freely convertible currency are set here, and momentary profits are not pursued. However, not all of currency exchange centers work like Gineya. Unfortunately, we also have centers that ignore the requirements of the National Bank of Moldova. We apply appropriate sanctions to them.

[Pavlov] In summing up what has been said, can it be expected that the West will continue to help us in the future in the monetary-credit sphere without fail? And will the interests of the national economy not suffer from cooperation with the IMF itself?

[Burunchuk] The fact is that representatives of the fund have declared more than once: Moldova has an opportunity for rapid growth of the economy, there are qualified specialists and a promising industry and agriculture. The main thing now is not to miss these opportunities and to use the rich experience of international financial organizations more widely, and success will be guaranteed to us.

As for the threat of encroachment on our national interests on the part of international financial organizations, I think that it does not exist. The Government of Moldova, of course, listens to the advice of Western experts, funds, and banks; however, it makes the final decisions independently, without any kind of pressure from outside.

ESTONIA

Meri Outlines Relations With Russia

944K0381A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 49,
1-7 Dec 93 p 6

[Interview with Lennart Meri, president of the Republic of Estonia, by Yelena Seslavina; place and date not given: "The Tanker and the Kayak"]

[Text] Tallinn is not that crowded and very clean, the stores have everything the heart desires, and there are Christmas candles, flowers, and fountains in the store windows. Not a trace of political passions. The Estonian People's Front, disturber of the tranquillity of the USSR of the 1988 model, has now ceased to exist; a question of confidence in the government (which has remained in office) has been discussed in the Estonian parliament; the newspapers are full of reports of the negotiations with the Russian side, which culminated in the signing merely of agreements on standardization and cultural cooperation.

Approaching the presidential palace in the snow-covered Kadriorg Park, which was laid out by Peter I in honor of Catherine, I noticed that the building had, like any street structure, a number: 39. Fortuitous or not, the number indicates the year when all too much was determined for the small Baltic country. Documents with the signatures of Molotov and Ribbentrop kept in safes for decades—I heard about this for the first time eight years ago from the mouth of Lennart Meri, a writer, son of a diplomat of the prewar bourgeois Estonia, and current occupant of the presidential palace who had, together with his family, survived exile to Siberia. He has since that time spoken Russian (as, for that matter, all the main European languages) well. A historian by education, social anthropologist, profound and ironical writer, and director and maker of film documentaries, Meri began his political career at the age of 60, coming to head the Foreign Ministry of Estonia. Then, ambassador in Finland, and on 6 October 1992 he became president of Estonia. The policy being pursued by the conservative coalition bloc has been distinguished by the consistent dismantling of ties to the republics of the former USSR and a strengthening of ties with European Western states, an adjustment of the demographic situation in favor of an increase in the numbers of the indigenous population, and a search for "soft" options of transition to the market.

[Seslavina] "We can foresee in the example of the Baltic states the future, Russia's hopes, hopelessness...." This, Mr. President, is a quotation from a speech of yours of two years ago. Estonia has officially approved, as it were, many of the processes occurring at this time on the territories of the former USSR and, evidently, has been one of the first to conclusively shape its appearance. What landmarks on this path do you consider the most important, what "reefs" are the most dangerous?

[Meri] We may speak of traveling a certain path. But we know that the Egyptian pyramids travel no paths, they stand where they have always stood.

[Seslavina] And time?

[Meri] States also may travel merely paths in time. I do not reject the idea of which you have just reminded me, but I have thought of one further image in these two years. Imagine to yourself a small boat—a kayak—and a supertanker. The kayak weighs approximately 4.5 kg and can sustain a cargo 10 times its own weight, the supertanker takes on board hundreds of thousands of tonnes of cargo. But the kayak can make a 180-degree turn literally on the spot, whereas the inertia of the supertanker requires a different space. This is the entire difference between Estonia and Russia. In other words, we are more nimble. We have scored successes more quickly than Hungary and the Czech Republic, not to mention Poland or, especially, Russia. The Estonian kroon, for example, is one of the most stable currencies in Europe.

And, of course, our country is so small that it appears transparent—we live in a glass house, as it were. Big swinish tricks may be perpetrated here, but everyone will know about them the next day.

[Seslavina] You believe that this in itself is a guarantee of ethics in policy?

[Meri] There is only the school that can guarantee ethics. So it is that the most complex path which we can travel is that which lies between our two ears, by which our thoughts travel....

[Seslavina] But there are problems that are identical for states both large and small, for the tanker and the kayak. Our tanker, traveling a path, as we hope, toward democracy, has failed to avoid bloodshed. Estonia has confined itself to a "singing" version of revolution. Now also you are succeeding in localizing social conflicts....

[Meri] Let us take the subject of Russians in Estonia. This is, most likely, a central problem—not because it is objectively such but because political forces which I would term extreme are attempting to manipulate it. The most intimidating expressions are being employed here, people stopping just short of talking about lynching. But this is the vocabulary of politicians. The Russian population of Estonia has seen that democracy is not an empty chime, and in publishing absurdities about Estonian reality a newspaper is risking merely its reputation.

[Seslavina] You refer to one in particular?

[Meri] Yes. But I do not want to point at this paper the bony finger of a Baba-Yaga because this could be interpreted as an attempt to limit freedom of speech. Time is working against lies, and there are some laws of statistics according to which mankind rejects extreme, ugly forms and manifestations and preserves the strong constructive nucleus. But the "smallness" of Estonia and the hugeness of Russia make our country highly sensitive in respect to

extreme currents with you. I am talking about such phenomena as Zhirinovskiy. There are on the political landscape of Russia some forces and organizational structures backing both him and the communists. I believe that this is a reason why an agreement on a timetable for the withdrawal of the former armed forces of the Soviet Union from Estonia has not been signed yet.

[Seslavina] How many troops remain on Estonian territory?

[Meri] Approximately 3,500 of the 50,000-60,000 that were here in 1990. Strategically, they do not represent a real threat. Consequently, there is a certain symbolic significance in the Russian military presence; I cannot agree with the purely technical insolubility of this problem when I recall eight times as many troops coming to Estonia within 24 hours.

[Seslavina] Nonetheless, in adjusting the demographic situation and prompting the departure from Estonia of its Russian noncitizens, are you not doing something you will regret?

[Meri] The sources go back to somewhere around the year of 1917. The breakup of great empires—Austria-Hungary and tsarist Russia—afforded their peoples for the first time opportunities to realize the right to self-determination, of which many, the Estonians included, availed themselves. In Russia this sacred right came to be in the hands of a bunch of terrorists, who have entered history under the name of "Communist Party Central Committee"; the possibility, initially merely theoretical, of restoration of the colonial power arose. You will probably be interested to learn that up to 1939 Estonian newspapers published daily the programs of radio broadcasts from Moscow and Leningrad (in the 1940's, when Estonian had become Soviet, this was banned).

The war was still going on when Moscow decided to settle northern Estonia with workers recruited for this. The thunder of war died down, and the demobbed soldiers were accorded the privilege of settling in any spot of the allegedly socialist alleged republic; the local authorities were required to provide them with housing first and foremost. As a result the proportion of the Estonian population fell from 95 percent in 1945 to 60 percent in 1988. Now a solution to this mess is having to be found....

[Seslavina] Speaking about Estonia, you have several times used the word "democracy." Are the fascists, who are praising one another for selfless struggle against Soviet authority, a part of it? Is this a serious political force or a psychological response to the Soviet past?

[Meri] If we are speaking about those who fought against Soviet power, put among them French and Norwegians and Danes. All occupied countries fought as best they could. I might add the following detail: In 1941, when

the first battles of the war called in Russia Great Patriotic were being fought, the Estonians themselves liberated their territory from Soviet troops. The Germans entered from Latvia. And the naivete of our desperate people was manifested in the illusion that it would be possible to restore statehood. When it had become apparent that their hopes were built on sand, many of those to whom it was repugnant to fight for the future of their state beneath the Swastika crossed the Gulf of Finland and joined the army of Finland, which was fighting both Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR. They did not flee to request political asylum, they fled to the front.

To be honest, your question about fascism in Estonia jarred on me somewhat. But I am pleased that it was asked....

[Seslavina] What you have just now been talking about is not at all obvious to Russians, simply unknown at times. But your attitude toward Russia is far more complex than the pragmatism of the leader of an adjacent country determining the political course.

[Meri] I live very much by the experience I accumulated when I was in Russia.

[Seslavina] In exile, in the war years?

[Meri] Not only then. My friend the director Voldemar Panso once taught me to be attentive to detail. I still have, for example, the stub of the bill of Yakutsk Hotel No. 2, on which two lines are printed: for the night, so much. For seeing to the horses, so much.

[Seslavina] What year was this?

[Meri] 1962. And I remember how a very kind person, the local projectionist, who had fixed me up in the hotel, took me on a tour of the city. At an intersection he said: "Almost like Moscow, is it not?" I dutifully looked both ways—I very much wanted to be friendly with him—but saw nothing of the kind. And in response to my questioning glance, evidently, he pointed one more time: "Look there!" Hanging there at the empty intersection was a set of traffic lights.... And I came to like this young fellow and the city with its boardwalks and the hotel, where, having learned that I was from the "center," the people came to seek advice, and the old lady from the refreshment counter, who fed me free of charge while I was waiting for money from home....

At one time I had more acquaintances in Moscow than I had in Tallinn simply because Moscow is bigger. They have long since gone their separate ways. But I still have, for example, drawings of Ernst Neizvestnyy, which he gave me at the time of the exhibition, before he had been chewed out by Nikita Sergeyevich; there were so many people there that we inched our way forward, as if in a packed metro car.... You wanted to ask about this?

[Seslavina] Certainly....

[Meri] And the years of exile are interesting in that in Kirov Oblast, where my mother and I were, the kolkhoz was only six years old. And the peasants still knew their own, albeit socialized, horses and cows and remembered in which field it was best to plant what. I cannot imagine how you could reconstitute the peasant stratum: the world has no experience of this, as far as I know.

[Seslavina] Privatization in Estonia is going slowly, and the possibilities of each individual are connected with how long he has worked on this land. Are there any farmers left?

[Meri] The fact that real Soviet authority came to us 22 years later, however insignificant within the framework of world history, thanks to this, people who do not have to read in the newspaper when to sow—their big finger tells them this!—are, although they are quite old now, still working. But, in all candor, the “region” on our political landscape involving the privatization of the farmsteads is the most backward, possibly. We wanted to be precise and fair, not always realizing how difficult it is to return to pre-occupation legal relationships. After the war, a person obtained a vacant farmstead, say, with just two walls standing, he restored it and set up house in it, and now one fine day someone knocks on the door and announces: the house belonged to my deported father, you have to return it. What is to be done?

[Seslavina] But you are doing something? Leaving the two walls, removing all the rest, and sharing it out according to justice? What is more important—truth or right, to employ a term from a Taamsaare novel?

[Meri] They can never be viewed separately.

[Seslavina] This is the ideal. But it is said of politics that it is the art of the possible.

[Meri] The problem is that a politician who thinks and feels with his heart always sets himself an ideal. And life is particularly hard for such a politician with its innumerable deviations from the ideal. It is necessary to come to terms with certain objective phenomena.

[Seslavina] What does Estonia produce currently? Does it feed itself?

[Meri] We even export agricultural produce—sheep, meat... to Iraq.

[Seslavina] To the Husayn regime?

[Meri] This is nobler than exporting missiles.

[Seslavina] I have to agree. But since we have been speaking about the ideal, I would like to ask you: Where is Estonia headed? Has this country become what you would have liked to have seen it become?

[Meri] I believe that even the Vatican has yet to become conclusively what it would like to be. But I shall not avoid the question. Let us take Holland. Smaller in area than Estonia. Just as flat (our highest mountain is 318

meters). Has no minerals. Nonetheless, it lives independently, happily, and prosperously. And questions concerning the future become calm calculations as to how many inhabitants there will be in such-and-such a year, how much electric power they will need, and so forth. These are normal questions, given a guarantee of the existence of the population itself.

We did not have such guarantees in the Soviet years, and the people, who for centuries had a clear identity and their own songs, ceremonies, and language, were required to reorganize themselves for perimeter defense. Perimeter defense is a signal of a state of emergency. But it cannot last for long. We have now approached the point where it is no longer necessary. I sincerely hope so, at least.

[Seslavina] I would like to be clear: the idea of a national state which has become established in approximately this way is the culmination of “perimeter defense” in a particular historical context? For not one European state, except for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, has at this time, at the end of the 20th century, been built on such a basis.

[Meri] I believe that all problems... there is the splendid Russian barroom word... will “go down.”

[Seslavina] It sounds splendid, but it is not, if you'll excuse me, an answer.

[Meri] It was not that serious an answer.... Estonia has always been a receptive, open society. There are studies that show, for example, that any trend of world culture, be it late Gothic, baroque, and so forth, became current with the Estonian peasant 12 years on average after it had appeared. I hope that our country will remain such.

[Seslavina] Are constructive relations with the new Russia part of the interests of the new Estonia?

[Meri] We are taking steps toward partnership. We have created the Baltic Strategy and Policy Research Institute, to which we have invited Messrs Kissinger and Brzezinski, Sobchak, mayor of St. Petersburg, Arbatov, Jr, and Academician Granberg, economic adviser to the president of Russia.

Estonian is being taught now even in Tokyo. Let us hope that the time comes when it is studied in Moscow also.

[Seslavina] And will Russian be taught in Estonia?

[Meri] It has been so taught for the past 400 years. Your question hurts me because it is highly typical. Do not forget that the recently departed Yuri Lotman, the pride of world scholarship on Russian literature, found refuge not in Moscow and not in Novosibirsk but in Tartu and created a school of semiotics here, which, naturally, will be preserved.

[Seslavina] We have begun to speak about culture.... Permit me to ask you, a politician and writer: What can power do, what can culture do?

[Meri] Culture can do just about everything, and power against the background thereof looks like Adam and Eve expelled from paradise—very naked.

[Seslavina] And how do you feel?

[Meri] Well, I am clothed (laughs).... Culture is not the handmaiden of power, and power, not even suspecting this, is ultimately the handmaiden of culture.

[Seslavina] Do you have artistic plans which you would like to realize or is it even absurd to talk about this?

[Meri] Very simple desires have come back to me—to sleep in for awhile or to take a walk through a snow-covered forest.... Tape of an unfinished scientific film about the Khanty's bear festivals and kilometers of sound recordings are just lying there. They have a text which is simultaneously 3,000 years old; they sing, just imagine, about a world flood, and this is not a borrowing. I no longer console myself with the thought that I will finish this work....

[Seslavina] What are you working on now? I am interested primarily in the future meeting with the president of Russia.

[Meri] Following the meeting with Minister Kozyrev, I was attuned to the possibility of it taking place in November, but we have received no positive signals on the part of Moscow, unfortunately.

[Seslavina] Have you already met President Yeltsin?

[Meri] The first time, if memory serves, was on 11 September 1991. A conference of the CSCE with the participation of foreign ministers was being held in Moscow, and President Yeltsin was to have received us. I was approached on the way there even by the doyen of the diplomatic corps and asked: "Have you been told that you will be speaking?" (We had been admitted to the CSCE the day before.)

The president of Russia welcomed us. Inasmuch as my best teacher in difficult situations is Huckleberry Finn, who maintained that you should never think over in advance what you say, I availed myself of this and said to Yeltsin: "It is being said among Russians that the Estonians detest you...." I recall that the stillness of the first day of creation had settled in the hall. "Yes, you are right," I continued, "we do detest. But not the Russians who brought us the totalitarian system but the totalitarian system...." I had the feeling that he understood me properly.

[Seslavina] Do you have the sense that he is a man who understands properly?

[Meri] I very much hope so because you have with your own hands entrusted Russia to him, and Russia is too big to be treated frivolously.

Conference On Security Policy Held

Fifty Politicians, Experts Take Part In Conference

944K0385A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
30 Nov 93 p 1

[Article by Erki Suits: "Politicians Concur: Estonia's Neutrality Is An Illusion"]

[Text]

Estonia's neutrality is an illusion, representatives of parties and movements represented in Riigikogu [Estonia's parliament] concurred at the conference called for the purpose of cooperating on national security and state defense matters, held at the National Library yesterday. Over 50 politicians and experts participated. Presentations were made by Commander of Defense Forces Major General Aleksander Einseln and Defense Minister Juri Luik. The proposal to hold this conference came from the Free Parliamentary Alliance [Vaba Parlamentaarne Uhendus] in the early part of October.

In his opening remarks, conference chair Ignar Fjuk, a member of the Free Parliamentary Alliance, emphasized the need to work out a concept of state defense that would not be affected by governmental crises, and that would not be altered with changes in the government. "Adopting such a concept requires a great social commitment. Carrying it out, however, takes the support of all the political forces," Fjuk said.

At yesterday's conference, the positions of representatives from all of Estonia's factions were in a surprising concurrence, said Ignar Fjuk, member of Riigikogu (independent).

He also said that similar conferences would be continued, and commissions assigned to deal with different areas.

Different Factions, Different Opinions

Tiit Made, chairman of the Estonian Entrepreneurs' Party, said that the prospect of Estonia remaining neutral, and thus preserving its independence, was viewed skeptically by all the politicians assembled. Endel Lippmaa, representing the Coalition Alliance, said that Estonia could never practice real neutrality, because its 'big neighbors' would not permit it.

According to Made, there was also agreement on where Estonia's enemy is. "The enemy is to the East of us and can attack us by air, land or sea," Made said.

Ignar Fjuk explained to the journalists, however, that Made's reference to the enemy East of us was just a figurative expression.

An overwhelming majority of politicians agreed that Estonia should, as soon as possible, integrate itself into international security systems and expand its broad-based cooperation with NATO. The only one dissenting

was Valdur Lahtvee, the 'Greens' representative. He said that 'Greens' do not favor for Estonia to join NATO or the European Union.

"We think that there are enough structures in the world to guarantee collective security that are not quite as binding and not as restrictive of independence," Lahtvee remarked. Among examples, he mentioned United Nations and CSCE.

"The cornerstone of Estonia's state defense is its foreign policy," said Rein Helme, member of Riigikogu [Fatherland faction]. It is important to cooperate with other states, while taking advantage of opportunities offered by NATO, Helme added. He said that general draft for military service should apply to men, but did not rule out the creation of professional structures, as the state becomes more prosperous.

Riigikogu member Ivar Raig (Rural Centrist Party) thought that Estonia's state defense should be linked to solving demographic processes, and involve farmers of the border area, so as to ensure control of the whole border.

Andres Mihkels of ERSP [Estonian National Independence Party] said that military service is the duty of an Estonian citizen, and that strengthening Kaitseliit [Defense League] was also important. Liberal Aap Neljas said that Estonia needs a professional army and cooperation with other states. Social democrat Lembit Luts represented the view of students, who do not favor a general draft.

Defense Minister Jüri Luik (Fatherland) said that all participants in politics must be given a chance to be part of working out a defense policy.

It was determined, at yesterday's conference, that work groups be formed to work out the concept of state defense and the principles of national security. These work groups will start preparing principles for structuring and managing the defense forces, the defense system and armaments, education, rear operations, intelligence, communications and ideology. The work groups will also draw on specialists from the State Defense Academy and the Ministry of Defense.

Conference Proceedings Analyzed

944K0385B Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian 1 Dec 93
p 2

[Article by Vahur Made: "Parties Discussed Defense Matters"]

[Text]

A cooperation conference on 'Estonia's National Security and State Defense', organized by the Free Parliamentary Alliance (at the initiative of Ignar Fjuk, chairman of the alliance), was held between representatives of different parliamentary factions at the Tallinn National Library, the day before yesterday. Participating

at the cooperation conference, besides representatives of different political parties and movements, were Aleksander Einseln, commander of Defense Forces, and Jüri Luik, minister of defense.

Aleksander Einseln said that president Lennart Meri had invited Ignar Fjuk, Jaan Kaplinski, Ardo Ojasalu and Kuno Raude, all members of the Free Parliamentary Alliance, to meet with him on October 10, for the purpose of discussing the state's defense concept. This is apparently where the idea of calling a cooperation conference originated.

Is There Great Accord Among Parliamentary Forces?

The atmosphere at the press conference following the cooperation conference was virtually pastoral. In their concluding remarks, most of the politicians emphasized a rare accord on defense issues among the different forces. It was found that differences remained in only some minute details, while parliamentary consensus prevailed on overall issues.

Most of the speakers repeated truths that had become quite familiar. It was found that Estonia does not have the funds for a professional army, and hence a general military draft would have to be maintained. Future plans call for replacing that with mobile units relying on high professional standards and good weaponry. Also emphasized were the need for organizing total defense, the vital role of Defense League [Kaitseliit], and the need for strengthening the police force and state borders.

It was pointed out that Estonia must seek support for its independence from the international arena, especially from NATO and other international organizations. Quite a few of the speeches touched on the admission that Estonia's security cannot be guaranteed by neutrality.

Differing with the rest of the politicians was Valdur Lahtvee, representative of Estonia's Green Movement, who did not favor Estonia's efforts to join up with NATO and the European Union in a hurry. In his opinion, Estonia has not yet exhausted the possibilities afforded by United Nations and CSCE.

Tiit Made, representative of the Entrepreneur's Party, said that a common admission was made: The enemy is in the East and can attack us from air, land, or sea, East or West. Ignar Fjuk's remark that the above is only a figurative statement to convey the mission of the meeting, was an apparent attempt to tone down the reality. At any rate, journalists were admonished to minimize the notion of the Eastern enemy as an imminent threat.

Actually, Many Differences of Opinion Remain

Outside the press-conference room, many differences of opinion were discovered. Consensus was not reached on whether Estonia needs a professional army or a draft-based army, where and at what price weapons should be

acquired, accepting women in the army, and on the coordination of command for defense forces, border guard, Kaitseliit, police and the security service.

Even though all participants agreed that Estonia is in dire need of a defense concept, and that the formulation of it is already overdue, no agreement could be reached on who should work out the concept. Should it be the government, Riigikogu, work groups created as part of the cooperation conference, the Academy of State Defense, or some other entity. Also unsettled went the question of whether or not Estonia needs a regular army at all? The presumed enemy could crush us in any case. Also left in doubt was the necessity and the need for guerrilla warfare under the name of total defense.

Interview To POSTIMEES given By Defense Minister Juri Luik

[MADE] What are the considerations for including Aleksander Einseln, commander of Defense Forces, in the Estonian delegation headed by President Lennart Meri departing for Jordan, Kuwait and Turkey on December 2? Is he expected to explain our purchase of weapons from Israel to leaders of the Islamic countries?

[LUIK] This is certainly not the reason for General Einseln to go along. However, I don't rule out the possibility of questions on this, and I couldn't think of anyone better qualified to clarify that issue. I think that the president's objective was to take along the most extensive and prestigious delegation that encompasses experts from the areas of business, foreign policy and defense.

[MADE] Have there been discussions on the issue of creating a special military police or military investigative organs within Estonia's Defense Forces?

[LUIK] This is one problem that needs to be resolved as part of the general defense concept. We already have a military police on a very elementary level. We can still recall those men in their SP-[military police] helmets patrolling the streets of Tallinn. For the time being, however, we do not have the laws necessary to deal with these issues, and legal professionals are still debating whether it makes sense to establish a closed military court, prosecution and police system in a country of Estonia's size.

On one hand this would be good, because they could react quickly to things happening within the military. On the other, there is danger that they could turn into a closed system, where administration of justice is jeopardized. Here, a compromise could be found. Military police and a military state prosecutor are obviously appropriate. But the court system could be shared.

[MADE] How are discussions coming along on military service for students?

[LUIK] In the military service bill, the government offers an option according to which students are also called up for military duty. But they have an opportunity

to go through military service voluntarily as part of the reserve officers' training, either at their universities or, after graduation, in some foreign country. But those who want to enter the army would not be prevented.

[MADE] At the press conference of the cooperation conference, it was said that the different parties agree on many of the issues. Do you think that those remaining differences in minute details could put a long-term damper on the completion of the defense concept?

[LUIK] In my estimation, our biggest problem is that there is not enough defense-related expertise in Estonia. Even the presentations made by party representatives were geared largely to general politics. The level of expertise will have to be raised even among politicians, because defense is a rather specialized area of activity. At the meeting here, I did not sense conceptual differences as much as I did talking past each other. There was confusion not only about the meaning of terms, but also about the background in which to use them. General Einseln, however, gave us a long-range view of things, saying that a meaningful concept will be completed as a result of work that will probably take a year and-a-half or two years.

'Memento', Former Political Prisoners Demand Change In Granting Residency Permits

944K0383A Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian 27 Nov 93 p 1

[Article by Enno Tammer: "'Memento' and Former Political Prisoners Demand Prompt Changes In Decree on Issuing Living Permits to Retired Soviet Military Personnel and Their Family Members"]

[Text]

The political committee of 'Memento' and Estonia's League of Former Political Prisoners submitted an appeal to members of Riigikogu [Estonia's parliament], in which they condemned the ease of obtaining legal living permits, as it was afforded to great numbers of retired Soviet military personnel and their families by the government's decree dated November 23, and demanded that this decree be changed promptly.

On November 23, the government enacted the procedure for issuing permanent living permits to Russian staff officers, who retired in Estonia before August 20, 1991, and their family members.

According to the government's decree, permanent living permits could be requested by those former Russian officers, who are born before 1930, whose spouse or child is a citizen of Estonia or has a permanent living permit, and those whose 'presence in Estonia is vital to the state of Estonia.'

According to population minister Peeter Olesk, this measure of the government could affect as many as 40,000 people.

The appeal of 'Memento' and former political prisoners states: "Most of us were convicted and sent to prison camps on rulings made by Soviet military tribunals. Units of the Soviet army, commanded by their officers, were also used in deportations, the transport of prisoners, and raids against participants in the resistance movement."

The appeal emphasizes that: "Occupation forces and all persons who have been connected with them in the past, must leave Estonia, unconditionally."

"In the name of all those who have been killed by the Soviet regime or perished because of it," the appeal submitted by 'Memento' and the former political prisoners demands that members of Riigikogu change the decree promptly and unequivocally.

According to POSTIMEES, support for this appeal has so far been expressed by Riigikogu members Mart Niklus, Enn Tarto and Kalju Põldvere. Enn Tarto said that he is also planning to collect signatures for this appeal from other members of Riigikogu.

Free Trade Agreement With EU Seen Top Priority By Foreign Ministry

944K0383B Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian 27 Nov 93
p 3

[Article by Hannes Rumm: "Foreign Ministry Sees Free Trade Agreement With European Union As Top Priority For Estonia"]

[Text]

Reaching a free trade agreement with the European Union is top priority for Estonia right now, taking precedence over application for membership, Riho Laanemäe, deputy chief of Foreign Ministry's political department, told POSTIMEES yesterday. The draft of the free trade agreement will be distributed to governments of member states in the European Union beginning next week, and the document will be up for discussion at the EU summit meeting in Brussels, to be held this December, Laanemäe announced.

Signe Ratsi, chief of Foreign Ministry's trade policy office, told ETA yesterday that the EU summit meeting in Brussels is expected to issue a political mandate to the Commission of the European Union for starting negotiations on a free trade agreement. EU officials have suggested January 1, 1995, as the effective date for the free trade agreement. The free trade agreement, according to Ratsi, will enable Estonia to send its goods to all the states of the European Union, without any customs or quantity restrictions. Currently, Estonia has free trade agreements with Sweden, Finland, Norway and Switzerland.

Laanemäe also said he is sure that Prime Minister Mart Laar's decision to form a commission for preparations to join the European Union is the right one.

"Actually, we don't even know what the European Union is," Laanemäe explained. "The state must first reach a certain level of development and do a lot of dirty work, to be ready to join the European Union."

"When the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary unilaterally assumed the responsibility of bringing their legislations in line with that of the European Union within the next three years, the EU officials smiled, suggesting that it will take them longer than that just to translate the laws. The economic legislation of the European Union is based on actual case histories, and there are thousands of them. To join the European Union in the year 2000, we would have to assign at least 10 people immediately, who would be involved in getting to know the inner workings of EU."

Laanemäe was skeptical about the statement made by Ivar Raig, chairman of Riigikogu's economic commission, that EU prefers small states like Slovenia and Estonia over the bigger Central and East-European states, when it comes to expanding its membership. "The policies of EU will not play one state against another. There is no point trying to outrun the train and make a fool of oneself," Laanemäe warned.

The positive side of Raig's proposal, according to Laanemäe, is that it will make politicians think seriously about the necessary requirements for joining.

Laanemäe said that, when it comes to joining the European Union, Estonia has chosen a route different from the Central and East-European countries inasmuch as, after entering the free trade agreement, there will be no need for the associate member status. "The association agreement will open practically the whole market to goods from Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic but, while letting these states protect their domestic markets against goods from the EU countries. Estonia has already opened its market to EU goods and, for that reason, we no longer need the association agreement in that form. Lithuania, for example, is leaning toward the association agreement, wishing to protect its electronic industry," Laanemäe remarked.

After the anticipated entry of Sweden, Finland, Norway and Austria in the European Union, the Union will probably stop taking in new members for a while. Laanemäe predicted. He said that EU usually follows a pattern of expansion followed by absorption. "After new members are accepted, expansion is curbed, and emphasis placed on intensifying cooperation. According to the Maastricht treaty, cooperation, too, will have to reach a completely new level by the year 2000," Laanemäe remarked.

Pointing to the example of the Nordic countries, Laanemäe toppled the notion of holding a referendum before the issue of joining EU could be approached. "First, negotiations will have to be held with the European Union and then, after reaching certain agreements, the matter of joining can be put up to a referendum, along with specific conditions," Laanemäe said.

Laanemäe said that Estonia's open market and agricultural policies are of interest to EU as a unique alternative. "The agricultural policy of the European Union has reached total absurdity by now, with subsidies gone beyond all reason," Laanemäe said. "Estonia, with its agricultural policies, could set an example for Europe, and not the other way around, as the agricultural ministry would have us believe."

Israeli Officials Pledge Support In Estonia's International Affairs

944K0383C Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
30 Nov 93 p 3

[Article by Marek Dreving: "Israel Supports Estonia In International Organizations"]

[Text]

Visiting Tallinn yesterday were Masha Lubelsky, Israel's deputy minister of industry and trade and member of the parliament, and Meron Gordon, head of the East-European department of Israel's foreign ministry, who are visiting the three Baltic countries as part of the 'Emissaries of Peace' program. In Estonia, the delegates from Israel met with Prime Minister Mart Laar, Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste, and Riigikogu's [Estonia's parliament] deputy speaker Tunne Kelam.

Their meeting with Estonia's leaders revealed that Israel and Estonia can share ideas and mutual support in the United Nations and other international organizations. Meron Gordon said that Israel has, in a sense, valuable experience in how to approach international business organizations, because it is very important how to ask for something. This is where Israel can be helpful to Estonia.

And since Israel has close business relations with both the United States and the European Union, it can also act as a bridge across the Atlantic.

Because economic relations between Estonia and Israel are still at their infancy, it would be too early to speak of any specific agreements. Tova Herzl, Israel's ambassador in Estonia, said that the main objective of governments is to get the attention of businessmen. The visit of the Israelis should move us closer toward this objective.

Israel has highly developed agriculture, telecommunications and other kinds of communications, as well as production of medical technology. In these areas Israel has a lot to offer Estonia.

Comments were withheld on Estonia's purchase of weapons from Israel, as it was found to be an ordinary business transaction.

The visitors comprised a so-called good-will delegation of the Israeli government, whose mission it was to convey information about the peace-process in the Middle-East.

Members of the delegation said that economic issues play an important role in the development of Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza strip and the Jericho region. Large investments will be needed to develop these regions. The development of infrastructure, the social sector and other areas of life is seen by the Israeli government as the principal way of increasing trust between the Israeli and Palestinian communities.

From Estonia, the delegation travels to Riga and to Vilnius.

LATVIA

LNIM Conference Detailed

944K0399A Riga NACONALA NEATKARIBA
in Latvian No 46, 1 Dec 93 p 2

[Article by Baiba Petersone: "LNIM Conference"]

[Text]The Latvian National Independence Movement (LNIM) party organizational conference took place on Saturday, November 27. Out of 229 nominated delegates, 182 participated in the conference. The conference was opened by LNIM board chairman, Aristids Lambergis, who gave a short summary of the LNIM Saeima faction activities, the conditions under which the voting for the "Latvian Way" citizenship bill took place, and with respect to this, the coordination of the national forces activities. The most import being—to create a Latvian national forces union and a national block in the Saeima.

The Saeima LNIM faction chairman, Aleksandrs Kirssteins, reported on the situation with the talks with Russia, stressing the significance of the Skrunda radar installation question on the realization of renewed Latvian independence.

The office chief, Elmars Vebers, presented his views on the work accomplished by the LNIM party organizational commission, which was created in September. The current conditions in the LNIM chapters have been assessed. It is obvious that quite a bit of work will be needed to renew local chapter activities.

Einars Cilinskis spoke about the accomplishments of the statute commission. The commission has rejected the creation of totally new statutes, and is developing proposed changes to the present LNIM statutes. Following the debate about changes in the statutes, a vote was held on the status of the LNIM chairman. If the congress accepts the proposed changes, then the LNIM as a party will return the chairman elected by the congress. The representative from Strazdumuiža, Inars Kirsbaums, reminded everyone about LNIM's bad experience with chairmen, who have caused a split in the movement already once before. Nevertheless, the majority of conference participants felt that a chairman is necessary for a parliamentary party's activities—since in the case where an administration must be formed, the chairman

will be the administration's Prime Minister. Sharp debates also came up on the question of the necessity of an honor court. Nonetheless, the votes were in favor of the variation presented by the commission and the necessity of an honor court. The transitional procedure, by which LNIM members are able to become party members, was accepted. The conference rejected the idea that the LNIM council could be replaced by conferences. The council, as an internal democratic institution, will be essential in party activities, as well.

Baiba Petersone, the leader of the program commission, reported on what has been accomplished and invited the chapter representatives to take a more active role in the development of the new LNIM programs. This is the largest job the needs to be done before the congress. The conference accepted the proposed program as a basis for further elaboration. Juris Karlsons made the criticism that the national economic sector in the LNIM program must be expanded, stressing the traits of the national economy. Opinions on the new programs and statutes were also expressed by G. Preinbergs, M. Klestovs, V. Dimants, J. Gaismins, O. Zanders, M. Budovskis, V. Roze, A. Ligere, M. Vitola, A. Ozols, A. Cabulis, H. Lacis, P. Tabuns, V. Prancans, V. Loginovs, and others.

Members of the leadership of the Latvian People's Front (LPP) were also invited to participate in the conference. Arvids Dravnieks, in his concise speech, stressed that, although the two organizations each have different weights in Latvian politics, their consolidation could produce a great deal more than just a grand total of members. There are some active people who have stepped aside for now. The unification of the national organizations could induce them to return to political life. Supporting neither an immediate unification of the two, nor an immediate assumption of one into the other, A. Dravnieks proposed the creation of a combined ballot for the municipal elections.

The LPP invitation for a joining of the two organizations provoked two debates. The most diverse viewpoints were expressed. A positive viewpoint was expressed by J. Dubinskis, stating the need to enlarge the intellectual potential of the LNIM. There were also some cautious and some extremely cautious speakers. In the end, it was decided to discuss this matter in the LNIM chapters.

Overall, there was a business-like and serious mood to the conference. LNIM members are united by their wanting to work and their desire to work for their nation. Let's wish them success!

Baiba Petersone

Resolution of the Citizenship and Immigration Department

We believe that the Citizenship and Immigration Department and its leadership, as of the present, has consistently and strongly defended the interests of the state of the Republic of Latvia and its citizens.

LNIM conference members are firmly against the attempts by the leadership of the Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry of Internal Affairs to change its leadership.

LNIM conference resolution on repatriation

Outside of Latvia—both in the West and the East—there are still many Latvians who wish to return to their fatherland. This is being impeded by the disarray in the legislation, the economic crisis, and other conditions.

Hundreds of thousands of USSR citizens illegally immigrated during the occupation years and are still living in Latvia. Many of them would readily return to their places of ethnic origin, but are unable to do so.

The LNIM asks the Saeima to form a permanent repatriation commission, for the development of a repatriation program, and through international organizations and during international discussions to actively recruit financial aid to support these programs.

Resolution on the resignation of the Minister of Welfare, J. Ritenis

We feel that the ruling coalition's social policy under conditions of economic crisis has put Latvia's pensioners, invalids, and families with children in a totally critical situation. Considering that the non-payment of pensions to working pensioners predominantly affects those employed in state budgetary offices, the majority of whom are citizens of the Republic of Latvia, then it must be assumed that this social policy is directed specifically against the interests of citizens.

The activities by the Minister of Welfare, J. Ritenis, demonstrate his inability to defend the poorly protected interests of citizens, his lack of understanding of the situation, and his non-suitability for the position.

The LNIM conference asks for reinstatement of pension payments to working pensioners and for J. Ritenis to resign from office.

[Photo captions: top: LNIM board chairman, Aristids Lamberg reads a notification to the conference. bottom: Aleksandrs Kiršteins, Juris Karlsons and Maris Budovskis at the conference.]

Citizens Congress Holds 14th Session

944K0399B Riga RIGAS BALSS in Latvian, 29 Nov 93
p 2

[Article by Alfons Betons: "For Active Political Opposition!"]

[Text]On Saturday, the scheduled 14th session of the Citizens Congress was held in the municipal building of Riga's Vidzeme suburb. The delegates statement on the citizenship question and future activities was adopted.

The chairman of the Citizens Congress, Eriks Vebers, presented an overview of the work by the third Latvian Committee, and since the progress of the congress was

broadcast on the second program of the radio, a wider group of people could listen in. Although the Latvian Committee had no unified position on participation in the June elections, it was continuing its activities. The situation is encumbered by financial difficulties; the committee received a practical empty account in the spring, and now the account is completely empty. The desire to grant those who are illegally living in Latvia the status of foreigners without a citizenship was considered as going in the same direction as the "zero" variation, since those without a citizenship will have to be naturalized with time, and no other country is obliged to accept them.

Commenting on the adoption of the citizenship law on the first reading was the "Fatherland and Freedom" faction leader, Maris Grinblats, who has temporarily lost his voting rights in the Citizens Congress. In his opinion, the ruling minority bill was supported by "Latvian Way", "Harmony", the Democratic Party, with the exception of Karlis Leiskalns, and one half of the Peasants Union, while a "no" vote was cast by almost all of the Christian Democrats, the other half of the Peasants Union, "Fatherland and Freedom" and the LNIM.

As reported by the mandate commission leader and Defenders organization chief, Janis Riba, it was revealed that there was no quorum for the session; the Citizens Congress has 173 delegates, six of whom permanently reside abroad and three who have temporarily lost their voting rights, thus leaving 164. Unfortunately, only 73 delegates were present on Saturday, which is ten less than what the congress needs in order to make any decisions.

Nevertheless, after debates lasting for several hours, the Citizens Congress delegates statement was adopted and signed by 59 delegates, which, of course, remains open for additional signatures. All in all, in the statement, it is once again acknowledged that the June elections are not considered to be Saeima elections, because the legal representation of the Republic of Latvia still belongs to the Citizens Congress. The delegates stated that the results of any referendums organized under conditions of occupation have no legal standing, and there is a need to employ various forms of active political opposition, and likewise continue issuing citizenship certifications.

Ministry of Internal Affairs Reorganized

944K0401A Riga NEATKARIGA CINA in Latvian
25 Nov 93 p 1

[Article by Mara Cerkasina: "Minister Explains Reorganization"]

[Text] During the past one and one-half months, various important changes in personnel have taken place in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Three heads of departments—Prisons, Police, and Citizenship and Immigration—have been changed. In connection with these events, the Ministry of Internal Affairs organized a press

conference yesterday, which was initiated by the minister, Girts Kristovskis, with a reprimand to the press that, despite his invitation to come to him with questions, no one has bothered the minister. On the other hand, personal explanations by people who have been fired from the ministry have been published, which is causing a great deal of confusion and scandal-mongering.

It should be noted, on this point, that everyone who has been affected personally by the resolution has the right to make his position known.

All of these changes, according to Mr. Kristovskis, have one goal: to reorganize and improve the work by the respective departments. For example, the change in the head of the Prisons Department has already produced some perceptible positive results.

In particular, there was a great amount of talk about the removal from office of the head of the Police Department, Mr. Kupris, since, according to what can be gathered from the words of Mr. Kupris, the minister accepted the resolution without being fully competent in this area.

Naturally, the Minister of Internal Affairs did not admit to a lack of competence, noting that since the former head of the Police Department had mentioned certain facts at an international meeting, without prior approval by the respective officials, this shows a certain degree of incompetence on the part of Mr. Kupris. And, as Girts Kristovskis said, that was not the only reason for changing the department head. Radical changes must be made in the Police Department. For example, cooperation must be promoted among the various branch workers, which the former head, unfortunately, did not know how to do.

The new head of the Police Department, Mr. Lieljukša, undertook providing explanations to the press on the necessity of the adopted resolutions and those still being worked out, and also on the activities. In the fight against crime, which is slowly changing over from being quantitative to qualitative, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is planning to form a National Crime Fighting Program in the first half of next year.

And we finally come to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

—It must be said that the main problem—said Mr. Kristovskis—in not with the department itself, but with its director.

The fact that Mr. Plavinieks has done a major and necessary job cannot be denied, but to allow Mr. Plavinieks to continue with his methods is no longer permissible. It is a major responsibility to resolve the problems of citizenship and immigration, and it is necessary to know how to make proper political evaluations. Unfortunately, as Mr. Kristovskis pointed out, resolutions have been adopted in the elapsed period which do not adhere to the standards of international rights. In

addition, they were adopted prior to being approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs, the administration, nor even by the leading members of the department.

—Departments cannot be led—said the minister—by using national and political slogans.

In speaking about the present situation, several times we heard the phrases—the work must be accomplished, the laws must be organized. However, the words “work accomplishment” and “organization” have become an unavoidable component of all discussions, and, while time is elapsing, not too much is getting done. For instance, with respect to the “Law on operative activity”, which is still being worked on, Mr. Kristovskis explained: “The bill that was developed in the winter of last year was based on USSR legislative principles and rights norms.” Naturally, these principles are not acceptable to us.

The topic of refugees and transients was touched upon in the press conference. While Latvia is not interested, at present, in refugees from other countries, legislation is needed, nevertheless, on how to classify immigrants. A definition is needed on what the attitudes of the Latvian state are towards immigrants. In our sea ports and airports, where such refugees arrive or transients are detained, complications arise on what to do with these people. At present, the question has also not been legally resolved on who is ultimately responsible for putting them up or deporting them.

Police, Labor Department Appoint New Heads

944K0401B Riga LATVIJAS VESTNESIS in Latvian
17 Nov 93 p 2

[Article by “LV” Information : “Aldis Lieljuksis, Police Department Chief; Janis Berzins, State Labor Inspection Director”]

[Text] Aldis Lieljuksis, Police Department Chief.

Aldis Lieljuksis was born in Jelgava on December 26, 1952, graduated from Minsk Highest Militia School (1984), and holds a degree in law.

For many years, he worked in the Riga district internal affairs system, he was police chief of the Saulkrasti division, and afterwards—the assistant on questions of internal affairs and defense to the Minister President and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and by the order of November 9, 1993 of the Cabinet of Ministers—Ministry of Internal Affairs - Police Department Chief.

His wife—holds a degree and works in trade, his oldest son - lives on his own, his youngest son—is a student. His activity for relaxation—“to dig around in the soil”.

Janis Berzins, State Labor Inspection Director.

Janis Berzins was born on September 18, 1944, in Limbazi district, Umurga (formerly Katvaru) rural district, to a peasant family, graduated from the Riga

Polytechnical Institute Department of Radio-technology (1975), and holds a degree in radio-engineering.

Until 1987, he worked at the Riga plant “Medichnika” as a worker, engineer technologist, technological office head and main engineer, and afterwards—technical labor inspector and head technical labor inspector for trade unions, and recently—state labor inspection leader, and by order of November 12, 1993 of the Cabinet of Ministers—Ministry of Welfare - State Labor Inspection Director.

His wife, Valentina Ziedone—holds a degree in programming engineering, and is the division head of automation systems of P. Strazdina Republican Clinical Hospital. His oldest daughter, Ieva—is married and teaches at the boarding school for the hearing impaired, his son, Reinis, and youngest daughter Aija—are 12th and 10th grade students at the 49th High School in Riga. His hobby—working in his rural home in his birthplace.

Academician on Exploration, Drilling, New Uses For Latvian Oil

944K0411A Riga DIYENA in Russian 27 Nov 93 p 3

[Article by Academician Janis Freimanis, laboratory director in the Latvian Institute of Organic Synthesis: “What To Do With Latvian Oil And Latvian Geology?”]

[Text]

Do We Know That It Is Not Usable?

Information on Latvian oil can be found in Latvian-language encyclopedias (Concise Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 2, p. 612, 1968; Great Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 7, p. 76, 1986), but today it turns out that we know practically nothing on this subject. Therefore, first and foremost we should remind ourselves that the very first instrument analysis of oil extracted in the environs of Kuldiga was conducted in 1963 at the request of the now deceased F. Osis, an associate professor of the chemistry department of RPI [Riga Polytechnic Institute], on a British-made *Griffin 2B* gas-liquid chromatograph—the only one in Latvia at the time—by Dr. habil. chim. Andris Andersons, then a doctoral student at the Organic Synthesis Institute, and his assistant A. Shpungin. At F. Osis' and Professor L. Osipov's initiative, more extensive work began at the end of 1968, and we can learn about it from the only person who actively carried out this work—Matis Latsis, an RTU [Riga Technical University] instructor. In 1972 the work was suspended for 14 years, since the oil deposits discovered then in Latvia simply were not needed on the scale of the USSR. The second oil boom began in Latvia already during the time of Gorbachev, but only after Latvia's own, practically industrial-use well, was drilled near the Lithuanian border. However, the new wave of research conducted in 1986-1993 under the supervision of the LSSR [Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic] (Latvian Republic) Government, which up to the end of 1991 had been financed

exclusively by the just-disintegrated USSR, for all practical purposes only produced more precise estimates of oil reserves, but because of a lack of money turned out scandalously ineffective with respect to the number of wells. Let us compare: From 1959 to 1972, 40 wells were drilled, with a total depth of about 44 km. From 1986 to 1993, we have managed to drill only six wells, despite the fact that our Lithuanian neighbors were already getting ready to begin industrial utilization of their well drilled in 1986. Much has been done over these years also with respect to shelf research, which has opened quite certain positive prospects. Official state structures currently in charge of this area show no interest in these problems. Instead, they waste poods of paper trying to decide whether to leave the state enterprise Ventspils Nafta [Ventspils Oil]—which, by the way, produces **nothing**—under the jurisdiction of Janis Blazevich or, which is almost one and the same, of the city mayor Aivar Lembergs, or to transfer it to rather wealthy structures representing private capital in Riga. Upon closer look at this affair, it turns out that one does not have to dig too far: At issue is which of these “structures” will offer the state a greater bundle of money—and no intellectual chatter about the existence of a monopoly, keeping things secret, or the need to hold a “bidding” (which practically already is in effect).

Let us, however, leave the sharks circling around this juicy morsel and come back to our geology. The data on Latvian mineral wealth have been compiled this year in a special report under the title “M. Borzin. The Results of Seismological Observations in the Liepaja and Kuldiga Rayons of the Latvian Republic, 1993,” published in just a few copies and not available to the general public. Also in the same 1993, data were compiled on geothermal water resources in Latvia, as well as data on the supply of bromide mineral water in Kurzema. I want to remind the reader that the existence of bromide water in Latvia was mentioned as early as in 1973, in a long-forgotten publication by a most competent Latvian hydrogeologist, Astrid Freimanis, in the then-extant “IZVESTIYA KHIMII AND KHIMICHESKOY TEKHNologii RPI,” printed in 500 (!) copies. Now recognized, but in Soviet times only tentatively identified, mineral deposits could merit further discussion, but let us limit ourselves to oil. For starters....

To Bend Down and Scoop Out

One would have assumed that in 1993 the first, or at least the second, step the Birkavs government would make would be to analyze the strategy for minerals extraction in Latvia and consolidation of all geological structures in the country. One would also have thought that it would occur to someone to just bend down and scoop out Latvian oil, which today costs as much as the expenditures on its extraction and transportation. None of that, of course, is included in the program of the esteemed Latvians Cels for 100 days and until the year 2000. One may find in it only the superficial (or rather, simply incompetent) judgments of State Minister A. Kreslins regarding Latvian oil affairs, in which by

Latvian oil he means **the oil being burned in TETs [thermal electric power stations] or refined into gasoline.** The general public, reading these remarks of A. Kreslins, draws a conclusion: “It is not worth it.” And they are not to blame—a minister is a minister, even though he may be knowledgeable **only** in power generation and certainly does not know that in the oil market the nomenclature of products, while the weightiest, is not the most varied. We will speak of Latvian **power-generating** oil when the government finally draws a fair sea border with Lithuania and we begin ourselves to develop the oil pools in the sea. Until then, I want to point out to my former colleague Mr. Kreslins that in regard to dry land deposits of Latvian oil, the subject is the development of **small-scale** (read: household) **Latvian chemical industry**, for which one simply does not need tens of millions tonnes.

The question of Latvian geology is a topic for a separate article. For some reason, however, nobody wants to write about it—afraid, perhaps? Very briefly: The formerly strong Latvian geological planning and production structures have been dispersed in a most primitive way among different ministries, whose level of competence in matters of the utilization of Latvian mineral wealth may be described more or less the same way a cobbler would characterize a tailor. The draft law “On the Latvian Geological Service” has been relegated to the commission of esteemed Saeima deputies Novakshanov, Lambergs, and Graudins—only because, if you forgive me this personal opinion, the state of affairs **if set in accordance with this law** would be out of line with the structural policy of state administration developed by esteemed Latvians in exile Vita Teraude and Egils Levits, which, of course, is taboo. Nobody is interested any longer in the fact that the issues of state strategy do not fit into the procrustean bed of the model of state administration as seen from the West, and that our country unfortunately still is a postsocialist country rather than a part of the Council of Europe and it needs to, first, **get together** its potential and **beware of primitive bankruptcy.** I will leave it at that, though, only hoping that some other *scientist*, with different arguments, will agree or disagree with me.

So let us go back to Latvian oil; to the article on this subject (by newspaper correspondent Livia Zeberline) published on 4 November of this year (not published in the Russian edition—Ed.), DIYENA attached an incorrect title that absolutely does not correspond to the article’s contents or specific circumstances: “Oil Extraction in Kurzema Is Not a Promising Undertaking.” Since this article, those who think differently than the esteemed Mrs. Zeberline have been in a difficult situation: The problem was dealt a low blow, of which DIYENA simply could not fail to be aware.

First, I will explain why the heading is incorrect, or at the very least conveys disinformation, of which the DIYENA correspondent may not have been aware. **All** current oil wells taken together, **at the lowest estimate** of state enterprise Latvian Geologia, are capable of producing more than 1.5 tonnes of good lubricant oil a day;

hence, one would think that our rather withered chemical industry would be able to refine them; these are **free**, and their production cost should not be included in the old, Soviet-time capital investment on drilling. They, esteemed Mrs. Zeberline, should be written off the same way as the then-occupying state that financed them. To pick up something that is being wasted is a promising undertaking for anyone who is not too lazy to do it, since it is extremely simple to unplug all drilling holes (you just saw the ends off the pipes); to begin this work one only needs the appropriate pumps and automated systems that turn the pumps on when enough oil accumulates underneath. In this respect I would like to take issue with some esteemed commercial traders who "do not believe in this." It is simply that they seem to have arrived through the looking glass instead of basing their conclusions on real arguments. Each of them rejects his own Palm Beach. So what are we to do with small-scale petrochemical production, or, to be precise, what may be of interest to any of us?

The Latvian Institute of Organic Synthesis, together with the Grindex company, has conducted expert analysis of the oil and reported on it at the 16 November weekly meeting of the chemistry and biology department of the Latvian Academy of Sciences. The goal was fully accomplished; the factual material systematically arranged; nevertheless, the interest in this matter on the part of chemistry scientists was minimal. Well, let them be, the captains of our chemistry. Let us recall the facts, since almost no one at this meeting was interested in the chemical data—all everybody wanted to know about were lats, dollars, kopeks, and francs. This is the way we are—after all, next year with this kind of "support" from the state budget we, the scientists, will simply be ground into dust. Everybody was already prepared for it!

So the world price of oil today is on average 10.3 cents per liter, or approximately 11 cents a kilogram. The price of the same immediately usable products of oil distillation, according to the catalogs of Fluka (Switzerland), Marck (FRG), or Aldrich (United States) companies, is on average \$10 per kg, or several tens of Swiss francs or Deutsche marks. Naturally, one can believe this, and then say that there is nothing in the ground in Latvia, in Kurzema. That is all! But it is not true—it is there, and as much as 1.2 million tonnes! How much of this oil we can recover depends only on us—whether we will pump it with grandfather pumps or will recover it using intensive methods of oil layer utilization. The skeptics should know that in many places in the world, those who chase after easy money pump out of the ground only what comes out on its own; when, however, this person—the former owner—already has interrupted his charmed way of living and has moved from Palm Beach back, for instance, into the Bronx in New York, then comes a true proprietor, who does not buy [as published] the abandoned "empty" oil fields cheaply, uses completely different technology, and now he is the one who lives in the resort of Palm Beach. Latvia should not dream about Palm Beach; instead, it should develop timely business

plans, which can bring normal profit to the proprietor, and to Latvia the needed quantity of petrochemical products, even in the event that we do not immediately become members of OPEC.

This product exists: paraffin oil, used in the pharmaceuticals industry, precision mechanics, and some other everyday trifles, which I will leave to some other newspaper to write about. We will have the so-called soft paraffin, which melts at a temperature of about 43° C, is used in the medical field, in pharmaceutical production, and in household items (for instance, play dough). In addition, there is also the so-called hard paraffin, which melts at a temperature of 53° C; the most graphic example of that are paraffin candles and similar products. Then we should mention petroleum jelly, without which the cosmetic industry and production of medical ointments is unthinkable altogether. This leaves also light oil products, of which there are relatively small quantities, but which can be used for chemical production of most valuable products: for instance, organic household paint thinner—the so-called white spirit—which we now buy from the Lithuanians, who sell it to us at relatively "moderate" prices. What is left after all this is a viscous fraction, which is commonly called the oil tar. In this respect, we again have two options: Mr. Minister Gurmanis gets the material to fix Latvian roads, or the material to produce automotive resins, which are used to coat the undersides of cars so that they will not corrode. Or perhaps some of us could use ruberoid? This can be done too!

I think this provides enough practical examples. And now, in a completely conciliatory tone, I can add the following: If the impossible does not happen within the next five years and Latvia does run short of chemical distillation equipment (which is supplied from Mazeikiai), and there is no shelf oil either—what then? In that case I hope that the oil will be sold to us chemists at moderate prices by the company that will lease and then privatize Ventspils Nafta. And second: Unless we begin to work with our modest (as compared to Texas and Iraq) oil supply literally tomorrow, what are we going to do when oil from the Latvian continental shelf begins to arrive at Pape, Pavilosta, or Liepaja—and **it will be coming!** How many more years will we waste until we train our drillers, our distillers, our market specialists, and our own—preferable good—production engineers? It is unlikely that someone will provide them for us gratis.

In conclusion, I would like to apologize to Deputy Lambergers for revealing the contents of one of our conversations, as well as to say that when it comes to the problem of oil we see completely eye to eye. It turned out that he is as interested in these issues as am I, a scientist. No country submits the resources of its strategic minerals to research, expert evaluation, or audit inspection to research or auditing firms of foreign countries if these countries may be considered competitors in this area. If I, for instance, engage in the production of eggs, and my neighbor does the same, first and foremost I will not

stand next to him in a farmers market. Second, if racketeers force us to trade together in a farmers market, he, as it indeed happens in a market, will say that my eggs are contaminated with salmonella, while I will suspect that his products do not even have yolks. Naturally, the Latvian state does not think much about this now and is looking for partner companies not where it is most logical, but where it is closest by. Perhaps this is good, or perhaps it actually is bad that the only people who are not engaged in the analysis of the oil resources of our state are, let us put it this way, the neutral countries of the Northern Sea oil basin or colleagues across the ocean. I would really like to see what happens if Sweden begins to pump oil 10 km from Gotland Island in the direction of our border, and another 10 km away we, too, begin to pump *the same oil* in our own territorial waters. What company will be able to develop a business plan or will produce an audit evaluation of it, which will be simply lucrative for Latvia and also for the undoubtedly friendly Swedish state? Would it not make sense to start thinking about it ahead of time, while neither they nor we are pumping this oil?

And lastly. Chemical scientists, and not only they, want to solve the problem of oil. Because then they will be the ones to destroy a very persistent stereotype myth of our ruling structures, that a scientist is a person who satisfies his personal curiosity at the expense of the state. I hope we will act and will be understood at least by those whose job it is to understand the oil business. The question that remains unanswered is: When will Latvian businessmen understand all this, rather than a curly-haired fellow from the CIS southern republics or from the beautiful Tula province? When will all this end?

Foreign Affairs Chairman Analyzes Troop Withdrawal Agreement

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in Latvian No 45, 2 Nov 93 pp 3,7

[Interview with Aleksandrs Kiršteins, Chairman of Saeima's Foreign Affairs Commission, by Baiba Petersone: "The Nation Shouldn't Cry Over the Spoiled Mood of Two Men; Aleksandrs Kiršteins on the Talks Between Latvia and Russia"]

[Text] If Russia is unable to realize a successful economic policy, then Zhirinovsky or someone with similar strong orientation will most likely come to power in the following election. If the Skrunda property is not removed by that time, that could be a catastrophic situation for Latvia.

[Petersone] A routine round of talks between the Latvian and Russian delegations has ended without results. What are your comments on the direction of the talks?

[Kiršteins] Looking at the larger picture, there really aren't any results. Agreements have been drafted on transportation, for the regulation of shipping, air traffic and automobile traffic. Globally—Russia has still not come to the realization that Latvia is an independent nation. If Russia, which territorially occupies one-sixth

of the world's land mass, persists in assuming that it is essential to preserve its radar installations on Latvian territory, bringing in an addition thousand or so military officers to complement its 700,000 citizens who remain here, then this could be explained in one of two ways—either Russia wants us to return to its lap, or it just doesn't understand historical and political reality. There has been no accord on the main agreement concerning the removal of military forces for the simple reason that Russia is asking for its Skrunda radar installation base. According to Russia's proposals, the status of the Skrunda base is, in fact, a war base status, because a small military city of about 700 to 800 people is needed in the vicinity to guard it. Since the Helsinki conference documents and United Nation's resolutions only make reference to a total withdrawal of military forces, then, from an international standpoint, in no way can Latvia settle for some sort of partial withdrawal. Russia has presented the question of military withdrawal as of August 31, 1994 as being linked to the preservation of the Skrunda base. Since Latvia does not agree to the latter condition, the agreement is not being signed. Therefore, the withdrawal of military forces will either not occur, or, which is more likely, will occur without an agreement.

[Petersone] What are the main points of the Skrunda problem?

[Kiršteins] There are two matters that have to be examined. It may be that Russia is genuinely afraid that it will lose Russian control over a defined sector, and through this sector, for instance, a certain General Makashov could enter the northern Atlantic Ocean from Murmansk with nuclear submarines. But we are not convinced that this is true. It is more likely that Russia wants to preserve Skrunda as a base to maintain its influence, and will attempt, at some point, to again reunite Latvia into Russia. If they are really only concerned about their own security, then the positioning of the problem is completely backwards, because nothing of this nature could be discussed without international guarantees of Latvian independence. This also means that the period of use of the Skrunda property must be strictly limited. Then, even if a left-wing administration comes to power in the next election, it will not have the right to prolong this period to twenty years, for example. Another basic condition should be to turn this into an international property - - it could be controlled by the Baltic states or the Northern countries, but without the participation of Russia, in any case. However, Russia would never agree to such a condition. These are only theoretical considerations.

We have declared that Latvia could, for the most part, engage in economic and culture cooperation with Russia. Politically, we can only cooperate with Western countries. If Latvia contains a Russian military base, then it changes its international status and political orientation, becoming a buffer zone for Russia. That would mean a total change of foreign policy concepts. The administration does not have the right to do this.

[Petersone] How are the Western countries perceiving the Skrunda question?

[Kirsteins] At present, the territory of the Warsaw pact nations is being called a "free space" internationally. Without too much publicity, the assumption has already been made that order in this space can only be maintained by Russia. The Americans have even provided justification for this—Russia is a democracy and has a free market economy, it is America's number one ally, etc. It is assumed that, sooner or later, the rest of the Eastern countries will return to Communist governments. This has been shown by the elections in Poland, Bulgaria and Lithuania, and by the municipal elections in Estonia. The conclusion drawn from this is that the West should not interfere, but should allow Russia to establish order over there, just as it did in Georgia. Russia has not wasted any time in taking advantage of this, and in Russian foreign policy documents, the "peace keeping" forces have already been renamed the "peace creating" forces. Peace has been created in Georgia, this can also be done in the Baltics.

Yalta, Teheran or Potsdam history is being repeated. The situation is exactly the same. Russia is allowed to act in all of these territories. The Skrunda question also appears in this context. Such are the logical conclusions of the major powers.

It is quite obvious that no Russian politician will want to give up Skrunda by free will. But Latvia's independence will only be as great as what the nation can accomplish. Even if all of its people have to help, if necessary. If Latvia's government doesn't want to act, if the people don't want to act, and even the National Guard doesn't want to act, then the possibility of becoming a buffer state is quite real. In practice, this means that the Skrunda question cannot be resolved at the conference table alone. But it could be resolved in another manner—after all, the Skrunda property can operate for no more than a few months, if it is supplied only by a diesel-powered electrical station. Even then, it can only operate as long as fuel is allowed to be delivered. That, in turn, would lead to tension in the political relationship, which further causes a worsening of the economic situation. The only way in which Latvia can save up the resources needed for the development of manufacturing and loan offering is based on Russian and Western import-export transactions. Everything else that we were hoping for in the beginning, like the West coming to our aid and investing money in Latvia,—has turned out to be unfounded. Those 64 million dollars, which is what the Western investment capital amounts to, does not exceed one bank's activity in volume. Even the Latvian commercial banks, for the majority, are basing their operations on raw material transactions and trade with Russia and the Western countries.

[Petersone] How will the results of the Russian elections affect the relationship between Latvia and Russia?

[Kirsteins] We are very interested in the December 12 election results. It would be to our advantage if those powers won in Russia who would not place the economy under political control. Russia's export interests are most closely allied with Latvia. Russia cannot export through Finland or Estonia, nor through ports that can freeze over. This is our most important source for collecting credit resources. Of course, there have always been people in Russia who can manage economic interests within political interests. They are prepared to send export shipments by rail to Finland, even pay 30 percent higher rates, just to let that Latvian rabble starve, and show that it's possible to get along without them. But even this club has another end. The private businessman will never manage economic interests within political interests. And with the creation of more powerful businessmen in Russia, there will also be more involvement of their interests in Latvian ports.

The most dangerous would be for Latvia to attract the interest of Western countries for the purpose of considering it a rest stop, a base before going in to conquer the Russian market. The major Western companies have already been misled. For instance, in the second half of this year, there has been an actual decline in the amount of capital investment in Russia. If Western businessmen have no interest in Russia, then they will also show no interest in the Baltics. Thus, a prevailing shift could occur in Russia, which would lead towards self-isolation. The December election is Russia's last chance. If the new government succeeds in establishing order, stopping the explosion of crime, then something positive can still be accomplished. If this does not happen, and if, however, the Skrunda base in Latvia is maintained, then our outlook for the future could be very depressing. The newly elected council in Russia will only work for two years. If it is not able to realize a successful economic policy, then the next government will most likely be a government of Zhirinovskiy and powers with an orientation similar to his. If the Skrunda property is not removed by that time, that could be a catastrophic situation for Latvia.

[Petersone] How would you evaluate the work by the Latvian delegation?

[Kirsteins] In evaluating the work by the Latvian delegation, it is necessary to consider its primary goal. If we accept that the withdrawal of the military is the primary goal, then we should not be arguing too much about social assistance for those leaving, etc. It would not be productive to argue over questions of secondary importance. Compromises can always be made on questions of secondary importance. But there should be no backing down on strategic questions.

If the talks dissolve and an agreement is not signed, but the military forces are withdrawn, then the politics on the Latvian side will be much stronger and Russia's opportunity to interfere in Latvian internal matters will be significantly less.

Looking at this objectively, such opportunities to interfere in Latvian internal matters are present in the current agreement draft. First of all, they are found in the requested social guarantees.

However, this is not a question of citizenship. Russia is no longer talking about the granting of citizenship, it is talking about the issuing of permanent stay permits to its officers. If there is no such agreement, then all of the officers will have to apply for stay permits individually, which is not possible. According to the agreement, for those who have lived in Latvia for a certain period of time, such stay permits will not be necessary. Such is the policy of the ruling coalition, and the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNIM) can complain about it, but is unable to change it. Latvia is a democratic nation. If the ruling majority had been formed by the LNIM, then, naturally, the agreement would also have been different. This agreement was inherited from the Supreme Council, and it has all the markings of the former policies. In my opinion, the Saeima had the right to develop a new agreement text, but the ruling coalition did not support this. Since we are the minority, this agreement will only please us if, as a result of it, the Russian military disappears from Latvia forever, along with its counter intelligence, its systems for eavesdropping, etc.

It should be remembered that this is a delegation from the administration. Even I, myself, am only a representative from the Saeima. The administration has the right to sign the agreement. The Saeima can refuse to ratify it and lodge a protest. Then the administration will fall. This is the first major event in which the administration is being put to the test. The next will be the ratification of the budget. Still, I have not gotten the impression that the "Latvian Way" administration would be interested in having Latvia become a buffer state. The ruling elite of Latvia are interested in Western credit and financing, which can be distributed among private companies. The buffer zone situation would also mean enormous financial losses for these companies. From the state's funds, which would be filled by such well-intended transit taxes, there would be nothing left for private companies, because what is in the state funds is distributed into the budget, and such money is very hard to steal.

[Petersone] What will happen if the agreement is still not signed during the next round of talks?

[Kirsteins] Even without the signing of an agreement, Russia will be forced to withdraw the military. There is also international pressure, because the Western governments have promised this to their voters. Even though, in their hearts, they would like to leave the Skrunda base to Russia, and perhaps even curse the day that Latvia gained formal independence—August 21. They would much rather like to see Latvia as a part of Russia. Nevertheless, in front of their voters, these Western governments have to pretend and, with a great deal of

displeasure, will have to simulate support for Latvia. This is also very sharply evident in the position of the United States.

Apparently, Russia and America have come to an understanding that the Skrunda property should remain a war base for a certain period of time. I remember how, during the time when Latvia's President was visiting the United States, the United States special envoy to the CIS countries, S. Talbot said: "I know you believe that we have come to an accord with Russia about Skrunda remaining theirs, but there is no such accord". After that came Warren Christopher's visit to Latvia. The situation changed. Also he proclaimed: "We don't want to interfere. This should be resolved among yourselves". Yet, many diplomats of the European embassies have suddenly started to use such phrases: "Those Latvians are really dishonest. Why, the former administration had promised to leave Skrunda...". This is where the complex relationships that exist between administrations and elected institutions are revealed. Our allies have always been and still remain today the United States congressmen and senators, who are compelled to recognize public opinion. In congressional circles, a pronounced dissatisfaction can be felt about Christopher's handling of foreign policy. For instance, the representatives of the congressional Foreign Affairs Commission have expressed their feelings to the press that Christopher should step down. Republican senators are very sharply critical of the present administration's foreign policy, not only on the Baltic question, but also in Somalia, and other hot spots.

In summary, we should ask: "If the moods of Yeltsin and Clinton have been spoiled because an agreement has not been signed—is this good or bad?" I don't think the Latvian people should cry because the moods of two men have been spoiled.

Aleksandrs Kirsteins, Chairman of Saeima's Foreign Affairs Commission was interviewed by Baiba Petersone.

LITHUANIA

Lithuania Faces Growing Social Tensions

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in Russian 30 Nov 93 pp 1, 3

[Article by Tamara Nikolayeva: "The Left: A Year After the Victory: The Opposition of the Right Is Demanding Early Seimas and Presidential Elections"]

[Text] Social tension in Lithuania is on the rise. It is hard to say to what extent this has been caused by the grim situation in the socioeconomic sphere, and to what extent by the inflaming of passions by the right-wing opposition. But both these factors are undoubtedly present. The decline in industrial and agricultural production in the republic continues. The minimum wage, pensions, and grants are not enough even for biological

survival with the start of the heating season, when the owner of a two-room apartment has to pay over 70 lits (the amount of the average pension) monthly for utilities. At the other end of society, meanwhile, a handful of people are amassing increasingly great wealth. The support of civilized capitalism—a broad middle class—is not in practice taking shape under the conditions of the continuing commercialization and lumpenization of society.

In recent months in Lithuania people have increasingly been going to protest meetings, picketing the Seimas and government buildings, and organizing hunger strikes. In November alone there have been two major demonstrations against the government's socioeconomic policy. One was organized by retirees and the handicapped—today the most unprotected category of society. The other by farmers, who even under the conditions of the decline in the level of production are unable to sell a large part of their products on account of the reduction in the home market and who are getting money for what has been sold from monopoly manufacturers. The social and economic complaints of both are perfectly understandable. But, having played their part, they are increasingly receding into the background under the pressure of political slogans and demands, the main ones of which are resignation of the present leadership of the republic and early Seimas and presidential elections. It is a long time now since posters beseeching the world to save Lithuania and its people from pro-communist rule have been seen on the streets of Vilnius. And the fact that they appeared is evidence of the increased activity of the right-wing opposition following a certain lull.

Seimas Chairman Ceslovas Juršenas declared that the right has thrown out a challenge to the legitimately elected authorities, taking advantage of the people's justified unhappiness in connection with the economic difficulties. The ruling majority in the Seimas saw the November protest actions as a clearly expressed desire to oust the authorities for the first time following a year of rule of the left. The idea that early elections are needed is being propounded increasingly persistently in LIETUVOS AIDAS, the paper of the right-wing opposition, and in the broadcasts of the Tele-3 independent channel from Kaunas.

The right-wing opposition's main trump cards are the indexation of personal savings and Lithuanian-Russian relations. The first card is, it may be said, no-lose: Are there many people capable of refusing a 100-fold indexation of savings, as the right-wing opposition in the person of former premier Gediminas Vagnorius proposes? The ruling majority, on the other hand, accuses the opposition of immorality and populism since the government does not have the money for such indexation. The other favorite card of the right—Lithuanian-Russian relations—is not today as no-lose as formerly, when Russian troops remained in Lithuania. The majority of people in the republic understand the present leadership's aspiration to establish normal mutually beneficial economic relations with Russia—this is

the insistent demand of Lithuania's industrialists and entrepreneurs also. Nonetheless, any positive changes in Lithuanian-Russian interstate relations are interpreted by the right as a "secret compact with Moscow" and an endeavor by the authorities to once again enter the sphere of Russian influence. Thus the Fatherland Union right-wing opposition party which was formed on the basis of Sajudis, whose leaders are Vytautas Landsbergis and Gediminas Vagnorius, expressed concern at the agreement on the creation of a commission for the formation of a stock company from the main gas pipeline crossing the territory of Lithuania and also from two major Lithuanian enterprises operating on the basis of Russian raw material—the Jonava Azotas and the Mazheyksaya Nafta. This agreement is interpreted by the right as a threat to not only the economic but also political independence of Lithuania.

Thus not only social tension but also a confrontation of the main antagonistic political forces are growing in Lithuania. And the right believes, what is more, that at the present stage of the crisis there is every reason to hope that it will come to power by way of early elections. In this connection the left, incidentally, has declared that last year's early elections also were inspired by the right, but the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party was the winner. But today the situation in Lithuania has changed appreciably. There was at that time disenchantment with the policy of Sajudis, today, according to sociological surveys, there are far more people with a negative assessment of the activity of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party than of its opponents. This party had an unenviable inheritance, but the social policy it has pursued for a year has been very far removed from its election promises. Nonetheless, President Algirdas Brazauskas' rating is still very high, and he is more than 10 points ahead of Vytautas Landsbergis in terms of popularity.

The left has declared that it has no intention of quitting office before the end of its term in 1996 and will do everything to fulfill its election promises and pull the country out of crisis, and the proposal concerning a referendum on the question of early elections is being heard from the camp of the right.

The price of reforms cannot be higher than people's possibilities. If the present ruling majority in the shape of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party can adjust its policy, it will gain supporters, and the idea of early elections will, possibly, die away.

Ex-Premiers Accused of Economic Crimes

944K0396B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Dec 93
p 2

[Article by Nikolay Lashkevich: "The Dock Awaits Almost All Former Prime Ministers of Lithuania"]

[Text] Vilnius—Lithuania sustained a financial loss of 208,337 lits, which was possible as a result of the unlawful directives of former Prime Ministers G. Vagnorius and A.

Abisala and certain other high officials in the republic's ministerial cabinet—this was the conclusion drawn by a most influential commission of the Lithuanian Seimas investigating economic crimes following a careful study of a special report of the republic's Department of State Control.

The gloomy prospect of the dock has loomed before both ex-prime ministers following so severe and authoritative a summing up. All the material has already been forwarded to the General Procuracy, which will, in all probability, shortly institute criminal proceedings against the former heads of government. G. Vagnorius (the most steadfast "long-liver" of all six Lithuanian premiers, who was at the helm of the executive for more than 18 months [1991-1992]) is the most vulnerable in this connection. Many decisions contrary to current legislation were formerly adopted under his leadership. Thus the former prime minister adopted in violation of the law a decree on the transfer to municipal self-government of several sanatoriums in the resort city of Druskininkai, on the transfer of Union assets to other organizations and institutions, on the privatization of the right-wing-conservative newspaper LIETUVOS AIDAS, which subsequently became the spokesman for the TEVYNES SAJUNGA (Motherland Union) party which he leads, on currency auctions, where, thanks to the auctioning procedure that was adopted, unseemly business was done, and on the compulsory replacement of 30-50 percent of employees of ministries and departments, which absolutely demoralized fearful state functionaries.

But, judging by the report, G. Vagnorius committed most follies when distributing resources from the state budget. In circumvention of the law approximately 12 million of the then coupons were transferred to the Lithuanian Investment Bank, and almost R17 million to the Department for Protection of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, whose "contributions" at the time of the V. Landsbergis government are known to everyone in Lithuania and which still await a legal opinion.

Certain sums were allocated altogether only in accordance with the personal directives of the ex-premier, which should not have been done under any circumstances, this coming under Article 177 of the Criminal Code of Lithuania—official malfeasance—and carrying a term of two to six years. And if the mysterious business of the "loss" of \$630,000 (the G. Vagnorius government allocated the omnipotent Department for the Protection of Parliament \$870,000 for the purchase of weapons which were forwarded to a British bank, but the weapons were purchased for only \$240,000, and the rest of the money incomprehensibly evaporated) is fully uncovered, very big problems, to put it mildly, threaten the former head of the government, who is distinguished by rare obstinacy and willfulness.

V. Juskus, chairman of the Seimas Commission for the Investigation of Economic Crimes, is firmly minded to "bring the proceedings to a conclusion."

"The activity of other Lithuanian governments: of K. Prunskiene, A. Abisala, and B. Lubys and of the present A. Slezevicius, will be investigated also," he said, "and if it is ascertained that they broke the law, proceedings will be instituted against them as well. A sufficient legal base for all governments—both past and present—to operate strictly in accordance with the law has been created in Lithuania."

What is most interesting is that L. Asmantas, former minister of power engineering, who had formerly raised the so-called "ministerial revolt" against the authoritarian premier G. Vagnorius, has also come under the chastising sword of the parliamentary commission.

He is now threatened with the dock as well. It has been ascertained, for example, that under his leadership the ministry artificially overstated the price of electric power and thermal energy, illegally obtaining several million lits here. A large part of the resources went to maintain an inflated staff, support dubious firms, and so forth. In a word, whichever way you turn in Lithuania, you unavoidably run into a future defendant from the cohort of top state officials.

Lithuanian politicians from the ranks of the eternal skeptics believe that the entire present scandal surrounding the activity of the former leaders of the government will end fruitlessly, for that matter.

Delegate Examines Lithuania's NATO Prospects

944K0373A Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
No 43, 29 Oct-5 Nov 93 p 3

[Interview with Ambassador Adolfas Venckus by Arturas Racas in Vilnius; date not given: "We Cannot Remain Silent on Our Aspirations, But We Should Speak Only for Ourselves"]

[Text] **Adolfas Venckus, leader of the Lithuanian mission in the European Community, representative of the Republic of Lithuania at NATO, and ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, was in Vilnius. He answered questions of LETUVOS RITAS.**

[Racas] Mr. Ambassador, you have to come Lithuania at a time when politicians are debating membership of NATO. You also participated in the debate indirectly when, according to ELTA, you said that "joining NATO is unrealistic for Lithuania." Is there really no prospect of this?

[Venckus] It is unrealistic in the sense that we would not be admitted at this time. On the other hand, Lithuania, in my view, should make every effort to revise the aims of the Western states. But Lithuania should, in my opinion, speak only for itself, not for all the Baltic states.

[Racas] How do you view Latvian President G. Ulmanis' statement to the effect that Latvia should be admitted to NATO together with Russia? Do you believe that Lithuania should adopt a similar line?

[Venckus] Not at all. What G. Ulmanis proposes essentially coincides with Russia's proposals. I would view the president of Latvia's statement as a step backward.

[Racas] What, as you see it, is NATO's policy in respect to Russia?

[Venckus] NATO's policy in respect to Russia is at the present time clear, it would seem: The organization may expand only up to Ukraine. Beyond this line some other forms of cooperation are possible. In addition, it should be remembered what is now happening in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia and understood that the leaders of NATO are unwilling to demolish the organization or convert the bloc into yet another United Nations.

[Racas] While in Lithuania you have met with the president, the chairman of the Seimas, the prime minister, and the foreign minister. Was Lithuania's view of NATO discussed at these meetings?

[Venckus] All the high officials of Lithuania with whom I met said that Lithuania's policy on this issue is clear.

[Racas] Mr. Ambassador, you have been Lithuania's representative to NATO for two years. Have we come close to becoming a member of this organization?

[Venckus] Lithuania is a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and the Lithuanian delegation constantly participates in the work of the NATO countries' Parliamentary Assembly. We have close contacts with the NATO leaders. Finally, the state of our relations is characterized also by an offer made by NATO General Secretary M. Woerner to President A. Brazauskas that he visit the bloc's headquarters.

The relations of Lithuania and NATO will depend to a considerable extent on the meeting of the leaders of NATO states on 10 January 1994. I was recently talking with an official of the United States' NATO mission. In his opinion, if a decision on the admittance to NATO of new members is adopted at this meeting, it will concern primarily the Visegrad states. According to the American diplomat, there would then be a great chance of the possibility of the admittance of Lithuania and the other Baltic countries being discussed simultaneously. I may maintain, therefore, that we are getting closer to NATO, if our leadership continues to aspire to this, of course.

[Racas] But if Lithuania says nothing about its intentions prior to the NATO summit, no one will know about these intentions. Have you received any instructions from the president of Lithuania in this connection?

[Venckus] I have, but it is not the done thing for diplomats to discuss such things in the press. I can only say that I have been charged by the president of Lithuania with making every effort to ensure that Lithuania continue its movement in the direction of NATO.

[Racas] You represent Lithuania not only at NATO but in the European Community also. What are Lithuania's prospects in this organization?

[Venckus] I would like to answer in the words of a high official of the European Community. He was surprised: "When I lived in the Letuva Hotel two years ago, it was state-owned, now, coming here again, I see that it is still state-owned."

These words are confirmation that Lithuania still has much to do. We have to get closer to Western standards. If we want to become members of the European Community, we should be similar to those who already live in this family.

Criticizing the aspiration to become a member of the European Community, some Lithuanian politicians, incidentally, are saying that we are giving up a little bit of independence. This is not the case. On the contrary, we will have more space for the expression of our culture and distinctiveness.

That we will have to coordinate our laws is another matter. Like in soccer—you cannot have 10 players playing by one set of rules, and the eleventh, by another.

[Racas] In which spheres, in your view, do we most lag behind?

[Venckus] Primarily, of course, in the sphere of privatization and free trade. Greater scope for private initiative and foreign investments. We must open our borders. But were we to do this now, we would be inundated with cheap merchandise, and unemployment would grow. To prevent this our products must be competitive. This is not the case as yet.

Administrative-Territorial Reform Planned

944K0373B Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
No 44, 5-12 Nov 93 p 3

[Article by Arunas Karaliunas: "By the Year 2000 We Will Have Become a Country of Volosts"]

[Text] The government working group on administrative-territorial reform headed by Stasys Vaitekunas, professor at Klaipeda University, held a news conference devoted to the laws on administrative reform, which the working group is preparing. Administrative-territorial reform in our country is to begin next year and to have been completed roughly in the year 2000.

It is contemplated dividing the entire territory of Lithuania into volosts. True, it is not known as yet whether this is what these territories will be called—the large cities, which will become the volost centers, disagree with this name. Another proposed name is local government. There are to be 92-95 local governments in Lithuania. Administrative reform in the country is to begin next year with elections to the local governments. But only four new local governments—Palanga, Neringa, Druskininkai, and Birstonas—will be formed in the course of the elections. Earlier Palanga, Neringa, Druskininkai, and Birstonas had the status of cities of republic jurisdiction. Other local governments will be formed on the basis of the present districts, the rest will take shape gradually, over four years approximately.

The draft new laws provide for a merger of the municipal and district authorities, and in place of the city mayor and council chairman there will be just one leader of local government. It is also planned to reduce the numbers of deputies of local government: thus there are to remain just 15-30 of them in Vilnius. It is planned to transfer to local government the duties which, according to Professor S. Vaitekunas, they are capable of discharging. These are questions of employment, health care, nature conservation, education, and social protection. The resources necessary for the performance of certain functions will be allocated from the state budget, and these resources will remain in the sphere of regulation of local government. Mr. S. Vaitekunas believes that financial independence is a prerequisite of the existence of local government.

The latest draft laws on administrative division propose the creation in Lithuania of 10 uyezd. They are to be formed at the coming local government elections. It will be necessary to draw up master plans of the development of the uyezd, train specialists, and create branches of higher schools and other vocational-training institutions and medical establishments. The uyezd in Lithuania are to take over the functions of ministries, departments, and other state institutions of the capital. This will make it possible to decide various questions locally, and the public will not have to travel to Vilnius. In addition, this will afford an opportunity for staff reductions in some of the above-mentioned institutions.

Professor S. Vaitekunas says that at the start of the reform the number of government officials in the country is to be reduced and that subsequently their numbers will be regulated as necessary. The professor believes that the number of uyezd and local governments specified in the draft is the optimum in the financial sense both for the populace and for the state. The present procedure is costly for both parties. Over the next five years the reform of administrative division will require investments of the order of 100-110 lts (this amount does not include the funding of new communications facilities).

Decree on Indexation of Wages Issued

944K0365A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 3 Nov 93 p.2

[Decree No 811 of Government of Lithuanian Republic on Indexation of Wages and Other Payments, signed by Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius and Minister of Social Welfare Mindaugas Stankevicius in Vilnius on 29 October 1993]

[Text] The Government of the Lithuanian Republic hereby decrees that:

1. The following will be established:

1.1. a minimum subsistence level of 40 litas a month per resident of the Lithuanian Republic.

1.2. a minimum monthly wage of 44 litas and a minimum hourly rate of 0.26 litas;

1.3. a state-secured income of 36 litas per family member a month and a guaranteed income of 16 litas a month.

These minimum rates will go into effect on 1 November 1993.

2. In line with the higher minimum monthly wage and minimum hourly rate, there will be a corresponding rise on 1 November 1993 (in relation to the amount set on 1 October 1993) in the salaries (or wages) and supplementary or additional payments for workers of budget-carried institutions and organizations (with the exception of forms of remuneration using coefficients based on the monthly wage or hourly rate approved by the Government of the Lithuanian Republic) stipulated in the corresponding decrees of the Government of the Lithuanian Republic.

3. The wages of workers engaged in profitable businesses and other enterprises, institutions, and organizations not financed by the budget will continue to be increased with a view to existing resources and according to the procedure stipulated in the Law of the Lithuanian Republic on Private Income Guarantees.

4. Starting on 1 November 1993

4.1. compensation for health impairments or death (along with earlier supplementary payments) will be increased by 10 percent.

This will apply to individuals who are already collecting these benefits or who became eligible for them prior to 1 November 1993.

4.2. there will be a 10-percent increase in payments to individuals collecting temporary disability benefits; unemployed individuals collecting unemployment benefits (with the exception of the minimum and maximum rates); and working women who are on maternity leave and are collecting maternity benefits.

This will be applicable if these benefits were granted prior to 1 November 1993.

4.3. during the calculation of social insurance benefits based on the average wage (or compensation) of the personnel of budget-carried institutions and organizations in the cases stipulated by law, as well as the compensation of the personnel of enterprises and organizations not financed by the budget, the wage increase envisaged in Lithuanian Republic government decrees will be added to the wages for the number of months during which there was no wage increase in accordance with these Lithuanian Republic government decrees. Enterprises and organizations not financed by the budget are advised to use this procedure to calculate the average wage for payments from enterprise or organization funds.

5. On 1 November 1993 there will be a 10-percent increase in the pensions of non-working pensioners.

6. On 1 November 1993 the scholarship allowances of the students of higher academic institutions and higher and vocational schools will be increased by 10 percent.

7. The Ministry of Finance will do the following:

7.1. allocate funds from the state budget of Lithuania to increase the wage funds of all budget-carried institutions and organizations and to cover other increases specified in this decree.

Local government allocations will depend on revenue projections based on estimated payments and subsidies for 1993;

7.2. the state social insurance budget will be augmented by the amount needed to increase state social insurance pensions.

[Signed] Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius
Minister of Social Welfare Mindaugas Stankevicius

No Significant Changes in Unemployment Levels Foreseen

944K0365B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 3 Nov 93
p 4

[ELTA report: "The Unemployment Curve in Lithuania"]

[Text] The unemployment curve in Lithuania will not undergo any significant changes before the end of this year, said General Director Vidas Slekaitis of the Lithuanian Labor Exchange. He does believe, however, that this "calm"—the unemployment rate in the republic remained stable at 1.5 percent throughout the third

quarter—might be the calm before the "storm" at the beginning of the coming year. By that time the Law on the Bankruptcy of Enterprises will go into effect, the reorganization of production will take more radical forms, and privatization will have been stepped up.


According to Vidas Slekaitis, the Lithuanian Labor Exchange is prepared to deal with a substantial surge in unemployment. It was already prepared for this, incidentally, even before; but the projected surge never took place. Since the beginning of 1993, 122,000 jobless individuals have turned to republic labor exchanges for help, and 28,000 have been placed in jobs. The unemployed figure decreased when stricter labor exchange requirements terminated the search for jobs for 90,000 individuals. According to Deputy Director Alfonsas Brazas of the Vilnius Labor Exchange, many had submitted applications to the exchange simply in observance of the formal requirements for eligibility for social benefits.

Around 70,000 jobless individuals and 32,091 officially unemployed individuals were registered in Lithuania on 1 October.

According to Alfonsas Brazas, many of the jobless individuals will not be eligible for unemployed status according to law until six months after the date of discharge. Furthermore, many simply do not register with the labor exchanges because any person has a legal right not to work.

The number of individuals working only a part-time day (or week) and workers on unpaid leave has decreased since the beginning of the year. Whereas there were

Changes in Rate of Unemployment in Lithuania from January to September 1993



Key: - rate of unemployment in republic; + rate of unemployment in cities. * rate of unemployment in regions

around 100,000 of these individuals registered on 1 January, by 1 October the figure had dropped to 54,000.

According to Vidas Slekaitis, the labor exchange in Lithuania has made a great effort to retrain jobless individuals and place them in new jobs. This is also contributing to the reduction of the number of unemployed workers in Lithuania. Vidas Slekaitis is certain that the data of the Lithuanian Labor Exchange reflect the actual state of affairs in employment.

Lithuanian Development Bank To Be Formed

944K0365C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 5 Nov 93 p 1

[Article by A. Gasiuniene: "A Lithuanian Development Bank Is Being Established"]

[Text] Prime Minister A. Slezevicius had good news to report yesterday at one of his regular press conferences: A Lithuanian Development Bank will be established. This absolutely new structure is expected to attract foreign investments to the republic economy. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Northern Development Bank have been instrumental in founding this bank. Most of the work involved in drafting the bank charter has been completed. The premier believes that the Seimas should assign the draft priority status. For now, here is some basic information about the new bank. Its authorized capital will total 5 million ecus: 35 percent contributed by foreign partners and 65 percent consisting of state-owned real estate and financial capital.

Prominent experts from the EBRD and the Northern Bank have come to Vilnius to complete the preparatory work. One of the members of this mission, Ulf Hindstrom, gave reporters a detailed description of the operations of comparable banks in countries undertaking economic reform. As a rule, they are granted special status and do not compete with commercial banks. They extend long-term credits—for an average of 3-7 years—and their interest rates are also preferential—around 10 percent. In this way, the investment banks establish favorable conditions for the development of small and medium private business.

A bank of this kind has already been in operation for more than a year in Estonia, one began operating recently in Latvia, and now it is Lithuania's turn. Estonia's positive example should not only instill optimism in interested parties in our country, but also urge them to take vigorous action. This was underscored at the press conference by President Yelena Leontyeva of the Lithuanian Free Market Institute, who has taken an active part in the preparatory work. In her opinion, the new bank could pave the way for foreign investments and attract the resources of prestigious foundations and official international organizations.

Reporters asked Adolfas Slezevicius why he had attended the press conference despite earlier reports that

he would be meeting in Moscow with Premier V. Chernomyrdin at that time. Slezevicius replied that schedule changes had postponed his meeting with the Russian premier for a week. A set of documents has been prepared for signature: treaties on trade, transit, cooperation by law enforcement agencies, and others.

Lithuania's Businessmen Keep Up Relations With West, East

944K0353A Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS in Lithuanian 3 Nov 93 p 11

[Article by Professor Arvydas Matulionis: "Two Thirds of Lithuanian Businessmen Do Not Limit Themselves to One Country, but Maintain Good Ties to Both the East and the West"]

[Text] Much is being said and written about businessmen. Some are upset that there are those in Lithuania who are growing rich, whereas others, to the contrary, assert that energetic people are being very restricted by duties and taxes.

There is, however, very little discussion about whom the businessmen are doing business with, where they get their raw materials and goods from, and where they are selling their products.

For this reason, we conducted a scientific poll of Lithuanian businessmen in October. We queried 305 Lithuanian businessmen in the large cities of Lithuania, as well as in Birzai, Mazeikiai, Telsiai, Utena, and Varena.

Thus, the poll included all Lithuanian geographical regions and cities of various sizes. Answers to the questionnaire were provided by those owning the largest businesses in Lithuania as well as by those owning small stores or workshops.

Two thirds of those queried do not limit themselves to some one country and maintain business ties to both the East and the West. Fourteen percent of the businessmen queried have business ties only to former Soviet republics, 3 percent only with countries of the former so-called socialist camp, and 12 percent only with Western countries.

Three quarters of the businessmen maintained that it was essential to maintain ties to all countries.

Every fifth respondent gives priority to the Western countries, 6 percent to the republics of the former USSR, and one percent sees better prospects in ties to the post-communist countries.

Some two thirds of those queried have business ties to Russia. More than a third of the businessmen indicated that they have relations with our closest neighbors, the Latvians and the Belarusians.

A somewhat smaller percentage—one in five—has ties to businessmen in the Kaliningrad region. A third of those

polled noted partners in Ukraine, and every fifth businessman has business ties to Moldova and the republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

Business ties to the Western countries are very significant. About half of the businessmen have established ties to Germany. Four of ten respondents have ties to businessmen in Poland. I want to single out relations with the U.S.: every ninth businessman has relations with this most powerful country in the world.

It is no less significant that seven percent of those queried have established ties to Asian businessmen. It should be noted that the interests of Lithuanian businessmen extend to all continents: even in far-off Australia, Lithuanian furniture is being purchased.

Countries/areas to which business ties exist and percentage of respondents indicating ties to that country/area (October 1993 data)

Latvia	35
Estonia	21
Kaliningrad region	18
Other regions of Russia	46
Belarus	34
Ukraine	35
Other former USSR republics	21
Germany	51
Scandinavian countries	22
Western European countries	32
Poland	38
Other Eastern European countries	15
USA	11
Other countries in the Americas	1
Asian countries	7
African countries, Australia	2

Lithuanian businessmen believe that raw materials can be best obtained in the territory of the former USSR, and especially in Russia. Naturally, goods are more frequently obtained from the West.

It is most convenient to sell products in Lithuania and on the territory of the former USSR. However, it should be noted that a group of businessmen has already emerged which does not limit itself only to the CIS countries, but also sells its products in Western countries, and some of these businessmen sell their products exclusively in Western countries.

About a third of those queried maintain that it is most difficult to cooperate with their own country's—i.e. Lithuania's—officials, whereas about 44 percent assert that it is easiest to deal with officials in Western countries. Thus it becomes clear why about two thirds of

respondents indicated that it was essential not to interfere with ties to other countries, and that the businessmen themselves will manage to develop those ties.

The sociologists conducting the poll do not doubt that the businessmen will succeed in doing just that. Never before had it happened that a sociologist conducting a poll was greeted with a pleasant smile and received one at the end of the interview as well, regardless of whether he had been polling a millionaire or a storeowner standing at her own counter.

Lithuanians are producing porcelain in a former cowshed, and next to it, in a modern office, a Lithuanian businessman is sending information by fax on the sale in Germany of his products.

Country/area in which it easiest to sell products and percentage of respondents indicating that country/area

Doesn't matter	4
Lithuania	38
Russia	9
Belarus	1
Ukraine	1
Other former USSR republics	1
In general in the former USSR	21
Neighboring countries	3
Western countries	5
Various countries	8
No response	9

Volunteer Defense Service Killings Decried

944K0353B Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS in Lithuanian 10 Nov 93 p 4

[Editorial under the rubric "LIETUVOS RYTAS, an Independent Daily Newspaper": "Signs of the Times"]

[Text] In Lithuania, a person's life is no longer at all a thing of value. The mafia hires killers and deals with its opponents with cold-blooded shots to the back of the head. The men of the Interior Ministry's Executive Protection Department, who protect the lives of the country's president, prime minister, and other government officials, mine a garage in the center of the capital with a TNT charge and blow up one of their associates, while department director A. Peckys dares to say that this is only "an annoying unfortunate incident."

A. Pocius, the new head of the Volunteer National Defense Service (SKAT), has come up with some similar strange arguments after peacetime killings—for the second weekend now—by drunken volunteers under his command. The victims were not the country's enemies, but rather its citizens, whom the volunteers are otherwise supposed to defend.

The lieutenant colonel explains without embarrassment on television, for example, that former volunteers shot a 16-year-old girl near Kaunas at a house that had gained a sad reputation (and which the volunteers had also virtually occupied, thereby encroaching upon the private property of a Lithuanian citizen). Generally speaking, it has now become customary in both the National Defense and the Volunteer National Defense systems to immediately remove from the membership rolls a volunteer who has committed an offense of some kind, and in this way wash their hands of this person. This is similar to how individuals were rapidly removed from the Young Communist League in the past.

In the last two years, 43 submachine guns, nine pistols, and two small caliber guns disappeared from various National Defense Forces units. Tens of volunteers and soldiers injured one another while on guard duty and the number of those in Lithuania who have died at the hands of its defenders has already reached double digits. Last year, on the night of the elections, volunteers shot at peaceful citizens in Kursenai, this year they shot at each other at the Kaunas airport, and now deadly shots have rung out in Alytus.

Nevertheless, there are still those in Lithuania who believe that as long as a volunteer is not a Brazauskas supporter, he can be absolved of all sins, even mortal ones, as well as of getting drunk while carrying a submachine gun and standing guard duty. For the journalists and editorial writers of LIETUVOS AIDAS, "all of these incidents are a carefully planned and still ongoing provocation", whose "purpose it is to undermine the country's defensive capacity and to destroy the SKAT."

Does Lithuania need such "defensive capacities", who spend their time drinking while on armed guard duty, who shoot at their own associates and at the citizens of their own country? Can they defend the country from anyone if the citizens of the country now have to defend themselves from such "defenders"?

Not all that long ago, after hearing of Arturas Sakalauskas' tragedy and the tens of young Lithuanians murdered in the Soviet army, Lithuania's answers to these questions would have been unambiguous. Today, now that we have our own army and its unfortunate appendage, the SKAT, there are two opinions on this topic. Moral nihilism always accompanies legal nihilism.

However strange this might seem, the governing Democratic Labor Party, has—despite its open antipathy towards the volunteers—nevertheless done nothing in one year to introduce order into the country's defense structures. On the contrary, the current government has—in a variety of ways—flattered the nervous and armed fellows who are not very inclined to live in accordance with the country's constitution.

Today, the SKAT is dying and it is becoming evident that those who have found refuge there need it more than the country does. According to information of

LIETUVOS RYTAS, the Vilnius territorial SKAT headquarters has a listed strength of 1309 volunteers, but the actual total is less than half this number. The volunteers' activities are poorly organized, and not more than a fifth of the volunteers attend them. Is there any reason to be surprised that they handle weapons as if they were just sticks?

The remaining volunteers in Vilnius are "dead souls", and of the more than 500 who are alive, 111 are being paid for their work. The functions of most of the permanent staff are not defined; it is unclear what the workers in the gendarmerie, operations, and intelligence sections do. Most of the officers were granted their military ranks without any military preparation, their discipline has gone awry. The SKAT district chiefs for Ukmerge and Vilnius, the head of the Trakai company, and many other officers were removed for immoral behavior. "Immoral behavior" is the transfer of explosives to mafia structures, accepting bribes, drunkenness, robberies.

The owners of a number of facilities being guarded by the volunteers have declined their services because of robberies by the volunteers. The volunteers have a lot of guns, ammunition, and explosives, but for a long time, these were not inventoried in most of the companies.

It is said that even a gun hanging on the wall can go off once a year. So is it really surprising that deadly volleys of automatic fire continue to ring out where the Lithuanian volunteers display anarchistic military discipline and do not avoid drinking while on duty? It shouldn't surprise us in Lithuania if we one day hear that in order to achieve greater security, the doors of the President himself were mined.

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[Article by Saulius Peceliunas, chairman of Democratic Party Council and Seimas faction: "We Are Probably Viewed as an 'Inconvenient' Party"]

[Text] Political parties in the republic recently became much more active. What is more, they are concentrating more on republic domestic and foreign policy than on internal party affairs. This is attested to by their numerous statements in the Seimas (in the case of the parties with factions there) and in the news media. Our correspondent V. Kuznetsov asked Chairman Saulius Peceliunas of the Democratic Party Council and Seimas faction to describe the state of affairs in his party.

Our party was one of the first to resume its activities in the republic—in 1989. Today it has around 2,000 members and it has branches in almost all regions of the republic (the latest was established in the Kaisiadorys region three months ago). Unfortunately, we still do not have our own headquarters in Vilnius. It is interesting that we did not get it in the days of the Supreme Council

or in the days of the present Seimas. We are probably viewed as an "inconvenient" party and we might be the only party without our own headquarters.

Our four-member faction in the Seimas is part of the Tevynes Santara opposition bloc. I realize that the public is not completely aware of the distinctions between this bloc in parliament and the bloc outside parliament, and I want to stress that they are not the same. It is true that we are part of the bloc in the Seimas, but outside parliament we are an independent political force, and we make joint decisions only after negotiations and consultations. We are categorically in favor of this kind of association on the local level. There are consultations on the regional level—conferences of not only the Tevynes Santara bloc, but also of the liberals, the social democrats, and other parties and movements. They get together for "roundtable" discussions and define existing problems and possible solutions and then pursue a common policy, without drawing any distinctions between "big" and "small" political groups. This is how things are done in Kaunas, Klaipeda, and Alitus. In fact, it would be simpler to list the locations where this kind of unification does not take place. In Vilnius and on the republic level, on the other hand, meetings of party leaders are sporadic gatherings for the discussion of specific issues (despite repeated attempts to organize the other form of association). I feel that this kind of unification is essential, and not just during election campaigns.

We have already held four congresses. We usually hold them without any "pageantry." They are simply working meetings. We are pleased that the predictions of our first congresses were accurate—i.e., we are pleased that our party has a quality that might be described as "political insight." The third congress was held during the campaign to approve the party ticket of Seimas candidates. We registered for the campaign as a separate political party, but then we agreed on a common ticket with the Christian Democratic Party and the Union of Political Prisoners and Exiles. During our preparations for the elections we realized that our campaign platforms were intersupplementary and that they coincided in many respects. After the elections, however, three separate factions were established in the Seimas, because we believe that each party should work according to the guidelines chosen prior to the campaign. In spite of the similarity of our views, I think it is much more convenient to work in this way, and the results are more concrete. I do not believe that the present quandary over the reregistration of factions is a problem for the Seimas. After all, it is each party's own choice to have or not have a parliamentary faction.

What is our party's view of our state's domestic and foreign policy? As far as domestic policy is concerned, I have to say that there is too much window dressing. Whenever we discuss the struggle against crime, for instance, no one seems to remember that we drafted the proposals on anonymous reports to the procuracy and the courts long ago. Furthermore, I can remember exactly who interfered with their passage back in the time of the Supreme Council. After the present Seimas was elected and the new minister was appointed, it was absolutely ludicrous that he began by proposing exactly the same things he had been resisting for such a long time. There are many other examples of this. As soon as we pointed out the need for better weapons for our police, there were immediate objections. Furthermore, the fight against crime, which is being discussed now by E. Bickauskas, should have started long ago, as we proposed so many times. Then there is the crucial matter of amendments to our Constitution, which has aroused so much debate recently. We feel that if we want to change something in the Constitution, we should take a look at all of the proposals, choose two or three of the most viable ones, and then discuss those. Now a whole group of amendments has accumulated in the Seimas, and it is obvious that no changes can be made in the Constitution under these conditions. After all, if we change too many articles, we will be impugning a constitution adopted by referendum. I feel that this would be wrong. It would be better to change nothing at this time and wait until specific changes are clearly required. This is the reason for the existence of a constitution and for the complex amendment procedure—so that no one will "play games" with it.

Moving on to foreign policy, I would like to say something about the recent meeting of the leaders of nine different parties with the president of the republic. I have to say that he agreed with the need for dialogue with the political parties, and he also agreed that our meetings should not be held just to deal with specific issues. This was gratifying, especially when we immediately agreed on the date of our next conference. This meeting was held to discuss foreign policy—more specifically, the question of our country's membership in NATO. I feel that our wish to join this bloc must be expressed right now, before the meeting of the heads of state and government of the NATO countries in January 1994, when the future of the organization will be discussed. After all, if we do not express this wish now, we will remain in the group of countries that are still mulling over this decision and we could lose at least half a year. The exact time of our membership, the procedure for joining, and the status to which we can aspire are different matters. There was some difference of opinion in these areas, but we expect stronger agreement at future meetings.

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